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This thesis examines the origins, implementation and motives of the ethnic Chinese expulsion 
campaign that took place in Vietnam between early 1978 and mid-1979 and the broader post-
Vietnam War political and societal developments starting from 1975 that were connected to the 
ethnic Chinese expulsions in Southern Vietnam. The main purpose of this historical study is to 
provide a clear account of how the expulsion campaign came to be commenced in southern parts 
of Vietnam, how it was implemented and to examine the politics and reasons that were behind 
it.  
 
The role of the Vietnamese government in the ethnic Chinese exodus/expulsions and in the 
emergence of the larger Vietnamese boat people crisis of 1978 and 1979 has been debated since 
the events took place, but few historical studies have re-examined this topic since more sources 
have become available. The main conclusion that this thesis presents on this subject is that the 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and Public Security Bureau officials and southern party 
cadres operating under their directives used covert voluntary departure program as means to 
expel ethnic Chinese from Southern Vietnam between late July – early August of 1978 and July 
1979. This program was officially only open to the ethnic Chinese and in order to leave the 
refugees had to pay a sizable “exit tax” to the government and a fee to the organizers who were 
supplying the boat and other means for the departure. I argue that behind this voluntary 
departure program and these expulsion policies were politics and distinct policies that aimed to 
facilitate these boat departures of the ethnic Chinese minority members that were perceived to 
be a possible fifth column in the Vietnamese society. Furthermore, I posit that in addition to the 
political motives, in the southern parts of the SRV there was a clear economic motive driving 
the expansion of the departure program that resulted from both Vietnamese governments’ and 
Vietnamese authorities’ desire to extort wealth from the ethnic Chinese individuals. This 
economic incentive according to many signs also affected how many departures were ultimately 
organized.  
 
Through a historical social scientific approach to the subject, this thesis explores how these paid 
ethnic Chinese boat refugee departures in Southern Vietnam were part of the larger the 
expulsion campaign in the country and argues that we should ultimately understand these 
departures through their wider societal and political context.  
 
Keywords: Vietnamese refugees, Vietnam, Vietnamese history, Boat people, Communist Party 
of Vietnam (CPV), Expulsions, Ethnic Chinese, Hoa, Forced Migration, Exit, Sino-Vietnamese 
relations, Refugee trafficking  
 
Note on the term used to describe Vietnam:  
In this study the term “Southern Vietnam” is used to describe the area that is the focus of the examination 
of this study. This term refers to the same areas which were under the rule of Republic of Vietnam, under 
the 17th parallel. Traditionally Vietnam has been divided geographically into three distinct parts, the 
northern region known as Tonkin (Bắc Bộ in Vietnamese) that contains roughly the delta of Red River and 
the mountainous areas to the west and north of it, the central region of Annam (Trung Bộ), which contains 
the long thin stretch of coast and mountains of the Annamitic Cordillera and the central highlands of 
Vietnam in the southern parts. The last area to which Vietnam is traditionally divided to is Cochinchina 
(Nam Bộ), which contains the fertile areas of Mekong Delta and the coastal areas to the west. The area 
referred to this study as Southern Vietnam contains sections of Annam and Cochinchina that were part of 
the territory of former Republic of Vietnam.  
I have chosen to use the term “Southern Vietnam” in this study, as this study discusses the events which 
took place in the areas of former of Republic of Vietnam, that underwent significant changes in the post-
war period. This area was still its own specific cultural and administrative region after the war with distinct 
political, demographic, and cultural differences to the former areas of Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 
Furthermore, some other terms such as “South Vietnam” would carry the resemblance towards the term 
used to describe the former Republic of Vietnam, that was also called South Vietnam.  
 
Naming of ethnic Chinese and non-English names and terms: 
This study discusses the treatment and expulsions of people of Chinese descent in Vietnam. In research 
literature, many terms, such as “overseas Chinese”, “Chinese”, “Vietnamese-Chinese”, “Hoa-people” and 
“ethnic Chinese” have been used to denote these people. In this study I primarily use the term “ethnic 
Chinese” to discuss these individuals and communities, as it refers to the ethnic origins of this group of 
people, rather than for example their citizenship (which has been historically debated).  
When discussing Vietnamese persons, the Vietnamese convention of family name preceding given names 
and last syllable of their given name being used to refer to them thereafter is followed. When possible, 
Vietnamese names are written in their Vietnamese forms to be more specific about who is discussed in the 
chapter. The names of Vietnamese cities are however written in their English forms. Vietnamese and 
Chinese terms used in this study are translated, with Chinese hànzì or Vietnamese quốc ngữ form of the 
word and the applicable translation visible.   
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 5 
1.1 A brief introduction to the sources ............................................................................................... 9 
1.2 Research questions and the thesis structure ............................................................................... 11 
2. Literary review and key-concepts ............................................................. 11 
2.1 Literary review on the existing literature relating to the ethnic Chinese expulsion campaign .. 11 
2.2 Essential concepts of this study.................................................................................................. 17 
2.2.1 Agency and action ................................................................................................................... 17 
2.2.2 What is considered as an expulsion? ....................................................................................... 20 
2.2.3 The terminology surrounding different types of expulsions ................................................... 22 
2.3 The politics of expulsions – instrumental and exceptional actions ............................................ 24 
2.3.1 Becoming expellable – agency and decision-making in expulsions ....................................... 28 
3. Historical social sciences approach to historical research ........................ 32 
3.1 Historical interpretation as a basis of historical research ........................................................... 33 
3.2 The scientific validity of historical knowledge .......................................................................... 35 
3.3 Sources ....................................................................................................................................... 38 
4. The origins of the expulsions campaign ...................................................... 46 
4.1 History of the ethnic Chinese communities in Southern Vietnam (111 BCE – 1954) ............... 46 
4.1.1 The origins of the ethnic Chinese question and issues in Southern Vietnam .......................... 50 
4.1.2 The communists, the nationalists, and the push towards assimilation (1954 – 1975)............. 53 
4.2 The restructuring of the Southern Vietnamese society after the war (1975) .............................. 57 
4.2.1 The immediate effects for the ethnic Chinese communities in Southern Vietnam (1975 – 1976)
 .......................................................................................................................................................... 61 
4.3 The rifts in the Sino-Vietnamese alliance and the ethnic Chinese (1975 – 1977) ..................... 65 
4.4 The people caught between the rhetoric and actions (1977 – 1978) .......................................... 69 
5.Vietnam’s expulsion campaign 1978 – 1979 ................................................ 74 
5.1 The first steps of the ethnic Chinese expulsion campaign in Southern and Northern Vietnam . 75 
5.1.1 The decision to expel the ethnic Chinese from Vietnam and the expulsions in Northern Vietnam
 .......................................................................................................................................................... 80 
5.2 The program for the Vietnamese of Chinese Descent to go abroad officially in Southern Vietnam
 .......................................................................................................................................................... 87 
5.2.1 The corrupt practices that were enabled by the program ........................................................ 94 
5.3 The different phases of the expulsion program in Southern Vietnam ........................................ 98 
6. Conclusions .................................................................................................. 107 
6.1 Evaluating the impacts of the expulsion policies in Southern Vietnam ................................... 107 
6.2 Voluntary departures, expulsions, or profitable extortion? ...................................................... 115 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On 6th of June 1979 a telegram from Hong Kong Government office reached the desk of newly 
elected British prime minister Margaret Thatcher.1 Written and underlined on the right-hand 
corner of the document were the words: “Prime Minister – An appalling assessment” and on the 
inside was a detailed description of information received from the interrogation of recent refugee 
arrivals from Vietnam. What the document disclosed was an overview of a system of official 
extortion conducted with secrecy by the Vietnamese government officials. It was targeted towards 
the ethnic Chinese Vietnamese looking to leave the country. How the system worked was that the 
ethnic Chinese in Vietnam had to pay the officials a large sum in gold for an organized departure 
out of the country by boat. According to the document, the Vietnamese government was now de 
facto involved in the business of exporting refugees and all the reports suggested that they were 
profiting from it handsomely.  
The information which Margaret Thatcher received was related to the developments of an 
expulsion campaign, that had started in early 1978 in Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). In 
March 1978, the Vietnamese Politburo decreed that due to the worsening relations with China, 
the ethnic Chinese minority were a possible fifth column in the Vietnamese society and for this 
reason they had to be removed from Vietnam. The Ministry of Interior, that was in charge of the 
public security apparatus in Vietnam, issued an order of allowing the ethnic Chinese to leave, but 
at the same time systematic harassment and persecution was also applied to make them leave.2 
Between April and July of 1978, before the closing of land border between China and Vietnam, 
over 160 000 ethnic Chinese from northern parts of Vietnam crossed the border to go to China.3  
After the first phase of expulsions in the North, the expulsion campaign continued in Southern 
Vietnam with a program which allowed the ethnic Chinese to pay to leave by boat to nearby 
countries. This program was commenced sometime around late July – August of 1978 and the 
shipping of refugees continued, with only one notable break in between, until July 1979, when 
the expulsion campaign was discontinued due to massive pushback from the international 
                                                 
1 U.K Prime Minister’s Office, PREM Series 19/129, telegram from Hong Kong to the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, Jun. 6th, 1979, p. 85-87. 
2 U.S Department of State, “Vietnam’s refugee Machine”, CIA-RDP80T00942A001200070001-3, Jun. 26th, 1979, 
p. 1. 
3 Amer (2013), p. 10.  
community.4  The primary focus of this study is on this second phase of expulsions, which took 
place primarily in the southern parts of Vietnam.  
The main argument that this study presents is that the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV, Đảng 
Cộng sản Việt Nam) and Public Security Bureau (PSB, Công an) officials and southern party 
cadres operating under their directives used covert voluntary departure program as means to expel 
ethnic Chinese from Southern Vietnam between late July – early August of 1978 and July 1979. 
This program was officially only open to the ethnic Chinese and in order to leave the refugees had 
to pay a sizable “exit tax” to the government and a fee to the organizers who were supplying the 
boat and other means for the departure. The registrations to leave were voluntary, but in actuality 
the whole program was part of a larger expulsion campaign initiated by the CPV in Northern 
Vietnam early 1978. I argue that behind this voluntary departure program and these expulsion 
policies were politics and distinct policies that aimed to facilitate these boat departures of the 
ethnic Chinese minority members that were perceived to be a possible fifth column in the 
Vietnamese society.  
This study is in large part a study of the Vietnamese ethnic Chinese expulsion campaign itself: an 
examination of its implementation and the motives behind it and an analysis of the historical 
context and events that led to it.  In relation to the expulsion campaign, this study argues that the 
departure program was meant to achieve a number off intended goals: 1) To drive away a section 
of population, that was deemed politically problematic in the light of the Sino-Vietnamese 
relations crisis, 2) to confiscate the wealth of the ethnic Chinese and to break the economic hold 
they had in the southern parts of Vietnam and 3) to alleviate internal pressure and opposition to 
the reforms taken to socialize in the economy in the South. All of these distinct goals acted also 
as motives to expel the ethnic Chinese from Southern Vietnam starting in 1978. Furthermore, I 
posit that while the expulsion campaign in Southern Vietnam was inherently connected to the 
Sino-Vietnamese relations and to the events in Northern Vietnam, there were differences in the 
way the expulsion campaign was implemented between these two areas that resulted from 
differences in the ethnic Chinese communities in these two areas, such as from their geographical 
and political closeness to China and their respective economic situation and social class among 
other factors.5 Lastly, I posit that in addition to the political motives, in the southern parts of the 
SRV there was a clear economic motive driving the expansion of the departure program that 
resulted from both Vietnamese governments’ and Vietnamese authorities’ desire to extort wealth 
                                                 
4 Amer (2013), p. 12 – 13. 
5 Han (2009), p. 2 – 3. 
from the ethnic Chinese individuals. This economic incentive according to many signs also 
affected how many departures were ultimately organized. 
This study argues that the expulsions in southern parts of the SRV were profitable to the SRV 
government for two distinct reasons. Firstly, each ethnic Chinese adult leaving through the 
government run program had to pay between 8 – 12 taels6 of gold in order to depart, with around 
5 taels paid to the PSB officials as the cut of the government. Secondly, with the operation came 
a notable increase in remittances from the ethnic Chinese living abroad which provided valuable 
foreign exchange, of which Vietnam’s economy had had shortage of since 1975. 7  Yet, the 
government was not the only one benefitting. While the expulsion campaign itself was party state 
sanctioned, the actual day-to-day organization rested on the shoulders of the southern party and 
government cadres and PSB officials. This resulted in large degree of local autonomy in the 
implementation and enabled systemic corruption to flourish. Corruption was widespread as the 
officials engaged in many illegal acts with the intention of making some extra money - such as 
selling departures to non-ethnic Chinese people for a premium, demanding extra bribes, fleecing 
departing refugees and forging documents.8 The argument this study presents in relation to these 
corruptive practices is that not all of the gold confiscated from the refugees ended up in the hands 
of the government, but based on several independent sources and accounts, there was a portion of 
the money paid for the departures which was the official government fee for the departure in 
Southern Vietnam.  
A large focus of this study is on examining this expulsion campaign and especially expulsions, 
which are understood to be exercises of state power, in which political actors, such as governments 
secure the removal of certain individuals or segments of population from the territorial space of 
the state, either “voluntarily” (with threats but no forcible relocation) or forcibly.9 They are 
political acts which are carried out with certain purposes and intentions in mind, and to which we 
can find motives and explanations which rationalize these actions. For example, concerning this 
particular case, it has been argued in previous research that the primary motives for the actions 
                                                 
6 Tael is a Chinese unit of weight (1 tael = 1,21 ounces or 37,79 grams) often used in Vietnam to measure gold. 
Traditionally taels of gold have been used for large business transactions in Vietnam. Before 1975, Saigon was a 
regional center for gold trade and even after the reunification, gold was used to buy items at the black market and 
later to buy a departure out of Vietnam, Truitt (2013), p. 7, 17 and 69. According to Wain (1981), p. 86, one tael 
was around $220 on the world market at mid-1978 and then rose to $250 in the second half of the year and finally 
reached over $600 during 1979. Prices presented here are not inflation adjusted. 
7 See PREM Series 19/129 p. 85-87, telegram from the Hong Kong Government office to London, Jun. 6th, 1979 
and Sinclair, Kevin, “Date set for new Vietnam exodus”, SCMP, Dec. 30th, 1979. The notable increase in 
remittance is confirmed in many seemingly independent sources.  
8 See for example AP, “How Hanoi officials bleed the refugees”, SCMP, Mar. 24th, 1979 and Wain (1981), p. 87. 
9 Bloch and Schuster (2005), p. 493, Goodwin-Gill (1978), p. 201 and Walters (2002), p. 268. This definition 
follows to a large degree the Goodwin-Gill’s definition of expulsion in international law setting.  
taken towards the ethnic Chinese were related to who the expelled were and to the military and 
political conflict which developed between China and Vietnam. 10  Number of other reasons, 
ranging from the ethnic Chinese having unclear political loyalties to them not assimilating 
properly to the Vietnamese society have also been cited as secondary motives. 11  These 
explanations help to understand that there were certain political conflicts and historical 
contentions between the political actor wielding the power to expel (the party-state) and the 
expelled (the ethnic Chinese) in Vietnam. But they do not give an answer to these two questions: 
why expulsions? and what specific purpose did the expulsions serve? 
Arguably, expulsions have throughout history been selectively used with various intents to banish 
certain groups of people regarded to be harmful to the polity.12  William Walters observed in his 
article analyzing the historical practices of deportations, that by the end of the nineteenth century 
a change occurred in who were the targets of expulsions, as no longer were they mostly 
revolutionaries, aliens or religious minorities, but increasingly more individuals branded as 
“social enemies in the form of various categories of socially ´undesirable´ persons” and this 
meant that these “enemies” from the point of view of the state belonged more and more to the  
“various categories of persons who are deemed to pose a threat to its population, which is 
increasingly understood in racial and biopolitical terms, or to [to pose a threat to] its economy or 
system of welfare provision”.13 But to this list I would also add, that to some regimes, the expelled 
were also increasingly people which were seen as a threat to the effective governance and 
governability14 of the state. This point is illustrated by examining authoritarian socialist regimes, 
such as Soviet Union and German Democratic Republic (GDR) who used expulsions to expel 
political opposition and people deemed as reactionaries, that were due to their political identity 
seen to be problematic to regime stability.15   
The problems which the ethnic Chinese presented to the SRV regime were not, however, 
attributable to them simply being political opposition or even reactionaries. The political 
motivations for the expulsions and expelling the ethnic Chinese stemmed from complex set of 
factors which this study intends to examine: first by describing the history of the ethnic Chinese 
                                                 
10 Amer (2013), p. 18, Chang (1982), p. 229 and Godley (1980), p. 36. The topic of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam 
became a serious diplomatic issue between China and Vietnam in 1978 and 1979, Han (2009) p. 22, see note 148. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Zolberg (1983), p. 32, Hirschman (1970), p. 76 Hirschman (1993), p. 184 and Light (2012), p. 401. 
13 Walters (2002), p. 278. 
14 This concept has been defined by Mark Bevir as follows: “the quality of being governable, that [which] is 
capable of being controlled or managed.”, Bevir (2007), p. 363.  
15 See for example Bell-Fialkoff (1993), p. 115, Green and Weil (2007), p. 2 and 8, Hasselberg (2016), p. 24, 
Hirschman (1993), p. 184 and Millers and Peter (2018), p. 7. 
communities in Southern Vietnam, their distinct cultural identity in Vietnam and outlining the 
historical, political and social reasons which made the ethnic Chinese problematic from the 
perspective of the communist authorities. This description is then followed by an investigation of 
the post-Vietnam War communist state-building and state-making process in the southern parts 
of Vietnam and a summary of the problems in the Sino-Vietnamese relations, which I argue 
together provided the justification for the CPV to take action towards the ethnic Chinese. The 
second part of this examination explores the implementation of the expulsion campaign itself and 
discusses the purposes that the expulsions served in the approach that the CPV took towards the 
ethnic Chinese in southern parts of Vietnam.  
The main purpose of this historical study is to provide a clear historical account of how the 
expulsion campaign came to be commenced in southern parts of Vietnam and how it was 
implemented, as well as to present the politics and processes that were behind it. The topic has 
historical significance, as according to one estimation 246 108 refugees arrived by boat to the 
nearby Southeast Asian countries and Hong Kong between July-August 1978 and August 1979 
when the expulsion campaign was operational.16 While the numbers on how many had to pay their 
way out are impossible to estimate accurately, the ethnic Chinese were a majority among these 
boat refugees and for this reason having a more detailed account of what the expulsions campaign 
was and when it took place is an important chapter in the stories many of the Vietnamese 
refugees.17 
The second purpose of this study is to provide an explanation why the ethnic Chinese were 
expelled. In this, expanding on topics such as who the ethnic Chinese were, what had been their 
historical significance and position in the Vietnamese society and on what foundation was the 
relationship between the communist policy makers and ethnic Chinese built upon, is important.  
 
1.1 A brief introduction to the sources 
 
A lot more remains to be said on this topic through examining it through new historical sources, 
ranging from what was the definitive role of the SRV government in the refugee crisis to 
discussing the developments which led to the expulsions in the southern parts of the SRV. The 
sources used in this study describe the political and economic developments in the Southern 
                                                 
16 Amer (2011), p. 36 – 37. 
17 CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Indochinese Refugees: The Continuing Exodus”, CIA-
RDP84S00558R000400020002-7, Apr. 1st, 1983, p. 27. 
Vietnamese society starting from the post-Vietnam War period in 1975 to 1979. The period after 
the Vietnam War, starting from 1975 was in Southern Vietnam a departure from the old in several 
ways, with the most drastic political change being the one in the political leadership and political 
system, which reshaped the society in a fundamental manner. 18  This study examines the 
expulsions as being linked to the political and societal developments in Vietnam, as well as to the 
political regime of the SRV, and takes on the view that expulsions are the results of longer societal 
and political processes. Therefore, starting the analysis from 1975, the period of drastic societal 
changes after the Vietnam War, serves as a good starting point for this historical study of 
expulsions.19 
The main body of the sources in this study consists of the South China Morning Post and Far 
Eastern Economic Review newspapers for this specified period. These are augmented by two 
books that are eye-witness accounts and investigations of the expulsion campaign in Southern 
Vietnam. The first one is by Barry Wain, a former Asian Wall Street Journal investigative 
journalist, who wrote the book The refused: The agony of the Indochina refugees in 1981 which 
provided the first accounts of the official government involvement in the Vietnamese refugee 
crisis. The second one is After Saigon Fell - Daily Life Under the Vietnamese Communists by 
Nguyen Long and Harry H. Kendall written also in 1981. It focuses on describing the life under 
communist rule and accounts the story of the how one of the authors, Nguyễn Long, left from 
Vietnam. He was an ethnic Vietnamese, who was able through false identification papers and 
connections to secure his departure from Vietnam through these official channels, that were 
created to expel the ethnic Chinese. The last type of sources are the confidential cabinet papers of 
first Thatcher administration and intelligence assessments from the CIA and the National Foreign 
Assessment Center (NFAC). These documents are mostly from 1979 and contain valuable 
intelligence assessments of the refugee situation in Hong Kong and about the Vietnamese official 
involvement in the exodus.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Goscha (2016), p. 377 – 379.  
19 Hasselberg (2016), p. 29.  
1.2 Research questions and the thesis structure 
 
 
1. Which factors and circumstances motivated the CPV to begin expelling ethnic Chinese in 
Southern Vietnam? 
2. In what way was the ethnic Chinese expulsion campaign carried out in the Southern parts 
of the SRV? 
3. What factors, motives and circumstances ultimately affected the implementation of the 
ethnic Chinese expulsion campaign in the Southern Vietnam? 
 
This research is structured as follows: chapter two discusses the gaps left by the previous research 
through literary review, as well as examines the research on expulsions in general and provides 
definition to the key-concepts used in the study. Chapter three outlines the sources used in the 
research and discusses their validity in relation to this topic and explains the basis of historical 
interpretation. The fourth chapter (research question 1) examines the origins of the expulsion 
campaign. After the fourth chapter giving the background to the expulsions, the fifth chapter 
(research question 2) will focus on the expulsions themselves and discuss the implementation of 
the expulsion campaign in southern parts of Vietnam. The six and last chapter (research question 
3) focuses on the evaluation the expulsion campaign and explaining purposes of the expulsions 
and aims to explain expulsions as purposeful political acts in the context of the ethnic Chinese 
expulsions in SRV.  
 
2. Literary review and key-concepts  
 
Although Vietnam’s ethnic Chinese expulsions have been studied in previous research literature 
since the events took place, the role of the Vietnamese government has often been side-lined in 
the academic studies and papers discussing the boat people departures and the ethnic Chinese 
exodus from Vietnam. This literary review section of the thesis introduces the major studies 
related to the topic of the ethnic Chinese expulsions and discusses why the exodus is in today’s 
research often presented in multitude of different ways.  
 
2.1 Literary review on the existing literature relating to the ethnic 
Chinese expulsion campaign  
 
This sub-chapter focuses on reviewing the existing literature and gaps in the literature concerning 
what this study calls as the ethnic Chinese expulsion campaign. The literature on the topic can be 
separated into three broad categories: firstly, to the contemporary research published shortly after 
the events took place and secondly, to the research which was published 5 or more years after the 
events. The third and last category can be regarded to be the new historical research on Sino-
Vietnamese relations, Vietnamese history and on the Vietnamese refugee crisis which has started 
to appear within the last 10 to 15 years.  
The first wave of research, that was published shortly after the events took place, was inspired by 
the drastic turns in the Sino-Vietnamese relations in the late 1970s. The ethnic Chinese issue in 
the SRV was painted as a dispute involving both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the ethnic Chinese were the people caught between the rhetoric 
in the dispute.20 Two representative examples of this wave are the Michael Godley’s article (1980) 
A Summer Cruise to Nowhere and the Vietnamese Chinese in perspective and the Pao-Ming 
Chang’s article (1982) The Sino-Vietnamese Dispute over the Ethnic Chinese. Godley’s article 
focused on analyzing a relatively small side affair in the diplomatic tug-of-war between the PRC 
and the SRV in 1978, as the focal point of the article was on analyzing the language and actions 
in the diplomatic dispute of whether the PRC can send ships to repatriate the ethnic Chinese from 
Vietnam.21 Examining the arguments and actions of both factions, Godley saw that the PRC’s 
fierce defense of the overseas Chinese community contributed to the ethnic Chinese Vietnamese 
position becoming problematic in the SRV.22  In a similar manner to Godley, Chang also saw the 
dispute between the PRC and the SRV as being conducive factor in the expulsions.23 Although 
Vietnamese actions towards the ethnic Chinese are in some small form analyzed in both of these 
articles, the main focus in both is on the diplomatic dispute over the ethnic Chinese communities. 
This is understandable, as the available sources consisted mostly of official Vietnamese and 
Chinese statements and propagandistic media articles on the issue, which were created to 
propagate the official viewpoints of the SRV and the PRC. The lack of available sources 
constricted the possibilities of conducting larger studies on the topic.  
The second body of literature which were written during the first wave were the investigations on 
the causes and events behind the Vietnamese refugee crisis. Barry Wain is an example of an 
important contributor to this discussion. His article titled The Indochina Refugee Crisis published 
in 1979 in Foreign Affairs and his book on the topic, that was released few years after the article, 
titled The refused: The agony of the Indochina refugees (1981) contained important insights into 
                                                 
20 Godley (1980), p. 55 – 56.  
21 Godley (1980), 39. The discussion on whether China can send ships to repatriate ethnic Chinese from Vietnam 
was a relatively small and short lived as a discussion, but it was one of the discussions that paved the way for the 
Sino-Vietnamese relations breakdown in 1978.  
22 Godley (1980), p. 56.  
23 Chang (1982), p. 229 – 230.  
what led to the expulsions in the SRV. Wain’s journalist investigation into the issue represents 
one of the earliest attempts to build a cohesive narrative of the events of the Indochina refugee 
crisis. It also provides one of the most damning account of the SRV government involvement in 
the ethnic Chinese exodus and argues that the SRV authorities authorized the departures of some 
of the boat people, charged them exit fees and effectively expelled them for profit.24  While 
Wain’s narrative on the events and description of the SRV government involvement in the 
expulsions is one of the most influential ones, further historical studies on the matter, such as this 
study, are still needed to collaborate it. 
Following this first wave came the first, more comprehensive retrospective accounts of what 
happened to the ethnic Chinese and what took place after the expulsions in the SRV. One of the 
earlier accounts was Lewis M. Stern’s article on The Overseas Chinese in the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam, 1979 – 82 published in 1985, which focused on the effect that the Vietnamese 
economic policies had had on the ethnic Chinese communities in the South and on the regime’s 
attitude toward the ethnic Chinese after the expulsions. These studies in general also established 
that a sizable ethnic Chinese community survived in Southern Vietnam even after the expulsion 
campaign in 1979, albeit these communities had been significantly impacted.25 A second, more 
comprehensive study, called The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Sino-Vietnamese Relations was 
completed in 1991 by Ramses Amer. The purpose of this study was to analyze the fate of the 
ethnic Chinese community in Vietnam and to examine what kind of effects the ethnic Chinese 
dispute as a political issue had on the bilateral relations between the PRC and the SRV.26 At the 
same time there was an emphasis on examining the domestic policies within Vietnam which 
affected Sino-Vietnamese relations. 27  Amer contributed significantly to the discussion of 
Vietnamese government official involvement in the exodus through analysis of the past available 
secondary sources. He concluded that in Southern Vietnam, there was a system of “semi-legal 
departure”28, that was administered by the PSB but which in practice worked often through ethnic 
Chinese intermediaries.29 He saw the role of the Vietnamese PSB as being one of administrator 
and also argued that in light of the actions towards the ethnic Chinese in the North, that were 
“tantamount to expulsions”, the SRV leadership could not have been unaware of what was going 
                                                 
24 Wain (1981), p. 12.  
25 Ungar (1987), p. 613 – 614 and Stern (1985), p. 527 and 536.  
26 Amer (1991), p. 1.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Amer described the system as follows: “a system of semi-legal departure that was open only to the Chinese and 
administered by the Public Security Bureau (PSB). In essence, Chinese who wanted to leave had to pay, through 
Chinese organizers, a fixed fee that was handed over to a PSB official. Furthermore, they had to pay for boat, fuel, 
and other necessities like anyone else who attempted to leave", Amer (2013), p. 12. 
29 Amer (1991), p. 85 – 87. 
in Southern Vietnam.30 But according to him, it was also quite possible that only those in charge 
of the internal security apparatuses were in the know of the situation.31 Amer’s arguments provide 
a solid foundation for this study also to further examine these claims.  
While the first retrospective examinations of the topic furthered our understanding of the topic 
significantly, they were still largely based on secondary sources and on previous research articles. 
In the last 10 to 15 years, recent historical interpretation based on new sources have started to 
appear. With the limited opening of the Vietnamese archives, continuation studies such as 
Examining the Demographic Developments Relating to the Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam Since 1954 
in 2013 by Ramses Amer and China's Economic Sanctions against Vietnam, 1975–1978 by Kosal 
Path have been made possible. Discoveries such as linking the developments in the semi-legal 
departure system to the number of refugees leaving the SRV have made it possible to state that 
the expulsion campaign had a definitive impact on the ethnic Chinese communities and have 
pointed to the conclusion that this expulsion campaign was more significant factor in the refugee 
outflows than previously thought.32 Findings like these reinforce the need to re-examine the terms 
on which we analyze the Vietnamese refugee crisis and this period in Vietnamese history.  
Historical monographs have also made their appearance and through them the topic has been in 
some sense re-examined. The most prominent work on the Vietnamese refugee crisis and the boat 
people has been Vo M. Nghia’s The Vietnamese boat people, 1954 and 1975–1992 in 2005, which 
concluded, in alignment to Amer’s findings, that the SRV government was involved in the 
exporting of the ethnic Chinese. However, rather than arguing that the expulsions were solely the 
result of the SRV authorities’ actions, Vo placed more emphasis on the fact that ethnic Chinese 
within and outside Vietnam were also heavily involved in the matter and worked in syndicates 
which engaged in human trafficking. 33  Another development which has resulted from the 
movement towards more cohesive narratives in Vietnamese history has been that the ethnic 
Chinese expulsion incident has become in a sense an unclear footnote in the writings focusing on 
Vietnam’s history. This was demonstrated in Christopher Goscha’s 2016 historical monography 
Vietnam: A new history where the affair of ethnic Chinese expulsions in the South and escapes 
from Vietnam were presented as a case of “internal hemorrhaging”, made possible by smuggling 
syndicates and bribes and only half a page was devoted to these events.34 Similarly in a long 
research essay published by Thomas Engelbert (2008) titled Vietnamese-Chinese Relations in 
                                                 
30 Amer (1991), p. 104.  
31 Amer (1991), p. 103.  
32 Amer (2013), p. 13 – 14.  
33 Vo (2005), p. 92.  
34 Goscha (2016), p. 386.  
Southern Vietnam during the First Indochina Conflict, the exodus of the ethnic Chinese becomes 
a part of the long-term developments of Vietnamese political history and in itself plays only a 
minor role in the modern history of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam.35 The events are addressed as  
“mass flights” stemming ultimately from expropriation, collectivization, and nationalization in 
Vietnam and from the Sino-Vietnamese crisis.36 
in Vietnamese and Chinese language research literature the origins of the Vietnamese boat people 
crisis and the events in Vietnam surrounding the ethnic Chinese expulsions have been discussed 
relatively little or even ignored. However, some studies and books have been written about the 
Vietnamese refugees who came to Hong Kong, both in English and Chinese. These studies have 
focused mostly on the challenges that the city faced as a result of the large influx of refugees and 
on the experiences of the refugees in Hong Kong, but have also limitedly discussed the reasons 
why these refugees came to Hong Kong.37 In general, the more in depth examinations done on the 
topic by Hong Kong scholars have been written in English, such as The Chinese/ Vietnamese 
Diaspora by Yuk Wah Chan (Ed.), which is a collection of English language articles by different 
authors on the Vietnamese refugee diaspora in Hong Kong and abroad.38 Yet, some Chinese 
language social sciences and history articles about the Vietnamese boat refugee situation in Hong 
Kong have been published also by researchers from mainland China. Two of these articles, one 
written by Li and Chen (2003) titled 香港的越南难民和船民问题 (Xiānggǎng de yuènán nànmín 
hé chuánmín wèntí, “Vietnamese Refugees and Boat People in Hong Kong) and other by Chen 
(2006) 论香港越南难民和船民问题的缘起 (Lùn xiānggǎng yuènán nànmín hé chuánmín wèntí de 
yuánqǐ, “On the Origin of Vietnamese Refugees and Boat People in Hong Kong”), even 
mentioned Vietnamese government engaging in what the authors described as “refugee trade” (难
民贸易, nànmín màoyì).39  According to them, the Vietnamese government, driven by economic 
incentive, were selling departures to the refugees and this was one of the factors that allowed 
many refugees to ultimately to come to Hong Kong during 1978 and 1979.40 In this manner, the 
topic of Vietnamese government involvement in the boat people departures has been limitedly 
been discussed in Chinese language literature.41 Based on the author’s own research into the topic, 
                                                 
35 Engelbert (2008), p. 222. 
36 Ibid.  
37 See for example articles by Suk Mun (2011) and Li and Chen (2003).  
38 See Chan, Y. W (Ed.) (2012).  
39 Chen (2006), p. 56 and Li and Chen (2003), p. 45.  
40 Chen (2006), p. 55 – 56 and Li and Chen (2003), p. 45.  
41 During the events, the actions of Vietnamese government authorities were also criticized in the official 
newspaper of the Central Committee of the CCP, Rénmín rìbào (人民日报, “People’s Daily”) on several occasion. 
The newspaper articles often used the term “越南输出难民” (Yuènán shūchū nànmín, “Vietnam(‘s) refugee 
exporting”) to describe the actions of the Vietnamese government. Renmin Ribao published articles demanding 
the topic has not been discussed in Vietnamese language research. This most likely stems from 
the fact that debates around the boat people and the ethnic Chinese exodus are most likely regarded 
to be in some terms sensitive still in Vietnam and closer examination of the events could present 
the actions of the Vietnamese government and the CPV in an unfavourable light. Patricia Pelley, 
a scholar of Vietnamese post-colonial historical writing, states on the topic of sensitive issues that 
since 1940s and 1950s, the CPV has functioned in a “powerful censoring way” and that while 
there are no formal guides on topics that should be avoided in historical writing, many 
conversations about difficult topics are still essentially forbidden in Vietnam.42 According to her, 
this has also caused many of the histories of ethnic minorities and non-normative groups to be 
minimally explored or even to be ignored in studies that have been written in Vietnamese 
language.43 
What a closer examination of the relevant literature reveals is that there has been a fundamental 
problem related to the characterization of the ethnic Chinese exodus. Do we discuss them as 
voluntary departures, ultimately being the result of push and pull factors which made the ethnic 
Chinese leave? Should we frame them as expulsions, even when there was this sort of voluntary 
business transaction involved in the exit? Or rather were they malicious acts perpetrated by the 
Vietnamese government to extort profit from human misery? So far, there has been several studies 
done on the ethnic Chinese issue and on the boat people crisis, which have discussed these events 
and have presented their own interpretations of what happened and who was culpable.44 Yet, a 
form of unclearness has persisted in the different accounts describing what happened and forming 
a precise picture of what happened has been hard due this unclearness.  Partly this could be 
contributed to the fact that after the book published by Barry Wain in 1981, the expulsions in 
Southern Vietnam in 1978 and 1979 have received relatively little attention. But I would argue 
that the more prominent problem has been that due to the fact that historical contemporary sources 
have not been re-analyzed, the picture of the agency and actions behind these historical acts has 
also remained unclear and convoluted and as a result, the interpretations of these events have 
varied both in detail and description.  
                                                 
Vietnam to stop the exportation of refugees, Chinese spokesperson statements on the issue and even published few 
exposé articles detailing their version of the Vietnamese authorities’ actions, see for example Su Yuanchun, 
“Yuenan de guoying nanmin chukou ye [Vietnam’s state-run refugee export industry]”, Renmin Ribao, Jul. 4th, 
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42 Pelley (2011), p. 569.  
43 Pelley (2011), p. 568.  
44 See for example Amer (1991), p. 85 – 87 and 102 – 104, Chan (1982), p. 222 – 223,  Stein (1979), p. 719 – 721, 
Suk Mun (2011), p. 118 – 119, Tsamenyi (1983), p. 354 – 355,  Vo (2006), p. 89 – 90, Wain (1979), p. 165 and 
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2.2 Essential concepts of this study 
 
 
Why do governments expel non-citizens and even their own citizens? Who have historically been 
the targets of expulsions? This section of the thesis and its sub-chapter provide answers questions 
such as these by examining theoretical and conceptual literature on the topic of expulsions. It 
highlights how expulsions are purposeful actions that often have some form of instrumental 
rationality behind them. In addition to examining expulsions as actions from theoretical 
perspective, this section of the thesis also acquaints the reader with the concepts that are relevant 
for understanding this thesis.   
 
2.2.1 Agency and action 
 
What is agency? Put into simple terms agency is “the capacity, condition, or state of acting or of 
exerting power.”45 It is at the same time an operation and capability, but in philosophical and 
scientific discussion also a concept which tries to encapsulate how the human possibility of action 
comes to be. The concept of agency holds within itself the principal idea that individuals are able 
to in varying degrees and with varying constraints make (rational) choices and engage in actions 
which are not predetermined or preordained. 46  Beyond these kinds of formulations, the 
ontological nature and the structure of agency has been highly debated.47 The central debates 
around agency have revolved around questions such as voluntarism versus determinism in action, 
to which degree actions can be perceived to be intentional and rational and in which manner our 
sociopolitical and structural settings affect and dictate our actions.48 Principally, social sciences 
and history have focused on studying the human society and social relationships and events and 
phenomena which have been the result or have resulted from human actions.49 For this reason, 
agency has remained as a central concept in social sciences and history as it aims to explain the 
fundamental sources, limitations and origins of action and acting.50  
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46 Emirbayer and Mische (1998), p. 964. However, there has been debate on whether free agency is possible at all, 
see for example Emirbayer and Mische (1998), p. 964 – 966 for summary of the debate. See also Brown (2016), p. 
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47 Emirbayer and Mische (1998), p. 962 and 964 - 966. 
48 Archer (1996), p. xi and Mele (2003), p. 5.  
49 Although some theories, such as Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network-Theory contribute agency also to other entities 
or objects (beyond humans) which act and most importantly affect, see Latour (2005), p. 70 – 79. In this sense some 
theories have also tried to move past the perception of agency being possibility of and the study of human action. 
See also Brown (2016), p. 103 – 105 for more on this topic.  
50 Brown (2016), p. 60 – 63 and Emirbayer and Mische (1998), p. 962 – 963.  
Two central debates in agency are relevant for this study: firstly, to whom we can contribute 
agency and in which manner can this agency and action be conceptualized to exist in these agents? 
And secondly, to what extent does the actions of others and structural conditions place constraints 
on our capability to act as agents? Starting from the first question, it is relevant for this work as 
expulsions are often defined as being exercise of state power, which are carried out by the 
government institutions and organizations which are part of the state.51 Following this type of 
definition of expulsions, the principal actor in cases of expulsions is then the government or other 
institutions within the state implementing these actions. Yet, the limits of and nature of the agency 
of government and institutions has been debated.52 Principally these debates have discussed in 
which manner are states and other institutions, as structures, comprised of their individual parts – 
do we see government’ and institutions’ agency being comprised of decisions of only certain 
agents high in hierarchy or in other words of the leading figures or are government and institutions 
in a sense also “bloodless”, meaning that they are as actors something more than the mere 
instrument of the actors involved in their structures. 53  Furthermore, do individuals making 
decisions within government act only in accordance with their own political agendas or their 
party’s line or does some form of collective knowledge of what a particular government (or nation) 
should strive to do also exist and affect the actions of policymakers? These examples are of course 
simplifications of the debates surrounding the institution-agency debate, but these problems of 
describing and analyzing agency draw attention to the conundrum which Wendt (1999) 
excellently puts into words: “any designation of actors and structures … will affect the resulting 
story.”54 Meaning that as we explain actions and contribute agency in certain actions to agents 
such as states and institutions, we also end up also describing the phenomenon or event which is 
studied in particular way, that is related to these contributions of agency and action. As was 
demonstrated in the literary review, this has phenomenon which Wendt described has also been 
reflected in the previous descriptions of the expulsions in Southern Vietnam.  
The second question is directly related to the phenomenon of expulsions and expelling in several 
ways. Expulsions entail the removal of individuals or groups through direct (for example through 
physical transportation) or indirect measures (for example through coercion or discriminatory 
measures to push people to leave “voluntarily”).55 As expulsions are not often clear-cut cases 
which take away all agency from those being expelled and are often accompanied with variety 
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54 Wendt (1999), p. 193.  
55 Henckaerts (1995), p. 5.  
measures designed to enforce people to leave, the question of to what extent does complying 
become a requirement is of course extremely relevant for this study.56 This problem relates to the 
problem of explaining whether something can be regarded to be a voluntary or involuntary action. 
In forced migration research this problem is as old as the research itself, Hugo and Bun (1990) 
formulated the problem of describing agency in these cases very succinctly: “in the strictest sense 
migration can be consider to be involuntary only when a person is physically transported from a 
country and has no opportunity to escape from those transporting him.”57 In general, in expulsion 
research there has not been not a lot of focus on analyzing and explaining agency within expulsion 
campaigns, which has, I would argue also meant that expulsions have been explained in a way 
which presents a very straightforward and monolithic picture of the agency and action involved 
in expulsions.  
In this study, agency is conceptualized along the lines of Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) 
formulation as a “temporally embedded process of social engagement” where actions and agency 
are informed (among other things) by both the past and evaluated on the basis of the perceived 
present and future.58 This broad conceptualization allows to discuss how social actors are capable 
of critically evaluating and reconstructing the conditions for action in a temporal reality.59 Actions, 
such as expulsions, are not only then seen as “pursuit of preestablished ends, abstracted from 
concrete situations”, but rather as being developed within contexts that are ever changing and 
which are subject to constant re-evaluations.60  
As a last point to the topic of agency and action, it is pertinent to add, as this study discusses 
actions taken and policies implemented by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s regime, that the 
actor of regime is not understood in this study as a sentient monolith. Behind the deliberation of 
the regime are understood to be humans and individuals, which pursue the policies which lead to 
expulsions.61 These humans and individuals are referred to in this study with the broad term 
“authorities” or regime actors, or by other terms that refer to more specific actors. Related to this 
question of nature of state/regime as actor, this formulation by Bob Jessop (1990) is relevant for 
this study: “it is not the state which acts: it is always specific sets of politicians and state officials 
located in specific parts of the state system.”62  This kind of formulation does not however 
necessarily fully explain how action and deliberation happens within the structures of the state or 
                                                 
56 Henckaerts (1995), p. 108 – 109.  
57 Hugo and Bun (1990), p. 20 
58 Emirbayer and Mische (1998), p. 962.  
59 Emirbayer and Mische (1998), p. 963 – 964.  
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61 Wight (2004), p. 273.  
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regime. I would be inclined to agree with Wendt (1999), that some form of collective knowledge 
of what the regime and government is, what are its principles and what is in its national interests 
and foreign policies, exists and is reproduced continually and affect policy-making.63  
 
2.2.2 What is considered as an expulsion? 
 
In its most clear-cut form, expulsions are political acts undertaken by the government or political 
regimes to remove certain individuals or segments of population from the territorial space of the 
state.64 However, there exists several distinct terms which are used to describe different forms of 
expulsions, such as mass expulsions, ethnic expulsion, ethnic cleansing, religious expulsion, 
forced population transfers and deportation.65 Each of these terms denote phenomena, which are 
the result of varying and sometimes differing causes, but at the same time are characteristically 
similar in many ways. To give an example, ethnic expulsions and religious expulsions have 
historically been perpetrated on the basis that the targeted are characteristically ( in ethnicity, 
nationality, religion, culturally) different and distinct from the perpetrators.66 Yet, these actions 
as expulsions, regardless of what brand of expulsions they have been characterized as, have 
generally aimed at removing certain segments of population from the territory and polity of the 
state. The justifications and motivations have then tended to vary, but, expulsions have 
fundamentally been actions carried out with the intention of achieving this prescribed goal.  
Expulsions can be separated from other natural and human factors which lead to involuntary 
movement of people within and outside borders. Factors such as civil war, internal strife and 
ethnic tensions all can make people move involuntarily, but the principal difference between 
movement resulting from these factors and expulsion is related to the fact that in acts of expulsion, 
there is a governmental or regime actors orchestrating these movements.67  
Traditionally it has been seen that behind the expulsions is often an expulsion order or decree.68 
Most often the orders have been often carried out by the designed authorities or military, but the 
                                                 
63 Wendt (1999), p. 217. This kind of process of reproducing collective knowledge explains for example continuity 
between different governments. 
64 Bloch and Schuster (2005), p. 493, Goodwin-Gill (1978), p. 201 and Walters (2002), p. 268. Although this study 
discusses expulsions in the context of people being expelled from nation state, expulsions can in the widest sense 
refer to expelling of individuals from any organization, as was discussed in Hirschman (1970), p. 76. 
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methods taken to make people leave have tended to vary. Henckaerts (1995) for example 
highlights that indirect measures such as coercion and various political, economic, and social 
measures are also often used by government actors to make people to leave.69 Expulsions can then 
encompass variety of actions intended to make people leave.  For example, in Northern Vietnam, 
the contemporary sources point to there being harassment, rumour spreading and even coercion 
complementing the voluntary departure policies which allowed the ethnic Chinese to cross the 
border to the PRC.70 In Southern Vietnam the method of expelling ethnic Chinese was more subtle, 
it relied on ethnic Chinese registering to leave and paying to officials to organize departure, 
sometimes through intermediaries and other times directly.71 In these expulsions in the South, 
there was an aspect of voluntariness involved in the departures, that would disqualify these actions 
as being labelled as expulsions, if we were to understand expulsions strictly as acts only involving 
forceful means or forced relocation of population. 72  However, Goodwin-Gill’s definition of 
expulsions for example emphasizes that expulsions can secure the removal of an individual “either 
´voluntarily´, under threat of forcible removal, or forcibly”.73 Expulsions and indirect expulsions 
in the broadest sense refer to any measures taken by governments to force people to leave the 
country.74  
One argument this study presents is that the available evidence points to there being this kind of 
expulsion order behind these actions. By this fact alone, the characterization of these actions as 
expulsions is justifiable. But at the same time, it must be said that the expulsions especially in the 
Southern Vietnam, present a quite a unique case to examine in terms of expulsions. As will be 
discussed later in this study, variety of indirect methods and methods relying on voluntary actions, 
such as the departure program, were used to facilitate departures of ethnic Chinese from Southern 
Vietnam. Yet, not all measures which affected the position of the ethnic Chinese in Southern 
Vietnam were taken with the consideration that they would force the ethnic Chinese to leave.75 
Therefore, this study is also an exercise in interpretation in relation to these expulsions and as 
such tries to highlight the decisions and policies behind these actions throughout the study.  
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2.2.3 The terminology surrounding different types of expulsions 
 
In this subchapter, a short introduction will be given to the various forms of expulsions and 
conceptual distinctions related to expulsions which are relevant to this study. Starting from 
deportations, according to Henckaerts (1995), they are characteristically almost identical to 
expulsions.76 The difference between the terms expulsion and deportation is largely one related to 
the context their used in, as expulsions are most often used in the context of international law, 
while deportations are mostly used in municipal law.77  Furthermore, in terms of legality in 
international law, deportations have been seen as form of legitimate expulsion targeted towards 
aliens (non-citizens) and regarded as a sovereign rights of the state, whereas expulsions of masses 
or mass expulsions are prohibited by international human rights instruments.78 At the same time 
there are few semantical differences between the terms as for example deportations are mostly 
discussed in the context of them being “authorized removal of non-citizens from state territory” 
and involving the idea of returning these non-citizens to their purported country of origin.79 In 
contemporary deportation research, deportations are often differentiated from mass expulsions as 
phenomenon.80 
Mass expulsions refer to expulsion of a large group of people, whereas the expulsion of 
individuals are often referred to as being cases of forced political exile or deportations.81 Mass 
expulsions are generally instigated or organized with the intention of inducing a group of 
unwanted people to leave.82 And in contrast to deportations, the targets of these mass expulsions 
are not only aliens (non-citizens), as the targeted are often nationals and possess at least the 
nominal citizenship of the country.83 Mass expulsions can be categorized as being either internal 
or international mass expulsions, depending on whether the expelled relocate within the country 
or to outside it.84 Frequently expulsions are spoken in terms of them being expulsions of masses 
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and due to this the terms mass expulsion and expulsion are often used interchangeably. However, 
expulsion is more of a general term for acts involving the removal of certain groups or individuals 
from the territory of the state and refers not only to the acts themselves, but to the wider 
phenomenon of expelling also. For this reason, this study uses the term expulsion instead of mass 
expulsion.  
Population transfer has been another widely used term to indicate certain type of planned mass 
movements of people.85 This term has been used when discussing for instance the population 
exchange between Greece and Turkey and to other transfers of minorities between countries.86 
The planned mass movements related to population transfers have in different cases been either 
voluntary or forced.87 Sometimes the transfer of population has been confined to areas within the 
country, other times population exchanges have transferred people between two different 
countries and across national borders. This term is also relevant to this study, as in the SRV after 
the war a policy of population transfer from cities to rural development zones called New 
Economic Zones (NEZ) begun after the war in 1975. The relocations were in some cases voluntary 
and other cases coerced to these zones.88  
Ethnic expulsion is another type of mass expulsion which, as stated before, is perpetrated on the 
basis that the targeted are characteristically  (in this case in terms of ethnicity) different and 
distinct from the perpetrators.89  Ethnic expulsions have often been one measure used in ethnic 
conflicts between competing ethnic groups, especially if one group has had a more established 
and dominant position than the other in the state/society.90 Sometimes ethnic expulsions have 
been motivated by a desire to “cleanse” the area from certain ethnic groups and in this way “purify” 
the area by forcibly driving people away from the area.91 Other times these ethnic cleansings have 
resulted in a genocide.92 In terms of naming, calling the ethnic Chinese expulsions as ethnic 
expulsions is in many ways justifiable. However, in this study I have opted not to use this term 
due to perceiving that behind the expulsions were also wider political motives stemming from 
political ideology and from variety of political goals in addition to the ethnic motives.  
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2.3 The politics of expulsions – instrumental and exceptional 
actions 
 
Expulsions are, above all, political acts carried out with certain purposes and intentions in mind. 
In Spain during the late 15th century, the unconverted Jews were expelled by the regime which 
emphasized religious unity.93 Zolberg (1983) states that “The Jews became to be viewed as an 
obstacle that must be eliminated if Spain were to reach its newly defined political objectives.”94 
Hirschman (1993) made similar observations of regimes using expulsions intentionally for their 
own purposes: “They [the German Democratic Republic, GDR] realized they could weaken 
internal opposition by a selective policy of either permitting certain people to exit or outright 
expelling critical voices considered to be dangerous or obnoxious.”95 Expulsions have often been 
framed as being instrumental and value-rational actions, that are used to achieve selected political 
objectives.96  
While some researchers, such as Van Hear (1993), suggest that expulsions are “episodes rather 
than continuous processes”, as they do not take place continuously, I would emphasize that they 
also often have significant political, cultural and historical reasons behind them and act often as a 
continuation in series of actions which target specific groups people.97 And so, while the acts 
might be sudden measures as Van Hear suggested, they also often have both identifiable longer-
term and short-term processes behind them.  
As a general theme, many of the more explanatory theories of expulsions have emphasized a view 
in which the politics of expulsions and agency in expulsions are related to means-end type of 
rationality.98 Weiner (1991) for example identified three types of politically motivated expulsions: 
the first one being expulsions used as a way to achieve cultural homogeneity or asserting 
dominance of one ethnic community over another, the second one being expulsions used as a 
method to deal with political dissidents and class enemies and the third being the use of expulsions 
as a part of strategy to achieve foreign policy objectives.99 All of these categorical types place 
some form of instrumental logic behind expulsions as actions, but they also establish that there 
has been no singular motive for the act of expelling. Perhaps for reasons that stem from 
conclusions similar to this one, there has been in a sense rejection of “singular” expulsion, as the 
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reasons behind expulsions have been seen to be greatly varied between different times and 
cases.100 This rejection has not, however, stopped researchers from establishing archetypes of 
expulsions along the lines of Weiner and from forming general observations of expulsions. In fact, 
as Walters (2002) has argued, these types of general observations related to expulsions can help 
us move “from seeing expulsions in singular or exceptional terms” and assist us in understanding 
whether they belong for example to “repertoire of techniques of social regulation” of states or 
whether they are one tool of governance.101 
From previous research literature, we can outline what kind of circumstances and politics 
expulsions have been seen to be related to. Starting from what causes expulsions; they have often 
been argued to have resulted from either a war, religious or ethnic conflict or security concerns.102 
According to Van Hear (1993) during nineteenth and twentieth century expulsions were most 
commonly instigated in periods of instability, after independence, during or after war, during 
elections or periods of nationalist upsurge, or during the emergence of new nation-states or 
polities.103 Expulsions have then been related to periods of political and societal change and have 
often in a sense been sparked by them.104 The justifications given for the expulsions by the 
perpetrators have often outlined the expelled as politically disloyal and have accused them of 
being a potential fifth column.105 And as Weiner’s classification of three types of politically 
motivated expulsions demonstrate, the acts have had some form of political purpose or intentions 
behind them. 
It could be argued that as acts, expulsions exemplify the coercive power which states hold to 
regulate who belongs and who does not.106 In general, the removal of individuals and groups 
through expulsions has also meant that they have been disbarred from the privileges and rights of 
being a citizen of the given state and excluded from participating in its future development.107 
Furthermore, it has also often meant for these people everything which accompanies forced 
relocation: loss of home, property, jobs and in terms of identity, and even a shattered sense of 
                                                 
100 Walters (2002), p. 272.  
101 Walters (2002), p. 271.  
102 Bell-Fialkoff, (1993), p. 115, O’Leary, ”Ethnic Expulsions”, retrieved May 29th, 2019 from 
https://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/328 and Zolberg (1983), p. 32. 
103 Van Hear (1993), p. 276.  
104 O’Leary, ”Ethnic Expulsions”, retrieved Jun. 16th , 2019 from https://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/328 and 
Zolberg (1983), p. 32 and Van Hear (1993), p. 276.  
105 O’Leary, ”Ethnic Expulsions”, retrieved Jun. 16th, 2019 from https://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/328 and Van 
Hear (1993), p. 279. 
106 Hasselberg (2016), p. 24 and Paoletti (2010), p. 5.  
107 Green and Weil (2007), p. 1, Light (2012), p. 401 and Paoletti (2010), p. 5.  In Citizenship and Those Who 
Leave: The Politics of Emigration and Expatriation, Green, Weil and other authors contributing to the book 
examine citizenship as not only being conceptualized in the terms of entry and staying, but also through exit and 
leaving as well.  
belonging.108 Yet, in terms of measures to exclude certain individuals from obtaining certain 
political rights, economic privileges or barring them from being a full-fledged member of society, 
expulsions have served as only one method. Detention or internment, a form of confinement 
within a camp or prison, has been one often used method.109 Even if detention or imprisonment 
have not actually removed people from the physical territory of the state, they have, as Bloch and 
Schuster (2005) argued, meant exclusion from society.110 In a similar manner to detentions and 
expulsions, population transfers within the country have sometimes been used as a way of 
removing and transferring certain minority groups from certain territories to another, in order to 
silence critique or opposition for certain political or economic projects.111  In this manner they 
have also meant political and societal exclusion for these people, especially if the transfers have 
taken these people away for example from their traditional lands or moved them to more remote 
regions.112 It is interesting to note that presented in this manner, all these acts could be argued to 
be a tools of political governance and population control, as they have been used by governments 
to move the people further away from the problem or threat they have been perceived to cause. 
This naturally leads to the question of what then makes expulsions special in terms their political 
utility or purposes, if they could be argued to be only one method among many? If there is a case 
to be made for the distinctive political utility of expulsions, it would arguably be related to the 
fact presented earlier in the introduction, that they serve as a concrete method of removing people 
from territory and from its political space.113 In his explanation of expulsions, Albert Hirschman 
for example argued that expulsions were among the many instruments which organizations, like 
states, tended to use to curtail critique and criticism.114 He saw that the removal of these people 
would effectively then also silence the political voice and critique of these people.115 More severe 
examples of how expulsions can arise from desire to politically exclude and remove people from 
territory can be found in the cases of ethnic expulsions, where the motive for expelling has, in the 
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most extreme cases, risen from a desire to ethnically “cleanse” certain territories due to political, 
strategic or ideological concerns.116 Possibly then the removal of certain people from the territory 
or political space in a sense also removes the problem which these expelled people have been 
perceived to cause or at least diminishes it. The removal or at least diminishing of certain societal, 
political, ideological, or economic problems might be argued to be in this sense the favourable 
outcome which expulsions produce. Perhaps the banishment of certain people also carries with it 
a certain permanence and concreteness through removing people from the society completely, 
which the other alternative measures such as detention and population transfers within the country 
might not have, but not the severity of more extreme measures that could be used to achieve 
similar results such as executions or organized killings.117  
What these types of formulations of expulsions elude to, is that there might be some type of 
strategic-context evaluations which lead to expulsions, and that the favourable outcomes or 
pursuit of these goals are then mostly measured from the perspective of the beholder, or in this 
case, from the point of view of the principle agent expelling these people – the government 
officials in charge of the expulsion policies and the authorities implementing them. I would agree 
with the position that there is certain special political utility in expulsions, which distinguishes 
and separates them as acts from other forms of exclusion and other ways to deal people who are 
perceived to cause problems and present some form of threat to political governance in some 
manner. However, I would also maintain that due to this agency regimes have in expulsions, the 
politics of expulsion are also inherently connected to the regime doing the expelling. Even if this 
agency and the politics connected to the actions are not uniform in style and always clear and easy 
to interpret. 
We must consider what are the special circumstances and actions behind expulsions if we are to 
explain expulsions beyond them being instrumental actions and mere responses and tools of an 
institutional agent. Explaining the purposiveness of expulsions requires considering what kind of 
agent or agents are behind the expulsions. But it also requires giving background to the act and to 
the sociopolitical relationships and political developments which are prevalently behind the 
expulsions. In this manner analyzing and studying politics of expulsion is also a descriptive effort, 
which assigns and illustrates meanings, and explaining expulsions themselves is an explanatory 
effort. In holistic study of expulsions, both are required, as expulsions do not come to fruition 
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without a purpose and the purposefulness in expulsions does not seem to only derive from the 
sum of the expulsions’ anticipated consequences.  
 
2.3.1 Becoming expellable – agency and decision-making in 
expulsions 
 
When one examines expulsions, it becomes clear that not all regimes expel in masses, nor do all 
subjects seem to be expellable. Basing on this statement, it is pertinent to ask how certain people 
then ultimately end up becoming expellable and how expulsions end up happening. One way of 
examining this question would be to examine who historically have been targeted by expulsions 
and scope out what these cases have been related to. However, this type of grand comparative 
sociological analysis of different periods and cases would go beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet, 
even a smaller and more general examination of this question can bring about salient points and 
insights, which can help us understand how people are targeted by expulsions and how they, in a 
sense, become expellable.  
Trying to answer the question of who are vulnerable to expulsions, Van Hear (1993) stated that 
the targets of the expulsions have often been those who are seen to be in some form partial or 
problematic members of the society they reside in, such as migrant workers or long-term minority 
communities of another ethnicity or of alien origin.118 He saw that in the question of who is 
expellable, the question of membership and status of the expelled is central, as often in expulsion 
cases, it is the societal membership (and citizenship) of the targeted people that becomes 
questioned as a form of doubt is cast upon their residence within the country.119 In a similar 
manner to Van Hear, Bonacich (1973) examined the question of what could explain why certain 
groups become targets of hostile actions. Her analysis dealt with groups that she called 
“middleman minorities”120, to which she attributed groups such as ethnic Chinese in Southeast 
Asia, Jews in Europe and Indians in East Africa.121 She argued that there can develop a form of 
“host hostility” towards the longer-term minorities and migrants, that reside within a country for 
number of reasons, ranging from the minorities having distinct identities and reluctance to 
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assimilate to the broader society to them having strong ties to their country of origin at the 
perceived expense of the country they reside in.122  She saw that at the centre of why these hostile 
acts (to which she included expulsions) happen, is the fact that both the minorities and the host 
society have their own and often conflicting goals that come into conflict for various reasons at 
different times.123 While this theorization is on quite abstract level, what Bonacich suggests is that 
some form of informed socially constructed relationship seems to exist between host society and 
these minorities and that this social relation seems to be the basis on which the action in these 
types of actions, such as expulsions, are deliberated upon.124 Even if the term host society is vague 
and unprecise in terms of explaining who is counted as being part of host society, the basic 
argument of Bonacich that there exists some form of informed socially constructed relationship 
between the expellers and expellers, and that this relations informs the actions seems believable.  
Both Bonacich and Van Hear discussed the problems related to the unassimilated long-term 
migrants and saw that their position in the society, who they were, their questionable societal 
membership and orientations had made them problematic and targets for differentiated treatment 
and hostile action.125 However, from different examples we can perceive that not all expulsions 
have resulted from these types of centuries old issues of unclear and unresolved membership. 
Finkel (2003, 2008) examined the deportations of Soviet intellectuals from the early Soviet era 
and accounted a story of the expulsions of Moscow intellectuals. These intellectuals were ordered 
to leave the country due to charge of “anti-Soviet activities”, but when they were expelled, many 
of them were oblivious to what they had done wrong.126 As background to the expulsions, Finkel 
explained that there had been struggles over university autonomy and on-going conflicts between 
the regime and the intelligentsia, that eventually led to expulsions.127 There had been no long 
lasting debate over whether these Soviet intellectuals were Soviet citizens or whether they had 
assimilated properly to the society, but rather according to Finkel, “the individuals selected for 
expulsions were considered to have overstepped boundaries of permissible behaviour by asserting 
for the intelligentsia a role to which it was no longer supposed to aspire.”128 Finkle argued that 
the fact that the intellectuals engaged in public discourse in the style of the West, was “tantamount 
to a political act” in the eyes of the Bolsheviks and dissent behaviour in the Soviet public sphere 
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that the Bolsheviks were trying to create.129 The expulsions were orchestrated by the regime then 
as a sort of punishment and the behaviour of the intellectuals reflected against the normative 
expectations of conduct that the regime had for public discourse and speaking. Furthermore, it 
seemed that to the Soviet leadership, upon deliberation, the expulsions were apparently a 
favourable option to others in solving the problems presented by the intelligentsia 130 In this case 
that Finkel described in detail, the belonging and membership of these people was problematized 
also, but on entirely different terms than what Van Hear for example presented in his article. 
From all these examples presented in this study, I would like to present three general observations 
about expulsions. Firstly, the decision to expel seems to be not only to be evaluated and 
deliberated, but is preceded by problematization by regime actors, that is often done in relation to 
some project or goal which needs to be resolved. Secondly, the problem that these people are 
perceived to present seems to be not the sum of any particular factor, such as ethnicity or social 
class, (although we can identify such factors in the discourses surrounding these expulsions), 
rather these factors seem to become a part of the wider political problem of their belonging, and 
this questioning of belonging goes beyond the scope of what ethnicity or what occupation these 
people for example represent as it is reflected to other goals and projects of the regime. Thirdly, 
while the problem of belonging becomes problematized in terms of it being reflected to certain 
goal, values or projects of the moment, there exists an historically informed and future oriented 
socially constructed relationship between the expelled and the perpetrators which affects and 
informs the exercise of power and action, among other things, in this relationship.  
In cases of expulsion, most of the time people are expelled by authorities, acting on behalf of the 
state.131  What I argue is that ultimately the decision to expel is up to the deliberation of the regime 
and in the cases of expulsions, the belonging of these people is often problematized in relation to 
some project or goal that the regime wants to realize or in relation to a threat that these people are 
seemed to cause to the regime. The goal or project can for example be building certain kind of 
religious state as happened in Spain in the late 15th century, construction of distinctive Soviet 
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society and public sphere, the pursual and construction of some manner of ethnostate or 
weakening the oppositional forces of the regime.132 In all of these examples I listed here, people 
have through their actions or as what they represent for example as a member of opposition or as 
a member of different faith, become a problem in terms of realizing these goals or projects.  
Yet, as was argued previously, the decision to expel is also informed by and reflected upon the 
historically informed and future oriented socially constructed relationship between the expelled 
and expellers. 133  In this manner expulsions do not happen in a vacuum and often act as a 
continuation in series of actions that have been pursued in order to try to resolve these problems 
that these people are perceived to cause. Furthermore, often the problematization of belonging of 
the people who have eventually been expelled from certain states or areas has happened and has 
been a political question for a long time even before the expulsions take place, as evidenced by 
“The Jewish question” in Europe during 19th and 20th century or the long-enduring political 
problems that surrounded and to this day surround the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia.134 But 
not always, as is noticeable in Finkle’s description of the expulsions of Soviet intellectuals. 
However, it is important to note that even in the Finkle’s description there was a conflict that had 
already formed with the intellectuals, and as is evidenced by the conflict and Soviet leaderships 
descriptions of the Soviet intellectuals, a socially constructed relationship between the expelled 
and the expellers which informed the decision to expel.  
As a last point, it is important to emphasize that when we distance ourselves from examining the 
decision-making in expulsions and move on to their implementation, we can start to see that there 
are agents within these political regime structures and outside them, who affect the events and 
actions in manners that were most likely never intended by the principal actors. Certainly, in mass 
expulsions, many of the events and actions are brought forward by what Finkel described aptly as 
“politics of the moment”, where the possibilities of the means dictate the action.135 This certainly 
was the case in Southern Vietnam, where the implementation of the expulsions changed several 
times during the period the campaign was active and was even put on hold one time due to 
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international pressure.136  In this manner, while the politics of the expulsion and ultimately the 
decision to expel might rest upon the regime doing the expelling and be inherently linked to the 
politics of it, we need to also explain how these actions take place and are implemented in their 
historical setting, in order to understand how many other factors also play a part in expulsions and 
becoming expellable.  
 
3. Historical social sciences approach to historical 
research 
 
Historical social sciences 137  is an approach or field of historical studies which adopts a 
sociological perspective towards historical phenomenon and events. In historical social sciences 
according to Rüsen (2005): “Society is seen as entirety of all things according to which history 
can be sought after theoretically and empirically.” 138  Historical transformation and social 
development are seen as being interconnected in a world comprised of “culturally constituted 
actors living within institutionally structured worlds” and for this reason, some historians such as 
Hall and Bryant (2005) have argued that historical and sociological modes of analysis should be 
both employed in the study of “social worlds past”.139 
This study focuses on examining certain type of actions (expulsions) that affect individuals and 
groups in historical setting. Expulsions are argued to be political acts which have to do with 
(among other factors) changes in the socially constructed relationship between the expelled and 
the expellers. For this reason, the type of analysis which Hall and Bryant championed for is 
employed for example in the chapter 4 of the study discussing the historical developments of the 
ethnic Chinese community and the evolvement of the socially constructed relationship between 
the ethnic Chinese communities and different Vietnamese polities. These changes that are 
analysed and highlighted are generally seen as taking place in a context of larger structural setting 
and societal changes.140 
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In general, this study can be characterized to be a historical social sciences study as it seeks to not 
only to understand141 historical experiences and phenomena, but to explain them and more notably, 
to provide explanations of them.142 Historical sources are the basis of the analysis in the study, 
but practical theories and concepts related to expulsions are also used to disclose and interpret 
findings in the last chapter. The purpose of this is to discuss the basis of these actions and highlight 
how they shape the motivations and destinies of individuals that become the targets of expulsions.  
In the next few sub-chapters, I will go over more the procedural basis and understanding of 
historical research that this study employs.  
 
3.1 Historical interpretation as a basis of historical research 
 
History, as an undertaking, is an intellectual effort to interpret the past.143 Historians engage in 
interpretation, when they are doing history as they have to reconcile conflicting information and 
“facts” which preside in the fragmented relics (documents and other materials that historians use 
as sources for research) of the past.144  Interpretation is a central method and process in historical 
research and as Rüsen (2005) states in all historical studies “more or less theoretically explicated 
conceptual framework of interpretation [is used] when… [historians] mould facts into sense-
bearing historical relationship.”145 It is also a the central method of this study.  
But what exactly does historical interpretation consist of? Historical interpretation is not 
synonymous with the process of source critique, in which the sources of the historical research 
are subjected to scrutiny and interrogated.146 Nor is it a mere heuristic process of discovering the 
facts from the sources. 147  Yet it relates to both of these processes. Through interpretation, 
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historians assign meaning and significance to the information and facts they discover from the 
sources. These facts and information do not have any special or extraordinary historical meaning 
or significance, as their historical sense comes from the semantic relationship to other facts that 
is brought forward by historical interpretation.148 When engaging in historical interpretation, the 
historian “makes use of principles of sense, meaning and significance, which have a different 
ontological status from the facts themselves.” 149  Furthermore, in historical interpretation, 
selectivity, both deliberate and non-deliberate is exercised and the reflections and judgements 
make certain patterns and information acquire special importance.150 This aspect of sense-making 
in historical interpretation should not be downplayed, as it relates significantly to how historical 
events are construed and constructed in historical sciences.151 
The traditional way of doing systematic research of a historical topic is often divided into three 
parts: heuristics (discovery), source critique and interpretation.152 The result of these successive 
steps and of the writing process which “transforms the source information into a sense and 
meaningful narrative sequence” is a historical narrative, that is the prose form in which the 
historical account is narrated and explained in.153 Historical interpretation has then a material basis 
that is subjected to the interpretation, as historians construct meanings from sources, but part of 
the process is also that the historical knowledge or “facts”, that are gathered from these sources, 
are through interpretation organized in manner that situates this newly gained knowledge to a 
semantic relationship with other “facts”.154 Ultimately, interpretation comes to be explained in 
historical studies is in a form which seeks to make the events and actions coherent and explain the 
reasons and origins of them, as well as seeks places them into a coherent historical order and 
continuity in a way that answers the question: what happened (in the past)?155 In this manner, 
historical research and reconstruction comprise of both interpretation and representation, that are 
connected to each other.156 
As a conclusion, interpretation is only one, albeit far-reaching, aspect of historical research, that 
is integrally connected to the nature of historical knowledge. Other elements, such as source 
comparisons and critique are also integral parts of the valid procedures of historical research and 
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solidify the basis of historical research and historical knowledge, as will be explained in the next 
few subchapters.  
 
3.2 The scientific validity of historical knowledge 
 
One of the most important question in historical sciences is the question of what is the scientific 
validity of historical knowledge that results from historical interpretation. Historical research is 
of course predicated upon the idea that we can have some accurate knowledge of the past.157 
Without this kind of presupposition, engaging in historical research would be pointless.  But as 
far as establishing an authoritative narrative or having “the right frame for understanding the 
general basis and direction of history”, it has been argued that historians cannot deliver on these 
promises.158  This possibility of not being to explain of “what truly happened?” in the past 
problematizes the validity of historical knowledge. In general, two major problems can be seen to 
relate to historical knowledge in terms of validity: 1) The problems related to interpretations and 
objectivity and 2) the problems related to the limitations posed to historical knowledge by the 
sources used in historical research.  
Starting from interpretation and objectivity, there is an aspect of interpretation (and perhaps as a 
result of this aspect - subjectivity) that cannot be separated from historical knowledge, and for this 
reason, in the absolute sense of objectivity, historical interpretations does not offer authoritative 
insights into the “truth of things.”159 This does not however mean that all forms of historical 
knowledge are subjective - and therefore invalid. While interpretation is an important part of 
historical research, it is not the only essential element of it, nor it is the only part of it which 
produces knowledge. Through source comparisons and source analysis, it is possible to analyse 
whether some event for example happened in a manner that makes this information not subjective, 
provided that there are sufficient sources from which we derive that this event has taken place.160 
Information can be gathered of dates, events and names and as a result of validation from source 
critique and comparison, these findings are not subjective. Yet, at the same time, historians do 
also provide descriptions of actions, explanations for events, justifications and interpretations 
when they do historical research and write about historical events in order to describe causality 
and continuity in history.161 For this reason, one of the most fundamental questions related to 
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interpretation and to its scientific validity is the question of how can we reduce the risk of mis-
interpretations and the risk of providing accounts which might not align with what actually 
happened.162 
One often repeated answer to this problem is that historians must be committed valid and 
verifiable procedures of historical research to reduce the subjectivity of their claims.163 As Megill 
(2007) states: “Good historians try to be as careful as they can about their procedures – going to 
properly verified primary sources, attending to relevant secondary writings, dealings in an 
analytic and explicitly counterfactual way with matters of causation, putting their evidence and 
reasoning on the table, and indicating clearly the degree of certainty or speculativeness to be 
attributed to their claims.”164 The valid procedures of historical research in this manner brings 
forward the basis of the historical interpretation that is presented and makes it possible to evaluate 
this interpretation based on its rational treatment of the experience of the past that is studied.165 
Subscribing to these procedures of research which Megill highlighted is important, as it provides 
a way for other historians to review your work. Yet, even with proper procedures, historical 
research is neither in its interpretation or representation totally detached from the person engaging 
in the research.166  
The second problem with validity of historical knowledge is often cited to be what could be called 
the problem of the sources. Historical sources are referred as being fragments of the past, as the 
perspectives they offer into the past are fragmented and the sources which are possible to use for 
research are always finite and can never offer the full picture of the events.167 What we can 
possibly know of any given historical period, event or action is limited by this evidence. The 
fragmented nature of sources places clear limitations to the extent of historical knowledge we can 
derive of them and to the very possibilities of historical reconstruction from sources. 168 
Furthermore, the interpretations we make from sources are also always open for reinterpretation 
due to the fact that historians’ research materials are always incomplete and must make amends 
with the possibilities of constant discoveries.169  
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164 Megill  (2007), p. 124. 
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Having presented the two problems with validity of historical knowledge, we should consider 
what constraints they place to the knowledge produced by historical interpretations and how we 
could avoid a third problem: the problem of stigmatising historical knowledge and questioning its 
validity in absolute terms (either as perfectly valid or inherently subjective and fragmented). For 
this reason, we should perhaps define in what terms historical knowledge could be argued to be 
valid. As a final matter on the topic of scientific validity of historical knowledge, I will present 
few arguments, which hopefully makes clearer my understanding of this matter to the reader and 
the arguments for the validity of the interpretations presented in this study. 
Firstly, following the procedures for historical research that Megill outlined, we can highlight the 
basis upon which the interpretation is made. This makes it possible to evaluate validity of the 
study on a procedural level, but of course places burden on the historian to bring forward the basis 
of his interpretation. Making clear statements on the shortcomings of certain sources and gaps in 
our knowledge brings validity to the information presented in the study as it makes it makes the 
terms upon which the interpretation is based upon more transparent to the reader. Secondly, 
related to whether historical knowledge has validity in scientific research, I would be inclined to 
agree with Rüsen (2005) that historical knowledge is scientific in the methodological sense and 
in its representation, as it involves framing the findings in accordance with principles of 
argumentation, conceptual thinking and following the procedures of historical research.170 Thirdly, 
related to the question of objectivity, historical research cannot perhaps guarantee objectivity or 
eradicate subjectivity, but it aims to harness subjectivity through procedures and commitment to 
accuracy of depiction.171 Whether this pursuit of harnessing subjectivity can ever be realized is a 
matter for debate, but this commitment to accuracy should not be downplayed as one driving 
principle of historical research. This commitment to accuracy acts as a guiding factor in the search 
for scientific validity in historical research and can be understood not just as an empty promise, 
but as a conscious effort by the historian to bring disciplinary validity to historical knowledge. 
Fourthly and lastly, the knowledge gained from sources is always an interpretation, that is open 
for reinterpretation and as stated before, is not an authoritative insight into the “truth of things”.172 
This means that the depiction of the past should be treated as such and its validity should be 
assessed on special terms; through the evaluation of the relationship between the events of the 
past and its rational treatment by the historian. We can for example assess how the historian has 
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made determinations over reliability and representativeness, to what he has assigned significance 
and meaning and for what reason and how coherent and plausible is his narrative and explanations 
in light of the sources presented and finally, how does the narrative compare to other accounts of 
the events.173  Through this kind of understanding of assessing validity, I argue that we can place 
the interpretations done by historians into a relationship with other historiographies and evaluate 
the historian’s dialogue with the experiences of the past derived from sources.  
 
3.3 Sources 
 
 
As was presented in the previous chapters, historical sources and their interpretation form the 
basis of historical research. In general, historical research entails making decisions on what 
sources to utilize, deciding which sources to use in the final interpretation and explaining why 
ultimately these specific sources were selected.174 Furthermore, sources are in an exceedingly 
important role in historical research, as historians always go back and forth between their sources 
and the analysis that they are making as they attempt to construct explanations for the problems 
they study.175  
The sources that were selected for this study reflect the methodological approach this study takes 
in regard to studying the expulsion campaign of 1978 and 1979. As expulsions are seen as being 
events which have extensive history behind them and have often been implemented after periods 
of drastic societal change, this study examines sources that describe the political and economic 
developments in the Southern Vietnamese already before the expulsion campaign started, from 
the immediate period after the Vietnam war in 1975 to the time when the expulsion campaign had 
finally ended in late 1979. An emphasis has also been placed on examining sources that have been 
not used before in studies that have examined these expulsions.  
Three types of sources are generally used in this study: newspaper sources, declassified 
governmental and intelligence agency sources and first and second-hand accounts from people 
that experienced many of the events that are described in this study. All of these types of sources 
have their distinct weaknesses and strengths. The purpose of using different kinds of sources was 
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to contrast and corroborate the information of individual documents or accounts to others in order 
to form a clearer view of the events.  
Starting from newspaper sources, the major ones that are used in this study as sources, South 
China Morning Post (SCMP) 176  and Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) 177 , provide an 
overview of the changes that took place in the Southern Vietnamese society after the war and 
follow the situation with Vietnamese refugees and ethnic Chinese already starting from 1975. 
Both of these newspapers were during the 1970s leading newspapers for English-based reporting 
on Asia and Southeast Asia. The articles about Vietnam within these magazines vary in style and 
content, as the FEER published more longer articles on the development in Vietnam and the 
SCMP generally published shorter ones, that tended to focus on just single issue or event in 
Vietnam. With the exception of few articles that were the written by foreign correspondent’s after 
visits to the area, most of the articles in the SCMP and the FEER can be regarded to be secondary 
sources, as they report about events that the reporters did not witness themselves and as the articles 
often contain analysis of information gathered from interviews of witnesses or from official 
statements. Both the FEER and the SCMP focused on reporting event and changes in Southern 
Vietnam mostly rather than in the whole country. Based on my findings from going through 
reporting of several newspapers of that time, it seems that this is a common feature of the Western 
newspapers’ Vietnam reporting during that period. This might have also possibly been dictated 
by the interest of the newspaper readers, by interests of the journalists themselves or limited by 
access to sources of information detailing developments in Northern Vietnam.  
In general, one of the challenges of using newspaper articles is judging whether one can generalize 
the small pieces of information contained within them.178 For example, one short account from 
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Asia throughout its history. By searching the South China Morning Post Proquest Historical Newspaper online 
collection with keywords such as “Vietnam”, “Vietnamese refugees” and “ethnic Chinese”, I was able to find in 
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Eastern Economic Review to shut after 63 years”, Reuters, Sep. 22nd, 2009 and The Editors of Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, “Far Eastern Economic Review – Magazine”, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Far-Eastern-Economic-
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Finnish National Repository Library in Kuopio in January 2019 to conduct archival research. As a result of this 
archival research I was able to find in total 36 articles that were relevant for this thesis. 
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refugee published in a newspaper might not tell us much of how things actually were in Vietnam 
at the time or be indicative of the general situation in the area. However, when used in addition to 
other accounts and sources, they provide valuable background and supplementary information 
about the changes in the Southern Vietnamese society. The collection of newspaper articles in the 
SCMP and the FEER represent some of the largest catalogues of contemporary information on 
the events in Vietnam at the time. They contain statements by Vietnamese authorities on different 
issues, interviews by refugees, investigative articles on the origins of the refugee crisis among 
other information and for this reason they are used in this study.  However, while these articles 
are informative, it is important to note that in general the articles’ focus has been decided by the 
author or the editor and in this sense these articles are never neutral pieces of information. 
Especially the longer articles in the FEER present a constructed narrative of the events in Vietnam 
and as such describe them from certain point of view. Some other miscellaneous newspaper 
articles from other magazines are also at times used in this study as sources when they have been 
found to be relevant for the subject at hand. These articles are listed individually in the sources 
list, as no systematic research has been done to uncover these articles and they are relatively few 
in number. 
One difficulty in studying the ethnic Chinese expulsion campaign has been that the whole 
expulsion campaign was essentially operated under a shroud of secrecy and as a result, during the 
contemporary period some core details of how the campaign was implemented remained vague 
and were not necessarily publicized. 179  But during the events, foreign governmental and 
intelligence agencies were active in trying to investigate the causes behind the boat people 
departures and the ethnic Chinese exodus. When the events were taking place, the U.K and the 
U.S were especially active in uncovering the extent of Vietnam’s actions. This became clear to 
me, when I analyzed U.S Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)180 documents regarding Vietnamese 
refugees and records of the U.K Prime Minister’s Office regarding Vietnamese refugees in Hong 
Kong (PREM files)181. The documents from the CIA archives used in this study are mostly 
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producing bodies in the world, Cohen (1999), p. 342 and U.S CIA, “Organization of National Foreign Assessment 
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181 In general, these PREM files contain assortment of diplomatic correspondence, intelligence information, 
meeting memos, research papers and prime minister’s general correspondence on the issue of Vietnamese Refugees 
in Hong Kong and their resettlement in the UK. The primary function of these documents was to keep the prime 
minister informed on the affairs related to these issues.  In total three collections of documents on this topic have 
assorted intelligence assessment and reports from between 1978 and 1979, when the interest 
towards the Vietnamese boat people crisis grew as the number of refugees kept growing.182  The 
CIA’s prominent role in gathering intelligence around the world and the history of the U.S with 
Vietnam was the reason I decided to go through these archives to search new information.  
The U.K Prime Minister’s Office files contain documents from between 24th of May to 14th of 
July 1979 and they contain correspondence and reports about the refugee situation in Hong Kong, 
that grew exponentially worse during 1979 compared to previous years as the result of additional 
departures from Vietnam.183 The reason why I decided to examine the files from the U.K Prime 
Minister’s Office for this study stems from the fact that the U.K had a strong connection to the 
Vietnamese refugee crisis. Hong Kong, which was a Crown colony of the U.K at the time, was a 
major destination for the ethnic Chinese refugees who had to pay to the government to depart 
from Vietnam. Due to the large number of refugees in Hong Kong in need of resettlement, the 
U.K was perhaps the nation most adamant about resolving this Indochina refugee resettlement 
through an international conference. 184 The U.K documents detail how it was applying pressure 
to Vietnam to change its domestic policies which they had deemed to be the cause of the crisis 
and at the same time trying to resolve the issue of resettlement of Vietnamese refugees with 
various countries and United Nations by pushing for a refugee conference under the auspices of 
the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. 185  While the relevancy of these diplomatic and 
intelligence assessment documents vary from document to document, they generally highlight 
what was being done about and known at the time about Vietnam’s expulsion campaign behind 
the “diplomatic curtain”.  
As sources, declassified governmental and international organization documents whether they are 
originally from intelligence agencies, international organizations or from other diplomatic 
organizations provide valuable insight for historical research, as they often contain knowledge 
that has previously not been available about events that are examined. Governmental intelligence 
and diplomatic entities also often have access to wider range of sources for information on current 
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events when they are happening than for example ordinary researchers. These entities also have 
more resources and ways to verify the information they obtain. For these reasons, some 
declassified intelligence assessments and governmental documents have been given especially 
prominent role in this study as they have provided information on the actions of Vietnamese 
authorities that has not been available before on the events. One intelligence assessment 
particularly by U.S State Department titled “Vietnam’s Refugee Machine”186 provides a detailed 
assessment of the Vietnamese government involvement in the expulsion program in the SRV 
between 1978 – 1979.187 The information within this document generally matches with the details 
of other accounts describing the expulsion campaign and the actions of Vietnamese authorities 
and for this reason it is utilized heavily in this study. That being said, inaccuracies, inconsistencies 
and wrong information exist also in these kind of documents and even when there has been a 
larger organization gathering and verifying information, the documents have been drafted to only 
give assessments of particular events/situations based on limited sources of information in a 
specific historical period.188  
The last major type of source utilized in this study are the contemporary first and secondhand 
accounts that detail the events. Perhaps the most significant first-hand account of the events is the 
account of Nguyễn Long (lived 1941 – 2020), who was a Vietnamese intellectual who escaped 
Vietnam by boat on April 30th, 1979. He stayed in Vietnam for four years after the war until he 
successfully left together with his family of five.189 Later in 1981 when he had settled in the U.S 
he chronicled incidents of his daily life in Vietnam after the war and his process of leaving 
Vietnam in a 200-page book titled After Saigon Fell – Daily life under the Vietnamese 
Communists. The book was co-authored by Harry Kendall who worked at the time as an 
international conference coordinator at the UC Berkeley Institute of East Asian Studies. During 
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the Vietnam War, Long had also received his PhD from UC Berkeley and returned there after re-
settling in the U.S, eventually becoming a Professor of Political Science there in the later years. 
Long’s and Kendall book is the only long-format English language account that I have been able 
to find which describes in detail all the proceedings that went along with paying officials to depart 
from Vietnam in 1978 – 1979.  He bought false identification papers which stated that he was 
ethnic Chinese so that he could register with a group of ethnic Chinese to leave Vietnam under a 
policy that the Vietnamese authorities had started called “Going abroad officially”.190 He paid his 
registration fee to depart with a group of ethnic Chinese from Cholon. The leaders of this ethnic 
Chinese group also organized their departure and payments to Vietnamese officials.191 
For this study, the first-hand account of Long is an important as a historical source, as it provides 
unique details of the ethnic Chinese expulsion system organized by Vietnamese authorities in 
Southern Vietnam that this study examines. Details of the escape and of its planning occupy a 
large portion of the book and for this reason it provides quite a detailed account of what is was 
like to leave Vietnam during this time. The tone of the book is however personal and it contains 
many anecdotes of daily life under communist rule, towards which Long grew more and more 
negative towards as time passed.192 This attitude towards the communist rule is visible throughout 
the book and it places questions on the reliability of the parts of the book which discuss the 
motivations and goals of the communist rule in everyday Vietnam at the time.193 Nevertheless, its 
description of one refugees journey to leave Vietnam is very in-depth and it collaborates many of 
the findings of other investigative articles and books on Vietnamese official involvement in selling 
the departures, while bringing also more information to the topic. For this reason, this particular 
account is very relevant for this study.  
Another important account of the Indochina refugee crisis and the Vietnamese government 
refugee trade was written by Barry Wain in 1981.194 His book The Refused – The agony of the 
Indochina refugees has been one of the most one of the most influential reports of the events for 
the past forty years.195 The book explores the factors that were behind the exodus of refugees in 
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Indochina and details how Vietnamese government had an active role in selling departures to the 
ethnic Chinese in Vietnam.196 Wain’s conclusion was that Vietnamese authorities had indeed 
authorized departures of refugees and charged them exit fees and therefore effectively “expelled 
[the ethnic Chinese] for profit.”197 
Although his book is described to be an eye-witness account in the back cover, the book is actually 
comprised of information received from extensive interviews, visits to refugee camps and other 
relevant places in Indochina and Asia and from secondary sources such as newspaper articles.198 
Therefore it could be regarded to be comprised of a mixture of first-hand information and second-
hand information. As a historical source, Wain’s account of the events at Vietnam at the time is 
perhaps the most complete one. It provides a credible description of the actions by Vietnamese 
officials at the time. For this reason, it is a compelling source to use as an authoritative narrative 
on the matter. However, as time has passed and more sources and accounts have become available, 
it is also important to contrast the findings of Wain to other sources in order to build even more 
cohesive picture in this study of the historical events in Vietnam at that time.  
Finally, besides the sources that were introduced earlier, some other potential sources were also 
evaluated for their relevance to the studied topic, but ultimately later left out or are used only 
limitedly in this study. Among these sources that are only limitedly used is the Rénmín rìbào 
newspaper (人民日报, “People’s Daily”), which was the leading newspaper in the PRC at the time 
and is still even today the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the CCP. When going 
through the material from the newspaper’s online archive, I came to the conclusion that while 
most of the articles in the newspaper regarding Vietnam did not discuss matters that were the 
focus of this study, some of the articles contained information that were relevant for this study. 
The relatively few articles that are cited in this study focus more on exploring the actions of the 
Vietnamese authorities. The biggest obstacle for using the Renmin Ribao as a source had to do 
with the tone and content of the articles, which were heavily critical of Vietnam and propagated 
a certain view of the changes in the Sino-Vietnamese relations.199 Many of the articles also from 
the years 1978 and 1979 discussing Vietnam also had to do with the issues in Sino-Vietnamese 
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relations. As the feud between the PRC and the SRV is not the focus of this study, and I did not 
want to focus on analyzing the reporting of the Renmin Ribao on the topic or on the feud between 
these two countries, I decided to only use few selected articles from this newspaper.  
On a similar note, several books that were published by official Beijing and Hanoi foreign 
language printing presses in 1978 and 1979 on the ethnic Chinese issue and Sino-Vietnamese 
relations, such as The Hoa in Vietnam - Dossier part I and II and The Truth about Viet Nam – 
China relations over the last 30 years presenting the arguments of the Vietnamese side and 
Guānyú yuènán qūgǎn huáqiáo wèntí (关于越南驱赶华侨问题, “On Viet Nam’s Expulsion of 
Chinese Residents”) cataloguing PRC’s statements and viewpoints on the issue are only cited 
infrequently in this study. These documents and the official statements contained within them 
have been well-analysed in many previous studies discussing the crisis of the Sino-Vietnamese 
relations and for this reason I decided not to re-analyse them more closely for this study.200 
Furthermore, these dossiers propagate a desired point of view of the events in Vietnam at that 
time from both sides and for this reason they are not reliable sources in describing what happened 
in Vietnam during this period. They however provide insight into what were the official stances 
of the Vietnamese and Chinese governments on the ethnic Chinese issue. In this respect these 
documents are limitedly useful for looking of representations of both of these countries point of 
views.  
As a conclusion to the section on sources and methodology in this study, it important to state that 
although this study employs wide-range of sources in its study of the expulsion campaign in 
Vietnam between 1978 – 1979 and of the events that preceded it in Vietnam between 1975 – 1978, 
no official Vietnamese documents from Vietnamese archives or from other sources are used in 
this study to validate the findings. Having access to these documents would answer many 
questions on the topic that can now only be left as unanswered. Whether or not Vietnamese 
government documents that would collaborate the official Vietnamese involvement in the 
expulsions and facilitating the refugee outflow from Vietnam still exist or will ever be released is 
uncertain. Officially the SRV has denied its involvement in orchestrating these departures.201  
That being said, an impressive amount of contemporary investigative material from intelligence 
organizations, journalists and academics can be found on the matter and these are used in this 
study to re-examine what happened in Vietnam during this time and to explain the role of different 
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actors in orchestrating the departures from Vietnam. And also, to build clearer the picture of these 
events and actions which have not been re-examined in detail by historians after they took place.  
 
4. The origins of the expulsions campaign  
 
This chapter and its sub-chapters give background to the difficult issues and debates that have 
existed around ethnic Chinese population identities, citizenship, and social position in the 
Southern Vietnamese society throughout history and to the more recent issues that contributed to 
the ethnic Chinese becoming targets of expulsions. The sub-chapters 4.1, 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 discuss 
the origins of the ethnic Chinese question and issues in Southern Vietnam and highlight the 
different solutions Vietnam’s different rulers have taken to address these problems. The sub-
chapters starting from 4.2 discuss the restructuring of the Southern Vietnamese society after the 
Vietnam war and the difficulties in the Sino-Vietnamese relations which both made the social 
position in the Southern Vietnamese society problematic after 1975.  
 
4.1 History of the ethnic Chinese communities in Southern 
Vietnam (111 BCE – 1954) 
 
The history of the Chinese migration to the area known today as Vietnam traces back all the way 
to beginning of the period known in Vietnamese history as Bắc thuộc (“Belonging to the North”, 
111 BCE - 938 CE).202 During this long period, soldiers, administrators and farmers migrated to 
parts of Vietnam to consolidate the area under Chinese rule.203 Another group which migrated to 
China during this long period in substantial numbers were the refugees fleeing the political 
upheavals and unrests that were taking place in China.204 After 938 CE Vietnam gained a form of 
independence and became its own, distinct monarchical political entity, the migration from China 
became less frequent. The small minority of ethnic Chinese, who had moved to Vietnam during 
this first phase of Chinese migration more or less integrated slowly to the surrounding society.205 
Yet, modest numbers of Chinese refugees and migrant kept trickling in to Vietnam during the 
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whole monarchical period (938 – 1858), but not in numbers that would be enough to establish a 
permanent minority of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam.206  
What was as the starting point for the second, more regularized, phase of the Chinese migration 
is up for debate. Amer argued that the second phase started when the whole country had been 
colonialized and secured under French rule in 1883, as during the colonial period  the stream of 
people moving from China to Vietnam became more regular.207 However, in reality the second 
phase of migration from China could be argued to have started already by the second half of the 
seventeenth century. One catalyst for larger Chinese migration to Vietnam was the fall of Ming 
Dynasty in China in 1644, which brought with it a wave of ethnic Chinese settlers that became to 
be known as Minh Hương (“Ming loyalists”).208 From mid-seventeenth century onwards, the 
Chinese migrants were allowed to settle in the major trading centres that had emerged in Southern 
Vietnam by the respective rulers of these areas and this resulted in sizable Chinese communities 
and Chinese quarters being established in the South for example in Gia Dinh (later Saigon) and 
Cholon.209  It was this second wave of migration which established a permanent Chinese minority 
to the different parts of Vietnam. 
As the ethnic Chinese migrant communities gradually grew, their position and existence within 
the Vietnamese society eventually became to be regulated through special regulations. Most 
important example of this took place in 1802, after Vietnam was unified by emperor Gia Long 
(the first emperor of the Nguyễn dynasty) after three-hundred-year period of it being ruled by 
multiple clans. He divided the ethnic Chinese into congregations in order to control and tax them 
more effectively.210 These organizations were called huìguǎn (会馆, “associations”) in Chinese 
and bang in Vietnamese and their primary function was to organize the ethnic Chinese 
communities into manageable administrative units.211 There were five main congregations which 
corresponded with the five principal speech groups of the migrants (Cantonese, Hokkien, 
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Teochew, Hainanese and Hakka).212 These organizations were useful to the migrants in many 
ways as a newly arrived migrant could ask a person from their native place to vouch for them to 
join a congregation and the people from congregation could help them set up their profession or 
provide assistance to them in other ways to help them settle in.213  
The congregations served as a way to preserve the cultural and religious traditions of each culture 
group and became places to nurture both social and business networks and Chinese culture.214 
Partly these organizations had their roots in the voluntary organizations that the ethnic Chinese 
tended to establish around dialect groups, common ancestry and surnames and religion.215 Each 
bang had their own leaders, businesses, special trade, their own financial investment organization, 
schools, hospitals and religious houses.216 They were welfare, interest and business organizations 
rolled into one and served the interests of their own dialect groups, but they also effectively 
insulated the ethnic Chinese from parts of the Vietnamese society, as these organizations fostered 
the forming strong autonomous ethnic communities that had no need assimilate to the surrounding 
society.217 
The congregations and special privileges which were first awarded to Chinese migrants during 
the 19th century, like the right to practice different professions, played an important role in forming 
an established ethnic Chinese minority to Southern Vietnam.218 Furthermore, many of the policies 
and privileges granted to the ethnic Chinese had strong continuity in the Southern Vietnamese 
society, and this continuity made the conditions favourable for more regularized migration. An 
example of this continuity was that after the Nguyễn dynasty rule, the French colonial authorities 
continued the policy of congregations when they secured their rule over the whole of Vietnam 
and made it a requirement by law to join one in 1871. The congregations were not abolished until 
1955 in Southern Vietnam.219 The continuity can be explained by the fact that the congregations 
were useful for the Nguyễn dynasty rulers and later to the French colonial administrators, as they 
made gathering taxes and Chinese immigration control easier.220  
All in all, by the early and mid-twentieth century, the ethnic Chinese communities had become a 
distinct and regularized part of the Southern Vietnamese society. In the Southern parts of Vietnam, 
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the communities were mainly centred around the cities and trading posts, with the bulk of them 
residing in Saigon-Cholon area (210 000) and with other communities existing in Can Tho 
(13 000), Soc Trang (11 000), Thu Dau Mot (10 000) and in Bac Lieu and Rach Gia (9000 
each).221 Within the cities the ethnic Chinese communities tended to form their own concentrated 
“Chinatowns”.222 According to Tong (2010), this custom also perpetuated the social segregation 
between the ethnic Chinese and the Vietnamese.223 In terms of professions, the ethnic Chinese 
mainly engaged in commerce and due to their efficient networks both in Vietnam and in China 
they gained a commanding position within many of these industries.224 For example, great bulk 
of the rice trade, money lending business, the regional water trade and the processing industry 
was run by the ethnic Chinese by mid-twentieth century.225 Congregations played an important 
role in this, as members of these organizations could pool together capital for larger investments 
and build connections which proved to be invaluable in the emerging capitalist environment.226 
As was noted earlier, starting from early 19th century, the ethnic Chinese were awarded some 
privileges that made their position, among other things, in the Southern Vietnamese society 
distinct from other Southern Vietnamese residents. For example, the privilege of ethnic Chinese 
men being exempt from military service was only removed few years after the 1975 reunification 
of Vietnam and beginning of the communist rule.227 However, it is important to note also that 
many of the privileges were not only given as a gift of being in someone’s good graces but were 
based on certain reasons that made the position of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam hard to regulate. 
The proximity to China and the Chinese historically having a say in what happened to ethnic 
Chinese in Vietnam was for example just one among many of the reasons that ultimately 
complicated the forming of fully autonomous administrative relationship between Vietnam’s 
rulers and ethnic Chinese. Furthermore, as Vietnamese nationalism began to emerge beginning 
from twentieth century, questions of citizenship, nationality and assimilation became more and 
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more important in how the Southern ethnic Chinese communities were ultimately viewed and 
treated in the Republic of Vietnam and in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam that came after it.   
 
4.1.1 The origins of the ethnic Chinese question and issues in 
Southern Vietnam  
 
Historically, the ethnic Chinese communities have often been painted as the “other” or even as 
dangerous during various times in Southeast Asian history by the authorities of different host 
countries in the region.228 This has not only been the case in Southern Vietnam, but also elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia. As ethnic Chinese have been the targets of persecution, discriminatory 
legislations and other harsh measures during various times in many places in Southeast Asia, 
studying the historical attitudes and policies towards these communities has been a relatively 
popular research topic.229 Yet, pointing out any specific issue as being the pivotal ethnic Chinese 
question is rather difficult, as in reality the status and treatment of the ethnic Chinese has 
historically varied greatly even in specific areas such as Southern Vietnam. At the crux of the 
issue has been wide variety of questions, ranging from the cultural and political identity of the 
ethnic Chinese to their citizenship and dominant position of power in the economies of Southeast 
Asian countries.  
In Southern Vietnam specifically, the question of the status and treatment of the ethnic Chinese 
has historically been linked to governance, to the proximity with China, to the economic power 
and dominant role of the ethnic Chinese in the economy, and later to the Vietnamese views on 
state-building and citizenship. As Christopher Goscha (2016) writes in his written history of 
Vietnam, “´Vietnam´ - whatever its name, shape, or form – has never been an ethnically 
homogenous polity.”230 This has traditionally meant that forming a policy on how to govern ethnic 
minorities and other political entities who had influence, such as religious groups and sects has 
been necessary to governing an area as ethnically diverse as Vietnam. In many respects, the ethnic 
policies which were historically enacted in Southern Vietnam included both particular as well as 
general characteristics related to the governance exercised by different Vietnamese political 
regimes. The long contentious history between the different Chinese and Vietnamese political 
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entities has most certainly also had its effect on how the ethnic policies were formed towards this 
particular group, but in general, these policies have also reflected historical forces of social change 
in the Southern Vietnamese society and evolved as the politics of the area has changed. 
As was presented in the last chapter, the special policies and privileges, such as the 19th century 
policy of congregations, became fundamental part of governance of the ethnic Chinese 
communities when the migration to different areas of Vietnam became more regular. But even 
before the 19th century examples of decrees which focus on regulating the status and living of 
ethnic Chinese in different parts of Vietnam can be found. The Nguyễn court, which was one the 
major ruling clans of Vietnam between mid-sixteenth century and late eighteenth century, for 
example decreed in 1698 that the Minh Hương must live in special Minh Hương villages.231 The 
restrictive decrees were however counterbalanced by privileges awarded to the Minh Hương who 
lived in these villages, such allowing them to own land, manage trade customs and ports and marry 
Vietnamese persons and the right to take civil service examinations and hold government 
positions.232 These privileges resulted most likely from Minh Hương playing a key role in the sea 
trade and government in Southern Vietnam at that time.233 This is just one example of how state-
community relations between the ethnic Chinese communities and Vietnamese authorities has 
historically played a role in the formulation of policy towards these communities.  
We can see that starting already from late seventeenth century, the ethnic Chinese have often been 
made have some form of special residential status through decrees and regulations in different 
parts of Vietnam. In general, regulating Chinese migration to Vietnam and making the position of 
the ethnic Chinese regulated became a requirement from the standpoint of governing as the 
communities grew and the number of migrants increased. Partially these regulations also formed 
and upheld the separate identity that the ethnic Chinese embraced in Vietnam. Congregations and 
Minh Hương villages are examples of these regulatory systems that socially separated the different 
ethnic Chinese groups from surrounding society.234 Cultural and religious organizations that the 
ethnic Chinese established in Vietnam also played an important part in socially insulating the 
ethnic Chinese from surrounding society’s customs and culture.  
Partially this position of the ethnic Chinese as special residents in different Vietnamese kingdoms 
and states was not only the result of Vietnamese views on minorities, but was also shaped by the 
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closeness to China and influenced by the Chinese views and policies on overseas Chinese235. 
During the Qing dynasty (1644 to 1912) for example the Chinese stance was that that any child 
born to Chinese father (even to those who had migrated to Vietnam) would be Chinese national.236 
This naturally complicated the residential status question and meant that the ethnic Chinese could 
not be in the fullest sense of the word Vietnamese citizens and subjects, before the Chinese would 
accept this position.  
Another stable feature of the Chinese engagement with the overseas Chinese was that the Qing 
dynasty and later the different Chinese governments tried to safeguard the ethnic Chinese 
communities and guarantee that their rights were being upheld in the host states through various 
manners. Mostly this safeguarding comprised of diplomatic actions, such as demands for 
negotiations on the position of the ethnic Chinese or diplomatic protests when the rights and 
privileges of the ethnic Chinese were not upheld in Vietnam according to the Chinese, but 
sometimes other methods were used also by the Chinese. At times this meant that the treatment 
and status of the ethnic Chinese also had implications for diplomatic relations.237  
While the relationship between ethnic Chinese migrants and the Vietnam’s different rulers were 
generally historically quite peaceful and stable, some concerns regarding the social position and 
status of the ethnic Chinese in Southern Vietnam emerged already during the colonial period. 
These concerns were things that later Vietnamese polities starting from the mid-twentieth century 
tried to later mitigate through policies which pushed ethnic Chinese to assimilate to the 
surrounding society and by regulating their activities more. At different points of colonial period, 
French colonial administrators had a concerns that the ethnic Chinese would become a sort of 
“state within a state”, an ungovernable section of the population whose political motives were 
also of suspect.238  Contributing to these fears were few factors: firstly, the growing political and 
economic importance of these communities. During the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century, the ethnic Chinese communities and their businesses and organizations had 
grown to be very influential in the export and trade sectors.239 This meant that quite a lot of 
economic power had concentrated in colonial Vietnam to the hands of these communities, that 
                                                 
235 The term overseas Chinese (in Chinese 华侨, huáqiáo) has after nineteenth century often been used to refer to 
Chinese living outside China by both Western writers and Chinese authorities. It is important to note however that 
the term carries a special connotation within itself: namely the idea that these Chinese living outside are Chinese 
also in the sense that they are part of bigger Chinese nation and that they are Chinese nationals. This connotation 
has emerged from the way different Chinese governments and scholars have used the term to refer to ethnic 
Chinese living outside China, Suryadinata (1997), p. 1 – 3.  
236 Goscha (2016), p. 167.  
237 Amer (1991), p. 10 and 13 – 14, Engelbert (2008), p. 198 and Khanh (1993), p. 28 
238 Engelbert (2008), p. 198.  
239 Engelbert (2008), p. 192 – 193.  
were partly self-governed through congregations and by their own community leaders. 240 
Secondly, through different kinds of business associations and cultural and political organizations, 
the different Chinese political parties maintained close ties with the ethnic Chinese communities 
during the late-colonial period. Organizations such as The Chinese Chamber of Commerce of 
Cholon241 were created by the ethnic Chinese communities to mainly foster business, but they 
also acted as channels to maintain connection between the overseas Chinese communities and 
China.242 Especially active in trying to foster these connections was the Chinese Nationalist Party, 
Gúomíndǎng (GMD, 中国国民党) in the early and mid-twentieth century. It tried to exert political 
influence within the ethnic Chinese organization in Southern Vietnam.243 The methods were at 
times quite brazen and ranged from establishing GMD led overseas Chinese organizations such 
as the Association of the Overseas Chinese (hoa kiền liên hiệp hội / 华侨联合会 , Huáqiáo 
liánhéhuì ) in Southern Vietnam to trying to control the congregations and other traditional ethnic 
Chinese organizations from within.244After 1949 the GMD’s influence weakened in Southern 
Vietnam due to the events in the mainland China, but the GMD led Republic of China still 
however continued to act as the guardian to the communities until the end of the Vietnam War.245  
Echoes of these types of fears of Chinese interfering in Vietnamese matters through the ethnic 
Chinese communities and using the ethnic Chinese to further their own political goals could also 
be discerned later, during the ethnic Chinese crisis of 1978 – 1979 as will be discussed later.  
 
4.1.2 The communists, the nationalists, and the push towards 
assimilation (1954 – 1975) 
 
After the French colonial rule ended in Vietnam in 1954 after the First Indochina War, in the two 
newly formed Vietnamese nation states the ethnic Chinese or Hoa246 question turned into largely 
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an issue of citizenship, nationality and assimilation. In Southern Vietnam, push towards 
assimilation and adopting Vietnamese citizenship became a persistent part of policy starting from 
the beginning of the first Republic of Vietnam president’s Ngô Đình Diệm247 era and it even 
continued later after the merging of the North and South Vietnam. As a contrast to the approach 
adopted by South Vietnam, in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) a more lenient 
assimilation policy was adopted. Behind this policy in the North Vietnam was a pact that was 
formed between the Chinese Communist Party and the Workers Party of Vietnam (WPV)248 in 
1955, which decreed that the ethnic Chinese could be persuaded to adopt North Vietnamese 
citizenship through soft measures, but not forced to assimilate. This pact later became significant, 
as the interpretation on the contents of the agreement became one of the main points of contention 
between the China and Vietnam during the ethnic Chinese crisis of 1978 – 1979 as China accused 
Vietnam of persecuting and forcibly assimilating the ethnic Chinese in the SRV.249  
In Southern Vietnam, the first years of Ngô Đình Diệm’s regime marked a significant turning 
point in the treatment of the ethnic Chinese, as series of governmental and presidential decrees 
were issued in 1955 and 1956 to coerce ethnic Chinese and other smaller ethnic minority groups 
to adopt South Vietnamese citizenship.250 First, it was decreed that all children born to Chinese-
Vietnamese parents were considered to be Vietnamese citizens and the ethnic Chinese could no 
longer choose between Chinese or Vietnamese citizenship. Then later next year, on August 1956 
it was announced that all ethnic Chinese born in Vietnam were considered to be Vietnamese 
citizens, regardless of their parents or their own wishes. This ruling was meant to apply also 
retroactively. All other Chinese were considered to be aliens and would need to apply for 
residential permits which had to be renewed periodically.251 As a last measure, on September 1956, 
government banned foreigners from engaging in eleven trades252, which were at the time largely 
                                                 
this point used by the Vietnamese (Southern Vietnamese and Northern Vietnamese alike) to denote the ethnic 
Chinese living in Vietnam and the term is still used today.  
247 In addition to becoming the first president of the Republic of Vietnam, Diệm was an anti-communist nationalist 
who, after securing and consolidating power, quickly started to decolonize, modernize and centralize the political 
system of South Vietnam with heavy handed measures. Goscha (2016), p. 283 and 286 – 287.   
248 The Workers Party of Vietnam was the predecessor of the Communist Party of Vietnam in North Vietnam 
during the war. The party was renamed from the Workers Party of Vietnam (Đảng lao động Việt Nam or Lao động) 
to the Communist Party of Vietnam in the Fourth Party Congress held in Hanoi in December 1976, Smith (1977), p. 
195. 
249 Amer (1991), p. 13 – 14. So far, the actual agreement has remained unpublished and therefore its specific 
wording remains unknown, except for one excerpt obtained by Gareth Porter from official of the SRV Foreign 
Ministry in Hanoi in November 1978 which states: "all the work regulating the Hoa people from now on, 
including the problems of mass organizations, newspapers, schools, hospitals, and all other relief associations for 
unemployment and social welfare, will be done by the Vietnamese side. ", Porter (1980), p. 55.  
250 Tong (2010), p. 180 – 181. 
251 Khanh (1993), p. 28 – 29.  
252 According to Amer (1991), p. 19 – 20 these eleven trades were: “Fishmonger, butcher, retailer of products in 
common use (chap-pho?), coal and firewood merchants, dealer in petroleum products, second-hand dealer, textile 
practiced by the ethnic Chinese.253 Businesses of non-Vietnamese engaging in these trades were 
given six months to one year to close down.254 Through placing restrictions on the rights to 
practice professions and on owning businesses, these decrees applied pressure to adopt 
Vietnamese citizenship in a way which was consequential to the ethnic Chinese.255 Furthermore, 
those Chinese nationals in Southern Vietnam who failed to adopt Vietnamese citizenship or 
register as foreigner would be expelled.256 In this manner Diệm’s regime also made clearer the 
distinctions between non-citizens and citizens in the Republic of Vietnam. 
In hindsight these decrees were also significant in the sense that they signalled a permanent shift 
in the ethnic Chinese policies in Southern Vietnam. Even when the Ngô Đình Diệm regime later 
backtracked or laxed some of these restrictions, due to the ethnic Chinese protesting and bringing 
the economy to a standstill temporarily, they were generally successful in achieving their goal.257 
From this point onward, the policies towards the Southern Vietnamese ethnic Chinese changed 
harshly towards forced assimilation.258 Based on research literature I would argue there were few 
distinct reasons for why Diệm’s regime adopted these policies meant to assimilate the ethnic 
Chinese communities. Firstly, with the emergence of Vietnamese nationalism, becoming a 
Vietnamese citizen became more important to the nationalist regime.259 Furthermore, with this 
emergence of nationalism and nation states, the notion of sovereignty, citizenship and nationality 
also had gained importance. Ending the separate citizenship status of the ethnic Chinese was then 
was important from this nation-building perspective. Secondly, the ethnic Chinese were still 
largely unassimilated to the surrounding society by the mid-1950s when Ngô Đình Diệm came to 
power. They had their own language, enclaves, schools, their own communities, community 
leaders, businesses and financial institutions.260  Diệm had the goal of building a centralized 
Vietnamese nation state with nationalized education and its own national language and for this 
reason many elements of the ethnic Chinese practices, identity and culture clashed with these 
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ideas related to state and nation-building. Thirdly, a part of this state-building project was to 
centralize the political and administrative power in the hands of Ngô Đình Diệm’s regime. This 
meant that the ethnic communities’ and religious sects’ autonomies, such as the semi-autonomous 
congregations, that had been established before were to be abolished. 261  Ethnic Chinese 
communities were then one obstacle to be dealt with in this endeavour.  
During the later war years, the general themes of the ethnic policies remained the same. For some 
of the ethnic Chinese the war itself provided lucrative opportunities for illicit trade of supplies 
and contraband.262 Few ethnic Chinese individuals grew also immensely wealthy and were able 
to monopolize certain sections of the economy during the war. Nicknames corresponding to the 
area of expertise of these monopolists, such as the “rice king”, “gasoline king” and “iron and steel 
king” were given to these individuals during the war.263 Behind these monopolies were also close 
connections to South Vietnamese politicians and military leaders and corruption.264 Later when 
the war was over, the communists cracked down on these individuals.265   
All in all, I would argue that from Ngô Đình Diệm’s regime onward, the policies which affected 
ethnic Chinese communities started to be entwined with the general goals of state-building much 
more than before. The state-building itself was fuelled by desires of institutional consolidation, 
consolidation of citizenship and allegiances and by desires of nationalizing education, language 
in Southern Vietnam. Push towards establishing a centralized Vietnamese nation state was an 
effort that begun in Southern Vietnam first during Ngô Đình Diệm’s era and continued later after 
the reunification under the communist rule. Although the methods and goals of state-building 
differed to some extent between these two political entities, the general undertone of Vietnamese 
nationalism scored the actions of both these political regimes when it came to ethnic policies. 
Push towards citizenship and assimilation became consistent traits of these policies. 266   
New important features also emerged to the ethnic Chinese question after the communists took 
over Southern Vietnam in 1975, which affected how the ethnic Chinese became to be ultimately 
treated in Southern Vietnam. After the reunification of Vietnam, the deteriorating Sino-
Vietnamese relations suddenly became the most important factor in determining in the fate of the 
ethnic Chinese communities in Southern Vietnam. Furthermore, in the midst of a severe crisis of 
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relations between the PRC and the SRV, the ethnic Chinese became to be feared to be a potential 
“fifth column”, a group of people set on shaking the society from within.267 Combined with the 
large changes in the Southern Vietnamese society and economic and political system after the 
communists consolidated their power, the presence and political loyalties of the ethnic Chinese in 
Vietnam became to be once again questioned and these factors, among others that will be 
presented in the next chapters, ultimately led to the expulsions. 
 
4.2 The restructuring of the Southern Vietnamese society after 
the war (1975)  
 
For almost thirty years, Vietnam and Vietnamese people had endured the gruesome state of war. 
Since 1945, as many as 3,6 million people had perished as a result of the war.268 From the many 
factions of the war, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and its People’s Army of Vietnam 
(PAVN) alongside their allies in the South had prevailed, first against the French and later against 
the South Vietnamese and the Americans.269 The capital of South Vietnam, Saigon (renamed to 
Ho Chi Minh City after the war), was conquered by the PAVN forces on April 30th 1975 and this 
marked the end to the long war.  
As the ending of the war became apparent, the speculation began on what would happen to the 
South Vietnamese people and society after the war. Punishment campaigns, persecution and even 
non-discriminatory violence were likely possibilities in the minds of some South Vietnamese as 
northern communists took over the South Vietnamese cities rapidly.270 What actually took place 
immediately after the war partly corresponded with these images in peoples’ minds, but not 
wholly. There was no immediate wave of violence or killings. Instead the newly formed Military 
Management Commission271 of Ho Chi Minh city adopted a twin-headed strategy towards the 
post-war restructuring of the Southern Vietnamese society: public campaigns and initiatives to 
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win the hearts and minds of the public were launched which focused on trying to address the 
pressing societal issues, such as economic situation, unemployment, feeding the people and the 
war refugee issue that had resulted from the war. The other focus became creating new 
administrative structures to solidify the communist governance of the South. This included 
creating new party institutions at all levels of government, reshaping old government institutions, 
and taking measures to impose loyalty and political control to all levels of society. In charge of 
implementing these new policies were two political entities which were responsible for the 
governance and forming policy in Southern Vietnam until the formal reunification in 1976 was 
the aforementioned Military Management Commission and the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG, Chính phủ Cách mạng lâm thời Cộng hòa 
miền Nam Việt Nam).272  
Many of the initial measures taken by the communist authorities were targeted towards problems 
that had resulted from the war. For example, as a result of the war, a large portion of the population 
had relocated to urban areas. In 1960, twenty percent of the population lived in urban areas in 
South Vietnam and by 1975 this percentage had increased to forty-three.273 A major reason for 
the migration was that the war and fighting at the countryside had forced people to relocate to 
cities. In addition to this people also moved to the cities to pursue the better economic 
opportunities that were available there. An artificial aid economy, propped up by the generous US 
aid, had created a lot of economic opportunities in the urban centres of Southern Vietnam, 
especially in service, import and retail sectors.274 This artificially propped up economy naturally 
crashed after the Americans left and the economic aid ended, and as the fighting reached the 
economic centres of South Vietnam. The result was rapid inflation and mass unemployment. An 
estimated one million people were unemployed in the urban areas as the northern communists 
seized power in the South.275  
In addition to trying to address issues that had resulted from the war, the building of a centralized 
socialist society in the South began almost immediately.  These policies taken under the guise of 
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“building socialism” (“xây dựng chủ nghĩa xã hội”) in Southern Vietnam included establishing 
state industries in the economic sector, creating state monopolies in education and broadcasting 
and press and creating other socialist and party organizations to establish communist party 
leadership effectively over the whole country.276 In a swift manner the central positions of power 
in the government and party apparatuses were concentrated to the hands of the northern 
communist faction. 277 Civil servants of the old regime were replaced by northern cadres, that were 
deemed to be more loyal to the party and in a similar manner the communists took control of the 
schools and universities.278 Parallel party structures were created for all levels of government and 
administration to secure the political leadership of the communist party.279  
While the re-shaping of the political and economic structures affected people at first mostly 
indirectly and in a roundabout way, what had a more direct effect in peoples’ lives were the 
measures taken to impose loyalty and political control to all levels of society. Many of these 
actions were implemented in a manner stylized after the examples of the PRC and the Soviet 
Union.280 Mass associations that were controlled by the communist party were created to mobilize 
the youth, agricultural workers and workers to strengthen ideological loyalty to the party and to 
the new unified socialist nation.281 People had to join organizations that coincided with their 
occupation, age or sex, and the activities organized by these organizations were mandatory and 
often consumed much of the free time people had.282 These organizations also had an important 
role as acting as a link in between the party leadership, administration and the people, as they 
passed down CPV policies and directives to the common people.283 They also were the part of the 
larger security and citizenship monitoring system that was established in Southern Vietnam, as 
participation and activities inside these organizations were monitored. In many respects, 
monitoring of the citizens by both security agencies and by their peers became part of everyday 
life for Southern Vietnamese citizens.284 Public Security Bureaus were created for every city ward 
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and even smaller security units to individual street blocs.285 Travelling and moving to another 
location was not allowed unless you had a special permission signed by the authorities.286 
Almost immediately after the war mandatory political re-education was ordered for all former 
South Vietnamese military officers, former South Vietnamese politicians, professors, policemen 
and other societal figures which were branded as dangerous by the communist authorities. 287 
Although for most of the detainees the re-education was rather quick, between 1 week to four 
weeks, for some of the higher-ranked officials of the former regime, the re-education lasted for 
over twenty years.288 Conditions were often harsh in these camps where the more “stubborn 
elements” were kept and malnutrition and starvation were commonplace in these camps.289 In 
general, people’s background and past deeds during and before the war became the yard stick by 
which they were measured and through which their post-war fate could be assessed through. 
Forcing those who had been affiliated with the former government to re-education was just one 
example of this in action. To assess people’s backgrounds, a household management system was 
created, in which each member of the household had to fill in an autobiographical statement (lý 
lịch, “background”), which included information of their current occupation, family relations, 
ethnicity and faith.290 These documents had significant importance as the contents within them 
ultimately determined whether you would gain access to education or to government jobs, or 
whether you would rather be sent to re-education.291 Based on background people were effectively 
then divided into “good elements” and “bad elements” and representing the latter meant that you 
could be systematically discriminated against, your property and excess wealth could be 
confiscated, you could be placed under tighter surveillance or even incarcerated.292 
These developments are important to outline, because they highlight both the circumstances after 
the war and the fact that in the new Southern society, it was the communist authorities and the 
CPV policies and directives which dictated who was to be regarded as “good” or “bad” element 
and which groups were to be subjected to which kind of treatment. Through rationing policies, 
they could even decide who was able to receive which kind of food and when.293  Around 6,5 
million people (of total of 20 million in Southern Vietnam) were according to a Hanoi 
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spokesperson regarded as being “compromised” in some form in 1975 due to the fact that they 
themselves or their family members had served in the government or army of the former regime 
or been part of anti-communist political party or mass organization.294 This estimate of course 
only includes those who were compromised through their or their family’s collaboration during 
or after the war. Your class status and being of the “unproductive” group in the labour force also 
subjected you to differentiated treatment.295  
In the case of the ethnic Chinese in Southern Vietnam, while they were not often the ones who 
were sent to re-education camps or even discriminated against on a large scale at first, we can see 
from later chapters that in a similar manner to other people who were subjected to differentiated 
treatment immediately after the war in the new Southern Vietnamese society, the ethnic Chinese 
as a group also became slowly branded as being a dangerous potential fifth column in Vietnam 
and the targets of their very own CPV policies and directives.  
 
4.2.1 The immediate effects for the ethnic Chinese communities 
in Southern Vietnam (1975 – 1976) 
 
The ethnic Chinese communities of Southern Vietnam were also affected by the stark political 
changes which took place in the society after the war in 1975. In a quick manner, education was 
nationalized and ideologized. As a result, many of the ethnic Chinese community schools that 
used Chinese as their primary language were either closed down or Vietnamized.296 Few months 
after the war, traditional culture and business organizations of the ethnic Chinese were also shut 
down, alongside community newspapers and pagodas that had been founded when congregations 
were still active.297 On an individual level people were at first subjected to similar treatment as 
other Vietnamese by the communist authorities and security officials.  
In general, we do not have a lot of available sources or accounts on how the life changed for the 
average ethnic Chinese individual in Southern Vietnam after the communists took over, at least 
before second half of 1978 when masses of refugees started arriving to other countries. Where we 
can find pieces of information are the general accounts of life in Southern Vietnam in the western 
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newspapers who had correspondents in the area or visited the area, in first-hand accounts of 
Southern Vietnamese citizens published after the events took place and research literature dealing 
with ethnic Chinese communities in Southern Vietnam. Due to this lack of first-hand accounts, 
this chapter highlights some of the general changes in economy and in the Southern Vietnamese 
society and analyzes their significance to the ethnic Chinese communities and individuals in 
Southern Vietnam.  
After the war, the economic landscape changed drastically in Southern Vietnam and this had its 
own effects for the ethnic Chinese communities. In relation to the economic reform, the 
communists adopted an approach of “gradual socialist reform of the national economy” in 
Southern Vietnam.298 This meant that the steps towards socializing the economy would be taken 
over time and not immediately. At first, even the relatively free-enterprise system was allowed 
continue, although the authorities began to supervise some of the bigger private businesses and 
industries.299 Some parts of the private economy were however nationalized immediately, such as 
banking sector and many of the larger privately-owned companies, and by 1976 this included 
almost all of production industries.300 The goal of the nationalizations was for the state agencies 
to eventually control all means of production. 
Another priority for the Vietnamese policymakers was to combat hoarders and speculators that 
had emerged during the war years and to stop the “comprador bourgeoisie”/capitalists in Southern 
Vietnam and this had an effect on ethnic Chinese businesses and businessmen.301  Few months 
after the war, a special mass campaign titled “X1” was started by the Provincial Revolutionary 
Government on September 11th, 1975. It aimed to confiscate “all or part of the property of the 
comprador bourgeoisie [individuals]” in Southern Vietnam.302 The extent of the confiscations 
would according to a government communiqué be dependent on the “seriousness of their 
crimes.”303 The campaign specifically targeted the leading businessmen, industry owners and 
monopolists of Southern Vietnam.304 Not all of those who were targeted by the campaign were 
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found to be part of the comprador bourgeoisie, but from those who were deemed to belong to this 
class, around seventy percent were ethnic Chinese.305 In general, the portion of the well-off 
businessmen who were punished by the authorities represented only a small portion of the ethnic 
Chinese community in Southern Vietnam, as most of the ethnic Chinese were either small 
business owners, service personnel or regular employees.306 Yet, the accusations were a serious 
matter, as according to Khanh (1993) several of those who were arrested committed suicide.307 
This campaign affected the ethnic Chinese business community and business infrastructure 
adversely and it was the first demonstration of the ideological economic mass campaigns that the 
authorities undertook to reshape the economic sphere in Southern Vietnam after the war. 
The ethnic Chinese population in Southern Vietnam was also affected in many ways by the new 
economic policies meant to change the economic landscape in the SRV. Bolstering agricultural 
production became an economic priority in the SRV and Vietnamese authorities planned to 
increase production through land development and collectivization of agriculture.308 To realize 
these plans, a policy of “building new economic zones” (“xây dựng các vùng kinh tế mới”) was 
started in June 1975. Much of the countryside had been ravaged by the war and a lot of wartime 
refugees had come to the cities as countryside had become unhabitable.309 The New Economic 
Zones (NEZ) aimed to develop agriculture in those areas that had been destroyed by the war, 
transform areas that had not been formerly developed for agriculture into land for agricultural 
production and to send people back to their native villages.310 Government promised free land, 
transportation and rice rations for six months to those who would go these zones voluntarily.  This 
population transfer policy was at first marketed to the urban unemployed and underemployed, to 
people who had lived previously in the countryside before the war and to the problematic political 
groups, such as the soldiers of the former South Vietnamese regime. The departure was also said 
to be voluntary.311 However, by the time a second Five-Year-Plan (1976 – 1980) was set in motion 
in the Fourth Party Congress of the CPV in late 1976, quotas on how many people should be sent 
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to the New Economic Zones were part of the official economic plans.312 The aspect of going to 
the New Economic Zones being based on own volition was soon forgotten by the authorities.313 
Very quickly it became apparent that if at any point you would find yourself underemployed or 
unemployed, you could be sent to the New Economic Zones. 314 This mattered as the New 
Economic Zones were often unforgiving territories and rumors quickly spread of the harsh life 
that would await there.315 In a similar manner to other people living in the cities, many ethnic 
Chinese individuals were reluctant to go to the New Economic Zones.316  
Often the economic interests of even the small businesses owners did not align with the new 
policies taken to reform the economy. Policies taken to redistribute wealth and to gradually move 
towards centrally planned socialist economy affected the ethnic Chinese communities’ livelihoods 
substantially as they were strongly represented in all aspects of business sector.317 On the other 
hand the strong representation and role of the ethnic Chinese communities in the private sector 
also meant that gaining control over the economy was also difficult for the state agencies and 
policy makers responsible for the economic planning. 318  Exacerbating this problem for the 
authorities was the fact that they had to break monopolies established during the war for example 
in rice and gasoline trade. 319  Gaining control over the economy was especially difficult as 
corruption, hoarding and black-market activity were prevalent in the bigger cities, like in Ho Chi 
Minh City. Hoarding and black-market activities were also issues, which brought the ethnic 
Chinese communities especially in Cholon to the radar of the local authorities and policy 
makers. 320  Several measures ranging from currency reforms to harshening punishments for 
hoarding were implemented to stop hoarding and rampant inflation that had partly resulted from 
it.321 Among these measures was also the X1 campaign. From the newspaper articles and from 
different accounts, it can be discerned that hoarding and black-market activity continued to be a 
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constant menace to the authorities and undermined their goals for controlling the economy.322 
Although the speculators were not in the statements of Vietnamese authorities at the time 
identified as being ethnic Chinese, during the expulsion campaign in a propaganda dossier 
published by Hanoi Foreign Language press in 1978 a group of “capitalist of Chinese origin” were 
mentioned as having worked against the revolution and socialist transformation of capitalist 
industry by speculating, hoarding and raising prices among other methods.323 
Alongside other immediate post-war reforms, a naturalization of the ethnic Chinese in Southern 
Vietnam also took place. This happened in a roundabout manner, as everyone had to register to 
vote in the April 1976 National Assembly general elections which held special symbolic 
significance as these were the first countrywide elections since the civil war had started. The 
voters were issued new identification cards that became essential for everything, including for 
receiving rations.324 With this mandatory voting and registration the ethnic Chinese effectively 
became Vietnamese citizens on paper.325  This naturalization of the ethnic Chinese was later 
disputed by the PRC, as a conflict over the treatment of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam emerged 
between SRV and PRC. 
 
4.3 The rifts in the Sino-Vietnamese alliance and the ethnic 
Chinese (1975 – 1977) 
 
The relationship between Vietnam and China steadily worsened after the Vietnam war ended in 
1975 and this came to have major repercussions for the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. The four major 
strains on the relations between the two countries were the territorial disputes, escalating conflict 
between Vietnam and Cambodia, disputes over aid and Vietnam’s deepening alliance with the 
Soviet Union instead of China. Small scale border clashes between the PRC and the SRV had 
risen from 100 cases in 1974 to 400 in 1975 and kept increasing yearly.326 Complicating these 
issues was the fact that no official border treaty had been signed between the PRC and the SRV. 
The last official treaty had been signed during the colonial times by French Colonial authorities 
and Manchu court in 1887.327 As a result of this “border-vacuum”, both Vietnam and China were 
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then trying to change the territorial status quo in their favour in the border between them and in 
the Spratly and Paracel islands.328  In addition to the border problems, there had also been serious 
disputes over the amount of aid the PRC was giving to the DRV already between 1972 - 1975, 
and disputes over the aid continued after 1975.329 After 1975, the PRC categorically rejected 
requests for non-refundable aid and delayed the delivery of existing aid support projects.330 This 
further strained the two countries relationship as after the war Vietnam relied heavily on aid to 
rebuild its war-ravaged country and economy.331  
At the root of the problems between these two countries was that starting from late 1960s, North 
Vietnam had steadily started to lean more towards Soviet Union in military support and aid. 
Throughout the different conflicts the PRC had traditionally been the DRV’s most vigorous 
supporter.332 The PRC had been the first country to recognize North Vietnam diplomatically and 
had provided large amounts of artillery, firearms and ammunition among other aid to the DRV 
since 1949. 333  Contrastingly, the USSR had not really been interested in supporting the 
Vietnamese revolution until a major re-alignment of policy took place as a result of change in the 
Soviet leadership and as American escalation of the war happened.334 Yet, even when both the 
PRC and the USSR were supporting North Vietnam during the war, the triangular relationship 
between the DRV, the PRC and the USSR was complicated as the relations between the two major 
powers in the socialist bloc had steadily worsened during the 1950s and effectively broken down 
in 1961.335 This meant that Vietnam had to balance between the demands and politics of these 
two powers if it would want to continue to receive aid from both of them. In addition to this 
difficult situation, the PRC was especially complicating this triangular relationship by torpedoing 
all initiatives for trilateral co-operation and increasingly demanding that the SRV should side with 
the PRC on ideological issues and debates that were debated at the time between the PRC and the 
USSR.336 However, already in 1965, the Vietnamese leadership were according to their own 
words frustrated with some of the PRC’s leaderships and especially Mao’s positions on politics, 
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Vietnamese conflict and co-operation matters, and this was perhaps one of the reasons why the 
SRV started to gradually lean more towards the Soviet Union.337 
This re-alignment, albeit at first slight, naturally brought tensions also to the relationship between 
the PRC and the DRV/SRV, as both major powers were trying to bring the SRV under their 
respective spheres of influence.338  After the war, the territorial disputes that emerged between the 
PRC and the SRV complicated the two countries relationship.339 In addition to this, after the 
fighting had ended and Vietnam was starting to focus on rebuilding, the Chinese leaders told the 
Vietnamese leadership in a meeting in Beijing that the PRC’s economic assistance to Vietnam 
would be substantially reduced.340 Most likely due to these factors, in addition to the previous 
difficulties in dealing with the PRC during the war, the SRV decided to deepen co-operation with 
the USSR rather than the PRC after 1975.341 By June 1977, after series of high-level meetings 
between Vietnamese and Soviet leaders in Moscow, Vietnam had secured additional support and 
aid for “all-round” co-operation from the Soviet Union and this ushered in a new era of deepening 
co-operation between these two countries.342  Finally in June 1978 Vietnam joined the Soviet-led 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), which finalized the co-operative alliance 
with the Soviet Union and reliance on Soviet support.343 
While these tensions were running high in the background, publicly both the SRV and the PRC 
maintained the appearance that things between them were fine, at least until late 1977, when the 
border conflicts started to intensify.344  However, according to Path (2012), already in July 1976 
in an internal report of the Vietnamese ministry of foreign affairs outlined some emerging issues 
regarding the border disputes and China’s mobilization of ethnic Chinese communities along the 
border.345 This document is the first indication of the fact that the Vietnamese authorities had 
started to be wary of the ethnic Chinese communities along the northern border and the possibility 
of the PRC using these communities to interfere in Vietnamese affairs already in mid-1976. 
Another show of distrust towards the Chinese was that in December 1976 in the Fourth National 
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Party Congress of the CPV, the pro-Chinese faction members were dropped from the CPV 
Politburo. In the same conference, a more aggressive stance was also adopted towards border 
disputes with Cambodia that had started in 1975.346 This meant that Vietnam was effectively 
engaged in border conflicts on both its western and northern borders.  
The border conflicts between China and Vietnam continued to escalate in the second half of 1977, 
as the number of border clashes between these two countries kept rising steadily.347 As a result of 
increasing border conflicts, some measures to address the perceived security risk of the ethnic 
Chinese in Northern Vietnam were taken. Surveillance of the ethnic Chinese communities was 
ramped up and members of the community who were cadres or had an important political position 
were dismissed from their jobs. Some of the ethnic Chinese who had ties to CCP through ethnic 
Chinese organizations were also arrested348 
In November 1977, Vietnam started to expel those Chinese who were not Vietnamese citizens 
from three Northwest provinces bordering China.349  In contrast to the situation in Southern 
Vietnam, not all ethnic Chinese in the North had been forced to adopt Vietnamese citizenship and 
therefore some were still Chinese. The expelled were these individuals who possessed Chinese 
citizenship or Chinese nationals who had come to work or trade in Vietnam.350 The expulsions 
had been preceded by a new fifteen-point order in April 1977 on how foreign residents or non-
naturalized citizens could be treated in Vietnam, which gave basis for the expulsions of these non-
citizens.351 According to this ordinance signed by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, Vietnamese 
government had the right to decide where foreign residents can reside and approve their 
movements. Other restrictions were also placed on foreigners, such as ban on certain professions 
and being able to participate in elections.352 It could be stated that from this point onward the CPV 
started to adopt harsher measures towards the ethnic Chinese who it deemed pose a security risk 
in Vietnam. The political loyalties of those Chinese who had not adopted a Vietnamese citizenship 
became to be questioned as the conflict between China and Vietnam escalated. Later in 1978, this 
questioning of political loyalties seemed to expand to the whole ethnic Chinese population 
permanently residing in the SRV.353 
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It is important to note that the measures taken towards the ethnic Chinese in the North were not 
at first applied towards the ethnic Chinese population in the South. There are few possible reasons 
for this. The Southern and Northern ethnic Chinese populations posed very different challenges 
to the CPV in terms of security and policy. This stemmed from the fact that the ethnic Chinese 
population differed greatly between Northern and Southern Vietnam. These populations differed 
not only in their geographical closeness to China, but also in economic power, size, cultural and 
occupational diversity and in political orientation towards the PRC and the SRV.354 In Southern 
Vietnam the ethnic Chinese communities presented problems to proceeding with the socialist 
reform of the national economy, as they were dominant part of the private trader community that 
still existed in Southern Vietnam.355 Without eventually abolishing private trade and gaining 
control over the means of production the socialist reform of the economy could not be realized. 
Most likely the ethnic Chinese in Southern Vietnam were also not thought to pose a security risk 
in a similar manner in the escalating border conflict along the northern border and therefore these 
security measures were not applied to them. However, later in March 1978, when private trade 
was in a swift manner banned in Vietnam and the expulsion campaign was started, the situation 
changed drastically for the ethnic Chinese in Southern Vietnam also.  
 
4.4 The people caught between the rhetoric and actions (1977 – 
1978) 
 
From late 1977 onwards diplomatic disputes emerged between the PRC and the SRV over several 
issues, of which one the most important one was the issue of the treatment of the ethnic Chinese 
in Vietnam. There were few major developments which contributed to these diplomatic disputes 
emerging. The first one was the escalation of the border conflicts between  the SRV and Cambodia 
and the SRV and the PRC. By second half of 1977, both Vietnamese and Cambodian forces were 
making border incursion to the other sides’ territories and these clashes quickly spiralled into an 
open conflict. Vietnam even reintroduced draft as the conflict became more serious and this time 
it also included the ethnic Chinese individuals who had previously been exempt from it due to 
special privileges.356 The PRC sided in the conflict with Cambodia and urged for immediate 
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, creating another point of contention between 
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the PRC and the SRV.357 At this point the border conflicts between the PRC and the SRV had also 
already become a major point of contention between the two countries. Between October 1977 
and March 1978 series of bilateral negotiations on the border issues between the PRC and the 
SRV were held and the Vietnamese notes on these negotiations demonstrate that the relations 
were already at this point severely strained.358 These negotiations were unable to resolve the 
differences between China and Vietnam and as a result the militarization on the northern border 
continued and the threat of open conflict between these two countries kept rising.359 
The second development was the CCP formulating a new policy in late 1977 on overseas Chinese. 
As a result of this new policy the overseas Chinese question quickly became an important 
domestic, foreign policy and diplomatic issue for the PRC. Historically, the different Chinese 
states had traditionally acted as guardians of the ethnic Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, 
but during the Cultural Revolution the overseas Chinese had become ideologically suspect and 
undesirables from class standpoint.360 During this period the CCP had abandoned its active policy 
towards these communities, but later after the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in September 1976, 
the CCP decided again to formulate new policy towards the overseas Chinese.361 As a result, 
preparatory conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs was held between November – December 
1977 in the PRC and as a result a new State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (国务院侨
务办公室, Guówùyuàn qiáowù bàngōngshì) was established as an administrative office under the 
PRC State Council in early 1978.362 The overseas Chinese were announced to be “part of Chinese 
nation” and they were called to participate in modernization of the Chinese nation. Furthermore, 
in an official statement in the conference the PRC also outlined that it would protect the legitimate 
interests and rights of the overseas Chinese who had Chinese citizenship.363 Two months later in 
the first session of the Fifth National People’s Congress on February 1978, Chairman of the CCP 
Hua Guofeng outlined that China would oppose “any attempt to compel overseas Chinese to 
change their citizenship” and that it would protect those overseas Chinese that decided to keep 
their Chinese citizenship.364  
After the new policy was formed, the ethnic Chinese issue became a key issue in the Sino-
Vietnamese relations. Already before this in June 1977, Chinese premier Li Xiannian had 
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reportedly raised the issue of the treatment of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam in bilateral talks 
between the two countries.365 The major issues emerged later however, as in late March 1978 
private trade was banned in Vietnam and sometime in late March – early April of 1978 the 
expulsions of the ethnic Chinese in the Northern Vietnam began.366 These two events affected the 
ethnic Chinese individuals in Vietnam significantly and after them the diplomatic protests by the 
PRC grew in volume and their tone harshened. 
At the heart of the argument between these two countries on the topic of the treatment of these 
contested “Chinamese” were three issues. The first one was the naturalization of the ethnic 
Chinese in Southern Vietnam. The SRV regarded that they had become Vietnamese citizens 
already twenty years ago, while the PRC argued that they had been forcibly naturalized and that 
this was breaking the 1955 agreement between the two parties on the naturalization of the ethnic 
Chinese in Vietnam.367 The second issue was the expulsions, which the PRC protested against on 
several occasions. The SRV however never officially admitted to expelling the ethnic Chinese.368 
The third issue was the general treatment of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. The PRC argued that 
the SRV had stepped up its discriminatory practices towards ethnic Chinese and that it had 
persecuted and expelled them, as well as made it harder for them to make a living in Vietnam.369 
Related to this third issue was also then the issues of the expulsions and the ban of private trade 
in Vietnam.  
The most distressing issue for the PRC seemed to be the issue of expulsions. As a first response 
to the issue of expulsions, on the 30th of April 1978, Head of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office 
issued a statement which condemned the expulsion of the “Chinese residents” by Vietnamese 
authorities.370 According to the PRC, 40 000 expelled refugees had gone to China during the 
month of April alone.371As the number of refugees kept growing, the PRC continued to protest 
the expulsions diplomatically. In an official letter sent to the SRV on 12th of May 1978, the PRC 
accused Vietnam of expelling Chinese immigrants since early 1977 along the border and of 
intensifying and expanding these expulsions to Chinese nationals in early 1978.372 The harshest 
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accusations however came from the PRC on 24th of May as Overseas Chinese Affairs Office put 
out a statement which accused the SRV of ostracizing and persecuting Chinese residents in 
Vietnam.373 Few days later on the 26th of May, in a surprise move the PRC announced that it 
would send two ships to Vietnam to bring home these persecuted Chinese.374  
This announcement by the PRC sparked a two-month long debate over whether Chinese ships 
could come pick up the persecuted Chinese it referred to with the term nànqiáo (南桥, which can 
be translated as “overseas countrymen in distress”) from Vietnam.375 Vietnamese representatives 
however refuted that there were any victimized Chinese in Vietnam.376 As Godley (1980) pointed 
out in his article A summer cruise to nowhere - China and the Vietnamese Chinese in perspective, 
at the centre of this argument were the terms both sides used for the ethnic Chinese. The PRC 
referred to ethnic Chinese in Vietnam as being Chinese nationals and the SRV stated that the 
ethnic Chinese were Vietnamese citizens and insisted that they were Vietnamese of Chinese origin 
or Hoa.377 Behind these different terms was the issue of the citizenship of the ethnic Chinese in 
Vietnam that the PRC was trying to dispute. 
While the debate raged over whether the PRC could send two ships to Vietnam to pick up the 
ethnic Chinese, from April to early July over 160 000 ethnic Chinese had already crossed the 
border over to the PRC from Vietnam either by foot or by boat.378 As a response to the sheer 
number of people crossing the border to China, the PRC closed its land border with the SRV on 
July 11th, 1978.379 In addition to the now closed border between the two countries, another signal 
of the worsening crisis in Sino-Vietnamese relations was the fact that after in total fourteen 
sessions of talks on the repatriation by boat, these negotiations also ultimately ended in failure on 
the July 19th, as the PRC and the SRV could not agree on the general terms for the repatriation 
and on the specific terms the people for repatriation would be selected.380 After this the talks over 
the general ethnic Chinese issue continued later on a Vice Foreign Minister level.381 
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During the two months of talks, preparations had however been made for the possible sealift of 
the ethnic Chinese. During the month of June, special registration offices had been set up in 
several places in Ho Chi Minh City and Haiphong for the purpose of this sealift.382 Those wanting 
to leave to the PRC had to register either with their local ward’s people’s committee or at the 
special registration offices that had been set up for the purpose of registration.383 The registration 
was popular among the ethnic Chinese especially in Southern Vietnam.384 Many ethnic Chinese 
individuals wanted to leave Vietnam as their livelihood had been disrupted by the ban on private 
trade and as making a living was becoming harder.385 However, as Nguyễn Long, a refugee who 
paid to leave Vietnam in 1979 with a group of ethnic Chinese recounts, many of the ethnic Chinese 
in Ho Chi Minh City at that time also had reservations of going from one communist country to 
another.386 However, as the negotiations failed, nothing eventually came out of these registrations 
as the evacuation talks were dropped.387 
After the failed talks on the possible evacuations, the second phase of the negotiations on the 
ethnic Chinese issues started on the August 8th.388 In these talks the issue of ethnic Chinese 
refugees who had been stranded at the Sino-Vietnamese border came up and the nationality and 
the expulsion issues were further debated. 389 Yet, behind the scenes the failure of the first 
repatriation negotiation and growing indifferences on the ethnic Chinese question between the 
two countries only seemed to encourage Vietnam to continue expelling the ethnic Chinese. The 
closure of the Sino-Vietnamese land border had temporarily halted the flow of refugees to China, 
but this only prompted the CPV changed its expulsion strategy; it would now start selling 
government sanctioned departures by boat through another program to the ethnic Chinese, while 
                                                 
382 AFP and Reuter, “Vietnamese prepare for mass exodus”, SCMP, Jun. 17th, 1978, AFP, “Thousands wait for 
rescue ships”, SCMP, Jun. 22nd, 1978 and Godley (1980), p. 42.  
383 AFP and Reuter, “Vietnamese prepare for mass exodus”, SCMP, Jun. 17th, 1978, AFP, “Thousands wait for 
rescue ships”, SCMP, Jun. 22nd, 1978 and Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 49 – 50. According to the SCMP article 
on 22nd of June, 24 of such offices had been set up in Ho Chi Minh City’s Cholon alone.  
384 Basing on the estimations in the articles of Benoit (1982), Chang (1982) and Porter (1980), Amer (2013), p. 12, 
offered an estimation that between 30 – 40 percent to about 75 percent of ethnic Chinese in Ho Chi Minh City 
would have registered to leave by the end of 1978. According to my own research this statement is not accurate, as 
these registrations did not in all likelihood continue until the end of 1978, but rather were discontinued after the 
negotiations failed on the possibility of sealift between the PRC and the SRV. In fact, what I argue is that there 
were registrations for two programs started around this same period: the first one was the free registration for ethnic 
Chinese to depart to the PRC, which was most likely discontinued when the negotiations failed and the second was 
the program to “go abroad officially” (see Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 47 – 50) which required people to pay a 
large sum of gold to Vietnamese officials to depart and did not have specific country of destination.  
385 Butterfield, Fox, “Chinese harassed in Vietnam: Refugee’s Tales of Woe”, Times of India, Jun 3rd, 1978 and 
Butterfield, Fox, “Reasons behind Hanoi persecution”, SCMP, May 30th, 1978. 
386 Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 47 – 48.  
387 Amer (2013), p. 13 and Godley (1980), p. 53 and 56.  
388 Godley (1980), p. 53.  
389 Godley (1980), p. 53 – 55.  
disguising these departures as clandestine departures.390 According to Nguyễn Long, in Ho Chi 
Minh City the ethnic Chinese community leaders in Cholon were approached by the communist 
authorities with the offer to “go abroad officially”. The offer was accepted, and the ethnic Chinese 
community leaders established an organization to liaison with the communist authorities.391 The 
program was started and by the end of the year, it was working regularly and Vietnamese 
authorities had established an orderly schedule for the departures.392 This “refugee machine”, as 
it was dubbed by a classified U.S State Department’s report in 1979, was being set up by the CPV 
and by the Vietnamese authorities in secrecy during the summer of 1978, while publicly the 
diplomatic talks between the PRC and the SRV over the treatment of the ethnic Chinese 
continued.393 This new program not only continued the expulsion policies adopted in early 1978 
in a different form, but also shaped the whole public face of the Indochina refugee crisis, as 
suddenly tens of thousands of weather-beaten and worn Vietnamese refugees or “boat people”, as 
they became to be known, started to appear in the second half of 1978 on the shores and ports of 
Southeast Asian countries and Hong Kong.394  
In the next chapters I will analyse the developments and different phases of the whole expulsion 
campaign more closely and highlight the reasonings behind the expulsion campaign further.  
 
5.Vietnam’s expulsion campaign 1978 – 1979 
 
This chapter examines how the ethnic Chinese expulsion campaign was implemented in Vietnam 
between 1978 and 1979 and highlights the role of the Vietnamese government in creating the 
Vietnamese boat people crisis that emerged during these years. The sub-chapters 5.1 and 5.1.1 
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focus on explaining the first steps of the expulsion campaign and the early decisions that the CPV 
took to deal with the problems that the ethnic Chinese were perceived to cause in Southern and 
Northern Vietnam. The sub-chapter 5.2 examines in-depth how the departure program that the 
Vietnamese authorities started in Southern Vietnam worked and the 5.2.1 highlights how the 
program enabled systemic corruption to flourish. The last sub-chapter 5.3 examines the refugee 
outflows from Vietnam and how the different decisions by CPV during the expulsion campaign 
ultimately affected the number of people leaving Vietnam.  
 
5.1 The first steps of the ethnic Chinese expulsion campaign in 
Southern and Northern Vietnam 
 
In early 1978, two important decisions that had lasting consequences for the ethnic Chinese 
communities in Vietnam were greenlit by the CPV politburo. The first decision decided by the 
Politburo in mid-February 1978 was to swiftly ban all private trade in the country. 395  The 
campaign to ban the private trade, codenamed “X2”, was started on March 23rd. The campaign 
was effectively also a clampdown on the economic power and structures still controlled by the 
ethnic Chinese in Southern Vietnam.396 The second decision, greenlit sometime in March 1978, 
was the adoption of a policy of expulsion towards the ethnic Chinese in Northern Vietnam.397 In 
practice it meant that the Ministry of Interior (Bộ Nội vụ) issued an order of allowing ethnic 
Chinese people to leave voluntarily for China, but that at the same time systematic pressure was 
applied to the ethnic Chinese population to make sure they would leave.398 These can be seen to 
have been the first steps in the expulsion campaign that sought to diminish the influence of the 
ethnic Chinese (and as extension the PRC’s influence) in Vietnam’s domestic situation, confiscate 
their property and wealth and to make them leave Vietnam.  
The decision to ban private trade was one of the final steps in the “gradual socialist reform of the 
national economy” in Southern Vietnam and in unifying the national economic system and as 
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such, it was carefully planned and implemented.399 Already in July 1976 the General Secretary of 
the CPV Lê Duẩn told in a speech to the National Assembly that the CPV must: 
“Undertake socialist transformation of private capitalist industry and commerce, 
agriculture, handicraft and small trade through appropriate measures and steps. We 
[must] also combine transformation and building in order actively to steer the economy 
of the South into the orbit of socialism and integrate the economies of both zones in a 
single system of large-scale socialism.”400  
A year later in July 1977, an announcement was made by Lê Duẩn that the government would 
soon seize control over the industries and commerce in Southern Vietnam.401 To manage this 
campaign, the Committee for the Transformation of Industry and Trade was created by the CPV 
Central Committee the same month, and senior party official Nguyễn Văn Linh was appointed to 
head it.402 After this, few months later in September 1977, another announcement was made, 
which mandated that all governments offices must streamline their personnel, as more trained 
cadres were required in the South.403 Finally in early 1978, thousands of new northern cadres 
replaced some of the previous cadres and reinforced the administration in Southern Vietnam, and 
as an additional measure, the party leadership was also overhauled in Ho Chi Minh City.404 
These new administrative structures and cadre changes were in all likelihood a response to the 
previous failures in Southern Vietnam’s economic management and to the rampart corruption that 
had existed among the cadres in the South.405 The campaign had to be carefully implemented for 
it to work, as previous economic measures taken for government agencies to stop hoarding and 
control the prices of essential products in Southern Vietnam had failed.406 Food shortages had also 
emerged in the whole country by 1977 and contributing factors to this were prolonged droughts 
and natural disasters and government mismanagement, creating urgency to hasten the economic 
reforms and to fix economy.407 Due to these reasons, it was essential to have new capable and 
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loyal management to oversee the final steps of the socialist reform in the South. Exemplifying this 
desire for reliable management was a last minute change in leadership of the campaign, as the 
man who had been in charge of the socialist transformation in the North in the late 1950s, Đỗ 
Mười, was also put in charge of implementing the campaign.408 
The actual campaign started with one swift strike meant to paralyze the entire private economic 
sphere in Southern Vietnam, as on the night of March 23rd, 1978 tens of thousands members of 
para-security force comprised of police, students and cadres appeared on the doors of every 
business and business owner in Cholon and confiscated goods and assets under the pretext of 
taking inventory of these items.409 According to Nguyen Van Canh (2017), similar scenes took 
place all throughout Southern Vietnam at the same time.410 The next day on the 24th of March, an 
announcement was made that all wholesale trade and big business activity was outlawed. This 
effectively forced all business activity to close down.411 The ban on all private was cemented with 
an order forbidding private trade on the 31st of March in the whole country.412 All in all, the 
massive operations to close down businesses and take inventory throughout Vietnam continued 
into mid-April.413 
In addition to the closure of private shops, stands and other places of business, the bourgeois 
traders and service personnel would be transferred to work in production. According to an order 
by Vice-Premier Đỗ Mười, the bourgeois traders could switch to working in production: 
“In conforming with the State lines, policies, programs and plans, and in accordance with 
the requirements of economic zoning and diversification and the redistribution of 
production forces and populations throughout the country and in each location.. 
Bourgeois households having to move to [New Economic Zones] designed by local 
authorities to carry out production will be given State assistance in transporting their 
families and property.”414  
What this meant in practice was that the private traders and service personnel were being forced 
to shift to work in production and some of them would be transferred to the New Economic Zones.  
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The consequences of the ban on private trade for many ethnic Chinese individuals were far-
reaching. A large majority of the ethnic Chinese in Ho Chi Minh City before the Fall of Saigon 
had been either small-traders or employees.415 According to Khanh (1993), the small and medium 
sized businesses had been allowed to exist well after 1975, with 93% of pre-communist era 
businesses being open still by the end of 1976.416 Now these ethnic Chinese traders classified by 
communists as non-comprador bourgeoisie417 were being transferred to work in production. How 
many ethnic Chinese were exactly transferred to the New Economic Zones either voluntarily or 
as a result of coercion during and after this campaign is unknown, but Goscha (2016) states that 
in total in 1977 New Economic Zones were home to 120 000 and in 1978 already to estimated 
half a million.418 Even accounting for population growth and for the continuing transfers of people 
to these areas, this number tells that the population transfers were ramped up significantly during 
1978 and this increase was most likely also tied to these decrees of moving former non-comprador 
bourgeoisie to work in production.  
Overall, these measures had several effects. The ethnic Chinese communities in Ho Chi Minh 
City organized several protests to demonstrate against these measures.419 Being ordered to go to 
New Economic Zones, young ethnic Chinese being drafted to the army due to the Cambodian 
conflict and the violent crackdown on private trade and seizures of private property were reported 
to be the main concerns among the protestors according to group of refugees who came to Hong 
Kong and were interviewed in early April.420    
The ban on private trade making the bad economic situation worse for many individuals also had 
lasting impact on their willingness to depart from Vietnam. The UNHCR reported that the month 
of April saw the highest number of refugees fleeing communist Indochina by boat since the ending 
of the Vietnam War in 1975.421 The departures by boat for each month doubled from previous 
levels before campaign during the summer months of 1978, so the effect of the campaign was 
evident.422 According to Nguyễn Long’s (1981) account, many ethnic Chinese in Ho Chi Minh 
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City started looking for a way to leave Vietnam around this time, either by illegally escaping or 
by joining the groups up north leaving for China.423 These numbers only returned to the pre-April 
1978 levels when the expulsion campaign was ended after the conference on Indochina refugees 
in Geneve.424 
The campaign to ban private trade was generally successful in achieving its primary goal. 
However, while the primary motives of the campaign can be seen to have been linked to reforming 
the national economy, the question whether or not the campaign had secondary motives, such as 
wanting to break the economic power of the ethnic Chinese in Southern Vietnam or to make them 
leave by discriminating against them during the campaign, has been discussed in academic 
literature since the events took place.425 If we look at the previous major developments behind the 
campaign and their timeline, we can see that the first practical measures towards realizing the 
campaign had already been taken nine months earlier and the need to bring the country under one 
economic system had been discussed since even before the formal reunification. From this 
perspective, the idea that one of the principal motives behind the campaign would have been to 
target the ethnic Chinese population specifically cannot be supported. However, if we put the 
campaign into the context of the previous X1-campaign, which aimed to stop hoarding, 
nationalized some of their property and targeted the comprador bourgeoisie elite in order to 
strengthen the government’s control over the economy, we can see that this second campaign 
learned from many of the mistakes of the first one. The campaign was started with a swift strike 
to the heart of the Southern Vietnam’s legitimate and illegitimate trade, Cholon, and its reach was 
bigger this time, as now all private businesses and even some private residences had their 
inventory searched and counted and unaccounted wealth was confiscated.426 By examining the 
implementation of the campaign and the orders during it to move the former non-comprador 
bourgeoisie to work in production, we can see that this time the campaign was meant to be much 
more effective and uncompromising. While the campaign targeted all private trade and traders in 
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politics as politically “the Party perceived that there was no longer any need to treat the non-compradore 
bourgeoisie considerately as the revolutionary power was already in firm command of the whole country.” He did 
not see other special motives that involved the ethnic Chinese behind the campaign. Khanh (1993), p. 84 saw the 
pressure of the border situations and Vietnam’s domestic led to the CPV taking the next step in its socialist 
transformation program, but that breaking the control of the ethnic Chinese over the economy had become a priority 
already earlier.  
426 Nguyen, V.C (2017), p. 44.  
Vietnam, it would not be unreasonable to assume that one of the secondary objectives of the 
campaign during the planning had been to break the economic power of the ethnic Chinese traders 
in Southern Vietnam, as the black-market trade of products, controlled primarily by the ethnic 
Chinese communities, was still dominant part of the whole economy.427 
Furthermore, the CPV’s attitudes towards the ethnic Chinese minority had also started to change, 
as can be evidenced by the actions in Northern Vietnam starting in the second half of 1977 and 
the policy of allowing the ethnic Chinese to leave to the PRC that was adopted one month later. 
While the ban on private trade was an important episode in the wider story of the expulsions, as 
the loss of job and being pushed to go to New Economic Zones made the prospect of living in 
Vietnam in the future for many unthinkable (and therefore pushed people to leave), the expulsions 
decrees were adopted in the Northern Vietnam around the same time as the campaign to ban 
private trade was implemented in the Southern Vietnam. The first steps of the expulsion campaign 
in Northern Vietnam are important to outline even when this study focuses on the departures and 
changes in Southern Vietnam, as the expulsion policies were only few months later in operation 
in the whole country.  
 
 
5.1.1 The decision to expel the ethnic Chinese from Vietnam and 
the expulsions in Northern Vietnam  
 
According to the U.S State department’s intelligence assessment in June 1979, the Vietnamese 
Politburo decided in March 1978 to drive out the ethnic Chinese minority from Vietnam.428 The 
policy was at first in a sense a policy of voluntary departure as the Ministry of Interior issued an 
order of allowing the ethnic Chinese to leave freely to the PRC.429  What this meant in practice 
was that the ethnic Chinese were not forcibly transferred to the border and the journey of those 
who decided to leave was not impeded by the authorities.  However, state-sponsored anti-Chinese 
discrimination measures, such as additional surveillance of the ethnic Chinese communities in 
Vietnam and dismissals from security critical jobs, had already started in the in late 1977 and early 
1978 before the campaign.430 Rumours of impending war amid the worsening Sino-Vietnamese 
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relations and border conflicts and the systematic discrimination of the ethnic Chinese that resulted 
largely from this conflict between the PRC and the SRV provided the backdrop for many of the 
refugees for the decision to leave.431 Once started, the exodus developed its own momentum and 
already during the first two months of April and May over 70 000 ethnic Chinese had crossed the 
border to the PRC either by foot or by boat, and in July in total 160 000 refugees had travelled to 
the PRC before it closed its borders in mid-July.432  
It is unclear whether Vietnamese security officials were actively at this time inciting the ethnic 
Chinese to leave for the PRC or not. The PRC did officially accuse Vietnamese officials of 
transporting groups to the border and of forcing them to cross it. 433  Furthermore, when 
international journalists were allowed to come visit these refugee camps in the PRC, they were 
told stories of persecution and forcible expulsions.434  These claims must be examined however 
by placing them to the context of the debate on the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam that was raging 
between the SRV and the PRC. According to Chang (1982) the PRC tried to shape the narrative 
of the events to the international audiences and domestic through a publicity campaign which was 
started in late May 1978.435 The access to most of these refugees and their stories was managed 
by local Chinese authorities and for this reason the stories presented of the events in these articles 
often supported the PRC approved narrative of the expulsions. This is visible for example from a 
picture reportage by Camera Press agency published in the SCMP on July 23rd 1978, that has 10 
stirring images from the PRC side of the Sino-Vietnamese border, among them picture of young 
handicapped person being helped cross a border river, a nine-year old child who travelled to the 
Sino-Vietnamese border without his parents and a 91-year old grandma who was driven out 
according to the picture text by Vietnamese authorities after having lived all her life in Vietnam.436  
The lack of access to reliable contemporary accounts from the refugees who went to the PRC is 
one aspect which makes analysing the first steps of the expulsion campaign difficult. Even 
previous studies discussing the topic have been largely reliant on either Vietnamese or Chinese 
official for many details of the events. 437  Nevertheless, from follow-up studies on the PRC 
refugees and their resettlement and from contemporary articles and interviews, some general 
characteristics related to the expulsions and to the experiences of the refugees can be found.  
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The picture that can be built from the sources not reliant on official Vietnamese or Chinese 
accounts of the events points to the fact that the large-scale ethnic Chinese exodus from Vietnam 
to the PRC seemed to have taken place abruptly. In many instances whole communities of the 
ethnic Chinese left together, as happened with a community of thousands of coal miners in the 
Haiphong area. 438  According to Ungar (1987), this might have been due to still prominent 
traditional social structures that centred around clans in the ethnic Chinese communities, as once 
the clan head had made the decision to leave, others often followed. 439 This might have been one 
contributing factor to why such a large number left, but on the other hand it is possible that the 
departures also created its own snowball effect, where the sight and stories of ethnic Chinese 
leaving created a sense of urgency for others to leave also.  
In general, the refugees travelled both by land and by boats to the PRC. From traditional fishing 
villages near the border and from islands like Cat Ba and Co To, people travelled by boat to 
Chinese harbours and to villages near border.440 A large majority travelled however by land and 
crossed the border over to the Chinese border provinces of Guanxi and Yunnan.441 People left 
especially from the border provinces on the Vietnamese side, such as from Quang Ninh, where 
one Vietnamese estimation in 1978 stated that nearly 60% of the ethnic Chinese population of the 
province had left by mid-June 1978.442 However, most likely the true percentage of those who left 
was already higher at this point or became higher in the subsequent months as according to 
October 1979 census in the provinces of Northern Vietnam from the 256 000 sized ethnic Chinese 
community in the DRV in 1974, only 53 672 remained in 1979.443 
According to most accounts, the departures were largely provoked by rumours of coming war 
between the PRC and the SRV and by rumours that ethnic Chinese would be violently caught in 
the middle of this conflict.444 In addition to rumours of coming war, other types of rumours like 
that China was requesting the Hoa to return to help build up the fatherland and that they would be 
awarded good jobs in the PRC were also circulating within the ethnic Chinese communities during 
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the spring of 1978.445 While rumours were influential in making people leave, the heightening 
military situation at the border and the worsening economic conditions were also legitimate 
concerns that contributed to ethnic Chinese leaving, if we examine accounts of refugees published 
in the newspapers at the time.446 
Based on available accounts on the events and academic literature, it is unlikely that Vietnamese 
public security officials were behind spreading these rumours. They had however contributed to 
the circumstances from which the refugees were fleeing and were in charge of implementing the 
additional discriminatory security measures that were taken towards the ethnic Chinese 
communities and individuals in late 1977 and early 1978. We can see that the official policies had 
undoubtedly changed towards the ethnic Chinese, as their journey to the PRC and departures were 
not impeded by the authorities.447 Normally, travelling required a permit from the local security 
office and longer travel required approval from even higher-level officials.448 A member of the 
CPV Central Committee, Xuân Thủy even reaffirmed the support for ethnic Chinese leaving in a 
public statement given 4th of May to Vietnam News Agency449 (Thông tấn xã Việt Nam) by stating 
that “if anyone wants to return to China, he only has to make an open request” and that “every 
assistance would be given to repatriate the Chinese ´through pre-determined crosspoints´.”450 
This statement was however completely contradictory to another statement by Xuân Thủy 
released in the same day, where he states that the whole exodus was illegal and that the 
Vietnamese government had requested the PRC authorities to advise Chinese nationals not to 
leave Vietnam illegally.451 In general, the CPV employed this kind of double-dealing tactic, where 
they publicly denied any involvement in the expulsions and tried to deflect the blame to other 
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entities, while at the same time implementing policies that contradicted the contents of their public 
statements all throughout the expulsion campaign.  
A brief closure to this first phase of expulsions came when the PRC closed its side of the land 
border on July 11th, 1978.452 After this only around 40 000 refugees more made it to the PRC by 
the end of 1978.453 However, the events that followed and the consequent actions by Vietnamese 
authorities demonstrate that the CPV was fixed in its resolution to the make ethnic Chinese, who 
they regarded to be a potential fifth column, leave Vietnam. In late 1978, as the relationship 
between the PRC and the SRV had continued to deteriorate and war was becoming imminent, for 
many of the ethnic Chinese who had not left during the first phase of expulsions the situation got 
worse as the discrimination and harassment by security officials got more blatant. The Ethnic 
Chinese were according to various accounts often interrogated by public security officers, 
dismissed from jobs and in some cases even their food rations were cut. Furthermore, additional 
security measures were placed in some ethnic Chinese neighbourhoods.454  
The situation between the SRV and the PRC finally evolved into an open military conflict in 
February 1979 after the long wind-up as the PRC launched its planned limited military invasion 
of Vietnam in February 17th, 1979.455This brief three-week war between the PRC and the SRV in 
February – March of 1979 only intensified the discriminatory measures taken towards the ethnic 
Chinese in Northern Vietnam. Following the announcement of withdrawal from the PRC side in 
early March, the Ministry of Interior issued orders to move the ethnic Chinese out of the cities, 
from areas near the border and from areas that were sensitive military-wise.456  Two detainment 
camps were set up for the ethnic Chinese who refused to leave Vietnam or be relocated to 
resettlement zones, one at Vinh Bao, near Haiphong and other one at Nghe An, on the grounds 
that that another military invasion by the PRC was possible.457 According to Porter (1980), in 
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Haiphong and Hanoi, local cadres convened with the ethnic Chinese communities at the end of 
March and presented them the options to either leave Vietnam or move to these camps.458 From 
the refugees’ accounts, it seems that during this time most had to organize their departure 
themselves or bribe security officials who assisted in organizing the departures.459 Relatively little 
attention has been given to these events in previous studies discussing the ethnic Chinese 
expulsions and often these particular events after the first phase of expulsions have been given 
little attention. More historical studies on the events would be needed to have a more complete 
narrative. However, it is clear that in general the measures towards the ethnic Chinese in the North 
were much more tied to the security situation and to the Sino-Vietnamese conflict than in the 
South. That being said, the events in Southern Vietnam were also affected heavily by the changes 
in the Sino-Vietnamese relations and the general situation between the PRC and the SRV. 
But what ultimately prompted the CPV to change its policy towards the ethnic Chinese and adopt 
its expulsion policy? This question will be examined briefly as a conclusion to this sub-chapter. 
It is clear that in some terms, the treatment of the ethnic Chinese, especially in Northern Vietnam, 
has been at different periods seen by both the PRC and the DRV/SRV as an extension of the 
general Sino-Vietnamese relations. 460  Conversely, the ethnic Chinese expulsion campaign 
demonstrated that the changes in Sino-Vietnamese relations could also affect this the social 
position and treatment of this contested minority.  
As was highlighted by Path (2012), the PRC’s mobilization of ethnic Chinese communities along 
the border was outlined already in July 1976 as an emerging issue by the Vietnamese 
government.461 Judging by the actions of the Vietnamese authorities towards the ethnic Chinese 
in late 1977 and 1978, the loyalties of the ethnic Chinese especially in Northern Vietnam were 
regarded to be questionable and the question of whose side they would be fighting on in a potential 
conflict motivated the additional security measures. It is also clear that these measures evolved 
alongside the changing situation. It is highly likely that the CCP’s new vigilant stance towards the 
overseas Chinese and active engagement with the ethnic Chinese question also contributed to the 
CPV adopting a new stance towards the ethnic Chinese. As Path (2012) argued in regard the flight 
of the ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, it is significant that the exodus coincided with the CCP’s 
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change in policy towards the ethnic Chinese.462 Taking into account the other circumstances in 
Vietnam at the time, not only did the new open arms policy in all likelihood contribute to many 
ethnic Chinese’s individuals decision to leave to the PRC, but it also most likely made the CPV 
re-evaluate what measures would need to be taken with the ethnic Chinese from that moment 
forward.  
The hardest question to answer based on available evidence is how one should interpret the CPV’s 
and Vietnamese authorities’ role in the first phase of the expulsions. Many gaps in our knowledge 
of these events exist and relevant first-hand accounts from that time are rare. Many contemporary 
sources relaying the experiences of the refugees’ previous life in the SRV and of their journey to 
the PRC seem to have a connection to the PRC’s publicity campaign, which means the information 
in these articles and statements needs to be evaluated carefully. The same is of course true for the 
SRV’s similar publications and statements on the issue. If we go beyond these sources, there 
seems to be little supporting evidence for the fact that at the beginning Vietnamese authorities 
were actively trying to make ethnic Chinese leave Vietnam at this specific time. The exodus 
seemed to have started organically and spiralled into massive proportions quite rapidly.  
This does not mean however that Vietnamese authorities and the CPV had no role in the exodus. 
Besides few attempts of trying to persuade vital workers to stay, the Vietnamese cadres and 
security officials working according to the CPV and the Ministry of Interior directives effectively 
allowed ethnic Chinese to leave freely.463 The questions about the loyalties of the ethnic Chinese, 
the changes in the Sino-Vietnamese relations and ethnic Chinese wanting to leave themselves 
most likely all contributed to this decision of allowing ethnic Chinese to leave. The policy also 
served the SRV’s strategic interests by getting rid of a potentially dangerous minority and by the 
fact the PRC would have to take these people in and take care of their resettlement. Furthermore, 
those who wanted to leave would in the process of doing so also demonstrate their true loyalties.464 
In this manner, although the expulsion policy was in practice at the beginning more of a policy of 
voluntary departure, the line between expulsions and voluntary departures was thin right from the 
start of the campaign and would get more blurred in the future as the campaign progressed. The 
decisions coming from the highest level of decision-making however point to the fact that the 
CPV wanted to facilitate the departure of ethnic Chinese minority individuals from Vietnam 
starting from March 1978.  
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By all accounts, the CPV’s voluntary assimilation policy towards ethnic Chinese had run its 
course by early 1978. Slowly assimilating and making ethnic Chinese de facto Vietnamese 
citizens in a way which would be recognized by the PRC had failed. Naturalization of the 
communities in order to make them Vietnamese, therefore reducing Chinese interference in 
domestic Vietnamese affairs through the ethnic Chinese had also failed. Making those ethnic 
Chinese who did not want to participate in building the new unified socialist Vietnam leave it 
clearly became a strategic goal early/mid-1978. This was demonstrated by not only the first phase 
of expulsions in Northern Vietnam, but by the new policy started in mid-summer of 1978, which 
allowed ethnic Chinese to register to leave by boat in Southern Vietnam. But in addition to the 
strategic goals, other ulterior motives also emerged which dictated how the expulsions would be 
organized from that point onward, especially in Southern Vietnam, as will be demonstrated in the 
next chapter.  
 
 
5.2 The program for the Vietnamese of Chinese Descent to go 
abroad officially in Southern Vietnam 
 
After the first phase of expulsions in Northern Vietnam and the failed negotiations on the 
repatriation of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam by boat to the PRC, a new expulsion program was 
commenced by the CPV in late July – early August 1978. It allowed ethnic Chinese to pay to 
leave the country by boat.465 Although the precise official name of the program is unknown, 
according to one written account given to Associated Press, the scheme was carried out under the 
name “Registration of Vietnamese of Chinese descent466 to go abroad.”467 In addition to the name, 
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account of Mr. Pham Dang Bao, the son of former South Vietnamese Foreign Minister (who left with a part of 
ethnic Chinese group through this program) are examined. The name of the program and the many of the details in 
many other details have also remained ambiguous about this program, as Vietnamese authorities 
aimed to keep the program and their role in managing it secret.468 The other contributing factor to 
this ambiguity has been the fragmented nature of many of the contemporary accounts. Due to the 
unclearness that has existed around the accounts describing this covert program, one of the 
primary goals of this sub-chapter is to provide a more cohesive picture of the implementation of 
the program.  
Although there are no accounts from key officials that would highlight the specific motives 
surrounding the decision to commence the program, based on the events in Vietnam at the time, 
the timing the commencement, and the way the program was implemented, the primary motives 
for starting it were most likely linked to the fact that the ethnic Chinese dispute had escalated 
between the PRC and the SRV and to the fact that during when the repatriation by boat to the PRC 
was still on the table, tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese had 
expressed their desire to leave Vietnam.469 The decision to ban private trade in Vietnam and the 
consequent decision to move the small traders to work into production in the New Economic 
Zones had also created protests and led to unrest in Ho Chi Minh City.470 These developments, in 
addition to the events in the Northern Vietnam, most likely led to the Southern Vietnamese 
authorities approaching the Hoa community leaders in Cholon with the offer to co-operate on 
allowing ethnic Chinese to pay to leave Vietnam.471 The program can be seen to be an extension 
of the policy that was adopted in the Northern Vietnam earlier by the CPV, as the fundamental 
idea of allowing a minority that was perceived to be problematic to voluntarily leave was the same. 
However, based on the program’s implementation, it is evident that the program aimed to also 
confiscate the wealth of the ethnic Chinese that they possessed.472 This was a powerful ulterior 
motive that seemed to drive the expansion of the program once it was started, alongside the more 
discernible motive of driving away a minority that could act as a potential fifth column in the 
event of conflict between the PRC and the SRV. 
When the program was commenced, special offices for administering the program were set up all 
throughout Southern Vietnam to allow ethnic Chinese to register to leave Vietnam, with a  
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regional main office in Ho Chi Minh City.473 These offices reported to the Ministry of Interior on 
the government side and directly to the Politburo on the party side.474 According to some sources, 
the ultimate responsibility for the refugee operation rested on the shoulders of the Interior Minister 
Trần Quốc Hoàn, who oversaw the Vietnam’s security services and political police.475 Although 
this is not certain, based on what we know of how the program was structured and how the 
Vietnam’s political police had a key role in running it, this would make sense. The most important 
decisions regarding the program were made in Hanoi and directives dictating the governments’ 
official exit fee and when to stop the departures and when to resume them came from there.476 
According to several trip organizer who were interviewed by the FEER, information on how many 
boats had been authorized to leave and how much gold had been gathered was periodically sent 
to Hanoi also from provinces.477 
The day-to-day coordination of the program and refugee departures were placed in the hands of 
the political-security divisions of the Public Security Bureaus (PSB), known also as the “B-2” 
division.478 The Public Security Bureaus in Vietnam were administratively part of the Ministry of 
Interior and were generally organized into functional divisions with each of the divisions having 
different responsibilities. Each of the different divisions was headed by deputy chiefs of police at 
the provincial level. The “B-2” division was the division which was normally responsible for both 
the internal and external aspects of security in Vietnam. What this meant in practice was that they 
kept tabs on parties and factions that might threaten the government or deviate from its political 
line.479  
The B2 PSB officers handled most of the practical and administrative responsibilities which were 
related to running the program. At the provincial level, which was the highest local administrative 
level, the responsibility of the B2 division deputy chiefs of police was to approve the departure 
applications, set the date of departure and to generally manage the program.480 The deputy chiefs 
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of police were the persons in charge at the provincial level of the implementation of the program 
and therefore they were influential figures.481 Other lower level officials took care of certifying 
passenger lists for each boat and collecting the gold from the passengers.482 In addition to these 
duties, PSB officers were also tasked with searching and confiscating excess gold and wealth from 
each ship and refugee that left under this program.483  
Although PSB officers sometimes provided boats and sold departures to individuals in exchange 
for bribes, in general recruitment of passengers and the practicalities related to travel, such as 
obtaining boat, fuel and supplies and documents for travel was handled by ethnic Chinese 
intermediaries/organizers.484 This was by design, as according to the account of Nguyễn Long, 
the communist authorities themselves had approached the ethnic Chinese community leaders with 
the offer to co-operate with them on the departures.485 According to Long, a new organization was 
also established by ethnic Chinese community leaders to liaison with the Public Security 
officials.486 A regular channel to those authorities in charge of running the program was required, 
as the total price for each trip needed to be negotiated individually between the authorities and 
trip organisers and official documents from each refugee had to also be submitted to them.487  
Through this new co-operation, the PSB authorities were able to circulate information about the 
new program among the ethnic Chinese communities, as well as establish plausible deniability 
that they were not directly involved in organizing the departures. This arrangement suited many 
ethnic Chinese syndicates in Cholon, which had since at least 1977 organized departures in 
                                                 
carried out by centrally-appointed provincial officials under the chief of public security. In interviews of the boat 
organisers who landed on Malaysian shores in May, the Review has learned that identical schemes operate in most 
of the major southern coastal provinces”, Sacerdoti, Guy, “How Hanoi cashes in”, FEER, Jun. 15th, 1979. 
481 Wain (1981), p. 91 - 92 
482 U.S Department of State, “Vietnam’s refugee Machine”, CIA-RDP80T00942A001200070001-3, Jun. 26th, 
1979, p. 1 and Wain (1981), p. 92.  
483 AP, “How Hanoi officials bleed the refugees”, SCMP, Mar. 24th, 1979, Chan (1982), p. 227 – 228 and Nguyen 
and Kendall (1981), p. 152. According to many different independent accounts, refugees were searched for wealth 
by PSB officials when they entered the ship that would take them abroad.  
484 U.S Department of State, “Vietnam’s refugee Machine”, CIA-RDP80T00942A001200070001-3, Jun. 26th, 
1979, p. 1 and Wain (1981), p. 86.   
485 According to Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 48 “The Chinese leaders in Cholon held an all-day consultation 
among themselves on the offer to "go abroad officially" and then established an organization to deal with the 
Communist authorities who were prepared to make illegal profits legally, including those who issued false papers 
such as identification cards, election cards, and birth certificates.” This co-operation between ethnic Chinese 
community leadership and Vietnamese authorities is mentioned in the academic article by Porter (1980), p. 57, 
although specific source for this piece of information is not mentioned. 
486 Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 48.  
487 The two required documents for registration were the Republic of Vietnam identification card and the National 
Assembly election voting card. From these two documents the National Assembly voting card was the one which 
detailed to which minority the individual belonged to. Long provided pictures of the falsified documents he 
provided to the authorities in his book, see Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 124 for information on the required 
documents and pictures on the pages between page 94 and 95 for picture of the documents.  
exchange for gold.488 What this program offered to these syndicates was effectively an official 
“license” to organize departures. These organizations quickly expanded their operations, as with 
the official approval they could purchase larger boats outside of Vietnam and bring them there to 
smuggle refugees to Southeast Asian countries and Hong Kong. 489  Several large freighters 
capable of carrying thousands of refugees at a time were brought to Southern Vietnamese harbours 
between late Fall-1978 and early 1979 and from there the refugees were shipped to different 
Southeast Asian countries and Hong Kong.490 However, it is important to clarify that not all 
refugees who registered to leave left with these big freighters, as the size of groups varied in 
accordance the size of the boat used to depart, normal groups ranged from less than a hundred to 
five hundred refugees.  
Even when there were these syndicates who were organizing big departures, often the trip 
organizers themselves were just individuals who had connections and gold to organize departure 
and would also want to leave with the group they were organizing the trip for. Yet, sometimes 
some of the middlemen would stay behind as organizing trips was lucrative.491 For each trip, the 
organizers received a portion of the gathered gold, amounting usually to around 10% of the gold. 
More trips meant more gold then for the organizers.492 Gold was not however the only motivation 
for the organizers. Nguyễn Long described in his account that the man who helped him organize 
his departure, Chan Hung and his business partner La Truyen both also aimed to get significant 
                                                 
488 Several articles published in SCMP during the year 1977 mention ethnic Chinese syndicates in Cholon working 
together with high-ranking Vietnamese officials in the city to organize escapes in exchange for gold and bribes. 
Official assistance to escape was often required as all vessels leaving ports and rivers were subjected to doubt and 
rivers and open waters were patrolled, Chang, Harold and Pang, Anthony, “Chinese point the way to freedom”, 
SCMP, Jul. 18th, 1977, Chang, Harold and Pang, Anthony, “Vietnamese escape trail paved with gold”, SCMP, Jun. 
28th, 1977 and “Vietnamese pay their way in gold”, SCMP, Jun. 17th, 1977. 
489 Porter (1980), p. 57. According to Wain (1981), many of the state-approved ethnic Chinese business groups, 
such as the Rice exporters Association of Vietnam had extensive contacts outside Vietnam, which were used to buy 
freighters and bring them to Vietnam, Wain (1981), p. 102.  
490 Starting from late September 1978, several large freighters carrying refugees arrived in Southeast Asian and 
Hong Kong harbors. The first one of these was the Southern Cross, which carried 1250 persons in September to 
Indonesia. After the first one, several bigger boats followed in the following months: Hai Hong (2450 persons to 
Malaysia) in November 1978, Huey Fong (3318 to Hong Kong) and Tung An (2300 persons to Philippines) in 
December 1978 and Skyluck (2651 persons to Hong Kong) in February 1979. See Wain (1981), p. 17, 22, 103, 111 
and 110 for information about these ships. Cited pages correspond with the order the ships are listed by name in this 
footnote.  
491 Wain (1981), p. 88.  
492 Wain (1981), p. 87. According to Wain, the 10% figure was usually the typical figure that was awarded to the 
organizers, with the other 40% going to boat and fuel and 50% to the government. The price of each trip was 
negotiated separately however, but the cut of the government remained quite constant. All in all, the organizers 
made considerable gold as the U.S State Department’s report estimated that they could make up to $1000 - $2000 
per passenger, U.S Department of State, “Vietnam’s refugee Machine”, CIA-RDP80T00942A001200070001-3, 
Jun. 26th, 1979, p. 2.  
number of members of their immediate and extended family out of Vietnam by organizing the 
trip.493 
In general, while there were differences between the provinces in how the departures were 
implemented, the exit procedures were relatively similar all over Southern Vietnam. According 
to Wain (1981), when the program was first commenced in the mid/late-summer of 1978, there 
was more wiggle room for the organizers to determine the location and the time of the departure 
themselves, but this changed as the PSB took firmer control of departure arrangements in the 
months that followed.494 By late 1978, departures had become more organized throughout the 
country and in early 1979, the processing time had been cut down from the original six months to 
as low as one month.495  Once the details of the trips were negotiated and the price and how many 
passengers would be leaving were preliminarily agreed upon, those wanting to leave needed to 
register and submit documents to the authorities. 496  This was handled most often by the 
middlemen, who would recruit a group of ethnic Chinese and then liaison with the authorities on 
behalf of the individual refugees. They also gathered the gold from the passengers and delivered 
it to the PSB officers.497 The registrations in general had a deadline by which date the gold needed 
to be paid.498 For example for Nguyễn Long and his family in Ho Chi Minh City, the registration 
deadline for his departure was October 1978, but his actual departure happened on April 30th, 
1979 due to the delays by authorities.499 
If we examine the different accounts which describe the prices of the journey, we can quickly see 
that the total price that the refugees paid varied between where they left from, when, and with 
which kind of boat. Long stated that the normal fee for leaving was 10 taels of gold for adults and 
5 taels for children under 18. According to the rumours he heard, four of those taels was supposed 
to go to the organizers to cover expenses and six to the government to “pay the revolution” as he 
colloquially described the process.500 Wain (1981) on the other hand stated that the final payment 
tended to average between 5 – 8 taels of gold per adult, with children paying half price and for 
                                                 
493 Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 119.  
494 Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 118 – 119 and Wain (1981), p. 88. 
495 U.S Department of State, “Vietnam’s refugee Machine”, CIA-RDP80T00942A001200070001-3, Jun. 26th, 
1979, p. 1 and Wain (1981), p. 88. 
496 Sacerdoti, Guy, “How Hanoi cashes in”, FEER, Jun. 15th, 1979. 
497 Wain (1981), p. 86 – 87. 
498 Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 121. This was the case for Nguyễn Long, but Wain (1981) described that 
sometimes the payments were split into two parts, one paid when registering and the other nearer to the departure, 
Wain (1981), p. 86. 
499 Long described the delays as follows: “Orders emanating from the My Tho security office caused our boat 
numerous delays in between the time I registered to go abroad officially in October 1978 until we actually left on 
April 30, 1979.”, Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 135. 
500 Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 116 and 119.  
kids under 5 or 6 the authorities were not charging anything.501 According to him, half of this 
price went to the government for the exit fee.502 The Hong Kong Government Office estimated 
based on interviews with recent arrivals from Vietnam that the average price for departure in early 
summer of 1979 was 10 taels of gold.503 All in all, judging from the different accounts, the final 
cost of the journey in Southern Vietnam most cases ended up being 8 – 12 taels for adults, with 
children under 18 having to pay half price and small children going free.504 The official exit fee 
paid to the government in Southern Vietnam averaged between 4 – 6 taels of gold, with usually 
50 – 60% of the total price of the gold paid by the refugees going to the government.505  
When the gold was paid, the actual departures were organized in secret, with little coordination 
between the different provincial PSBs and the local security authorities of the different 
provinces.506 The PSB officers took care of the administrative processes related to the departures 
and decided when the departures would take place, but the refugees themselves needed to gather 
at the embarkation point. Often to convene at the embarkation point, the refugees needed to travel 
to another province by public transport. The permit for the travel needed to be obtained by the 
refugees themselves and they would need to travel to the location few days before the departure 
would take place.507 Before reaching the departure point, the refugees needed to keep their plans 
secret, as local security officers were tasked with stopping clandestine departures and would arrest 
those who were travelling without proper reason or found to be trying to leave Vietnam 
illegally.508 This was due to the fact that the program was kept secret from those security officers 
                                                 
501 Wain (1981), p. 86 – 87.  
502 Wain (1981), p. 87.  
503 U.K Prime Minister’s Office, PREM Series 19/129, telegram from Hong Kong to Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, Jun. 6th, 1979, p. 85-87. 
504 See AP, “How Hanoi officials bleed the refugees”, SCMP, Mar. 24th, 1979, “Hanoi to ´export´ 1m ethnic 
Chinese”, SCMP, Feb. 24th, 1979, Lane, Winsome, “Huey Fong’s ´journey of deceit´”, SCMP, Jun. 8th, 1979. and 
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505 However,  in the case of Huey Fong, the ship that carried 3318 to Hong Kong in December 1978, the 
Vietnamese authorities received 10 of the total 12 taels paid by refugees, according to trial evidence presented in 
Hong Kong in a case against the ships’ crew, Wain (1981), p. 103.  
506 Wain (1981), p. 93.  
507 Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 135 and Wain (1981), p. 88. Long received the knowledge that his boat had been 
ordered to depart only in three days in advance through non-direct channels, he described the moment as follows: 
“Hoa, my Chinese student, brought me the news at 10 P.M. on April 27. That morning, she said, the My Tho 
security office had ordered all registered boat passengers to assemble for departure. I was taken by surprise. 
Something was wrong. I had seen Chan only two days before and he had known nothing of the impending order. 
Hoa did not know the departure date but was certain the boat would not leave that night. Passengers for registered 
boats normally were allowed two days to assemble from Saigon and other points.”, Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 
140.  
508 Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 119. This also meant that once the refugees were registered, they also needed to 
keep their plans secret from their local and neighbourhood security officials, as suspicious activity that would hint 
towards a person planning an escape could lead to him being arrested, see Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 135 – 
137.  
who were not directly involved in it. However, once the refugees would reach the open sea, they 
were on their own in both good and in the bad, as the journey was full of dangers, but they would 
also be free to travel towards their country of choice and pursue the freedom that they often had 
longed for.  
 
5.2.1 The corrupt practices that were enabled by the program  
 
The way the program to sell departures to the ethnic Chinese was implemented led to systemic 
corruption flourishing within the whole departure system, from the lowest officials to higher-
ranking party members. As descriptions of these corrupt practices have occupied such an 
important role in the accounts of the refugees who shared their experiences leaving Vietnam and 
in descriptions of journalists and academics detailing the actions of the Vietnamese authorities, 
separating the practices that resulted mostly from individual motives from the practices that 
resulted from official guidelines is required in this study in order to provide an accurate picture of 
the whole program.  
Although endemic corruption had been a problem since the war years in Southern Vietnam, 
according to Nguyen and Kendall (1981), the officially sanctioned departure program allowed 
many party and government officials to benefit in a massive scale. They wrote about the program 
as follows:  
The ´going abroad officially´ gimmick provided an official means for the Vietnamese 
Communist ´revolutionaries´ to obtain bribes in the form of gold, the bluntest ever in 
Vietnamese history. Those who benefited most were the high-ranking Party and 
government officials who dealt most closely with the Chinese merchant classes. They were 
those responsible for security and the management of sea-products offices, and industrial 
and commercial reconstruction offices.509 
Demanding and receiving bribes in addition to the negotiated payments was very much a common 
practice among the PSB officers and party-members who were in contact with the departing 
refugees. 510  As Nguyen and Kendall described, the high-ranking officials, especially in the 
provincial level, were in the best spot to solicit and demand bribes in exchange for services, as 
they were handling the contract negotiations and generally in charge of giving the greenlight to 
                                                 
509 Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 48.  
510 Wain (1981), p. 87.  
the individual departures. The extensive autonomy for the provincial authorities to arrange and 
sell departures and the lax oversight from central government made the bribe-taking relatively 
risk-free endeavour. This lack of oversight made bribe-taking a common practice for PSB officers 
on all levels, as Wain (1981) described: 
It was common practice for PSB officers to solicit and receive bribes in addition the 
negotiated payment. This was what they took on the side for their services; it did not have 
to be declared and passed on to the government. The bribes were paid in gold, jewelry, 
furniture and anything else of value. Rolex watches were especially coveted.511 
As the program was perceived to be one of the only reliable ways of getting out of Vietnam, the 
refugees often had no choice but to pay these bribes that the PSB officers demanded.512 
The possibility of obtaining lucrative bribes also incentivized PSB officers and party officials to 
compete amongst themselves for organizing departures. Long described this competition among 
the authorities in his account as follows:  
At this time local Communist authorities were competing with each other in the collection 
of gold and currency from the ethnic Chinese who wanted to register to go abroad 
officially. They ordered the construction of new boats or the repair of old ones rather 
publicly and let them put out to sea with no common plan. Any city which had boats and 
could collect enough gold immediately exported Chinese boat people.513 
In a similar manner to the middlemen, the authorities often also personally benefitted from 
organizing more departures, as more refugees also meant more possibilities to obtain bribes. 
Supplying and selling boats to refugees and selling departures to ethnic Vietnamese for additional 
price were examples of services that PSB officers in different parts of Vietnam provided to the 
refugees in exchange for bribes.514 Even though the program was officially open only for the 
ethnic Chinese, according to Wain, on few boats that he examined as many as half the passengers 
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512 Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 120 - 121 and Wain (1981), p. 91. Long described in his account the thought 
process that went into deciding whether to try to escape illegally or through the official program: “Chan asked only 
six taels of gold each for my wife and me and nothing for our children because they were all under ten. This price 
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a matter of time rather than of safety. For my family safety was more important than time.” 
513 Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 118 
514 U.S Department of State, “Vietnam’s refugee Machine”, CIA-RDP80T00942A001200070001-3, Jun. 26th, 
1979, p. 1 and Wain (1981), p. 89 – 90.  
were ethnic Vietnamese.515  This was not indicative of the passenger composition on most boats, 
but in general allowing ethnic Vietnamese to depart for premium price was  a common scheme 
among the PSB officers to earn extra coin.516 Sometimes refugees would also bribe local officials 
to allow them to depart secretly from a ship landing place or from other sites that were under the 
jurisdiction of the co-operating officials. This practice was called “Mua bãi”  (literally “buy the 
landing”).517 Buying the landing was often cheaper than paying to register to leave officially, but 
also riskier, as the refugees were leaving illegally. According to the description of Nguyen and 
Kendall, the price was usually one tael for each adult and half for small children.518 
In addition to selling boats and departures, different kinds of extortive practices and pat downs 
were also common ways for PSB officers to enrich themselves. One example of this was river and 
boat patrols from other provinces stopping refugees and demanding bribes, as even if the refugees 
had paid for their departure and left officially, they could be still be arrested if they were caught 
by security officers of another province or district or by the navy. Getting out of these kinds of 
situations required paying bribes.519 Usually however the authorities would try to organize the 
official departures in a way where the refugees would get pass the security checkpoints and make 
past the patrols to the open sea.520 Another way for the organizing authorities to shakedown the 
refugees was to also search the refugees for gold and other means of wealth when they were 
departing.521  
In general, the safety of the passengers during the trip was seemingly of little concern to the 
authorities. Once they had departed and reached the open sea, they were generally on their own.522 
Little was done on the part of the authorities to make sure that the boats were seaworthy. 
According to Wain, in the Southern Vietnamese port city of Rach Gia and its neighbouring city 
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516 Wain (1981), p. 89 - 90.  
517 See Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 121 and Nguyen, V.C (2017), p. 121. The term was comprised most likely of 
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518 Nguyen and Kendall (1981), p. 121. Nguyen V.C (2017), p. 152 stated that the price was usually 6 taels of gold 
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521 AP, “How Hanoi officials bleed the refugees”, SCMP, Mar. 24th, 1979. As an example of these practices, Pham 
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522 U.S Department of State, “Vietnam’s refugee Machine”, CIA-RDP80T00942A001200070001-3, Jun. 26th, 
1979, p. 2. 
of Rach Soi in April 1979 for example, around 80 – 100 small river and coastal fishing crafts were 
converted for refugee departures on PSB’s orders.523 In general, these kinds of vessels, regardless 
of whether they were supplied by the PSB or the middlemen, were often ill-suited for sea travel. 
This general disregard for boat safety was likely one contributing factor to why countless ships 
sank in the rough seas. At least 10 percent of the refugees died during the journey as victims of 
rough weather, pirates, and unseaworthy ships according to few of the more moderate 
estimations.524 Exacerbating these problems was the fact that the ships were often overcrowded 
as the result of PSB officers selling unofficial departures. What this meant in practice was that 
PSB officers would recruit their own additional passengers, obtain gold from them and force 
departing vessels to accept these unofficial passengers that did not appear in any lists as their 
passengers.525 Adding their own unlisted passengers to departing boats was common corrupt 
practice for PSB officers and it resulted in making the ships overcrowded and dangerous to travel 
in. The U.S State department assessment estimated that perhaps as many as 20 percent of the 
different departing boats refugees might have been these unofficial passengers.526 This percentage 
seems believable as an average, although in many cases the percentage was even higher, as is 
evidenced by several accounts by refugees and from information received from interviews of 
refugees.527 Nguyễn Long also had first-hand experience with this practice when he was at the 
harbour preparing to board the ship that he would leave Vietnam with. He recounted in his story 
how the PSB officers, conniving together with the ships’ other owner, forced the ships’ crew take 
over additional 100 unlisted passengers for their trip at the moment of the departure. As a result 
of the additional passengers, the ship was totally overcrowded and Long and his family members 
had no room to even extend their legs fully for four days.528  
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As a conclusion to the topic of corrupt practices that were enabled by the program, It can be stated 
that the practices themselves were an integral part of how the departure system was implemented 
in practice, as many of the different practices were so commonplace and affected how many 
refugees would ultimately leave and how. However, it is important to note that these practices did 
not result from official guidelines, but rather became common due to the reason that they 
benefitted the individual PSB officers. For this reason, they must be separated from the other 
practices and understood to have resulted from how the program was structured rather from 
stemming from its original motives. The systemic corruption was just one factor which affected 
how the program ultimately was implemented. In the next sub-chapter, I will examine more in-
depth the different events which transpired from the implementation of the departure program and 
the circumstances which shaped how the whole program ran its course. 
 
5.3 The different phases of the expulsion program in Southern 
Vietnam 
 
In the second half of 1978, weather-beaten and worn refugees started to arrive on the shores and 
ports of Southeast Asian countries and Hong Kong at an alarming rate. This phenomenon of 
Vietnamese refugees leaving by boat and arriving to nearby countries was not new by any means, 
as clandestine escapes (đi “chui”, literally “go underground”529) had been a thing since the war 
ended in 1975.530 However, during the second half of 1978, the number of arrivals shot up to 
heights that had not been seen before. Whereas the total number of refugees arriving by boat in 
the years 1976 and 1977 to the nearby countries had been around 12 500 and 17 300, the number 
of refugees multiplied to 87 800 in 1978, with most of these arrivals taking place in the second 
half of the year.531 The Vietnamese refugees who arrived at the nearby countries starting from 
second half of 1978 were also predominantly ethnic Chinese, whereas previously both ethnic 
Chinese and ethnic Vietnamese refugees had arrived to these countries in nearly equal amounts.532 
This increased traffic and the changes in the ethnic composition of the refugees were clearly linked 
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to the CPV’s expulsion campaign and departure program for the ethnic Chinese that became 
operational in Southern Vietnam in late summer 1978. 
What we generally know of the changes in the implementation of the program relies heavily on 
the accounts provided by refugees and on investigations by journalists and diplomatic and 
intelligence agents. These accounts and research reports are fragmented and they focus on 
different things, but there are enough of them that building a broad picture of the changes in the 
implementation of the departure program and the reasonings behind them through these accounts 
has been possible to some degree. Statistics such as the number of refugee arrivals by boat to 
nearby Southeast Asia countries and Hong Kong provided by Amer (2013), NFAC (1979) and 
CIA Directorate of Intelligence (1983) also help us assess better when the program was 
operational, although the statistics tell us little of what happened in Vietnam at the time and which 
motives were really behind driving the changes.533 
Based on the Vietnamese refugee arrival statistics for each month in 1978 and 1979 to nearby 
countries (see Figure 1. on the next page), Ramses Amer divided the operation of the program he 
referred to with the term “semi-legal departure system” into four distinct phases. The first phase 
according to him begun in August 1978, when the program was started and this phase lasted 
roughly until December 1978 when the departures slowed down due to policy changes.534 The 
second phase was a phase where the number of departures dropped from the peak of November 
1978 and remained comparatively low. According to him, this drop was due to the fact that the 
number of official departures was cut down as a result of international pressure. The third phase 
was comprised of the four months after the war, starting from April 1979 and lasting until July 
1979. During this phase there was a sharp increase in the number of refugees, with the numbers 
in May and June over doubling the last years’ peak month of November. The last phase of the 
departure program started in July 1979 after an international conference on the Indochina refugee 
crisis in Geneva. In this conference according to Amer the Vietnamese authorities pledged to stem 
the outflow of refugees and after it the departures dropped dramatically, eventually dwindling 
down to similarly low numbers that had been the norm in early 1978 before the expulsion 
campaign began.535 
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Figure 1: Arrivals of Vietnamese Refugees by Boat in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong in 1978 and 1979536 
 
The analysis of the arrival numbers by Amer explains the larger link between CPV policy changes 
and the refugee flows and demonstrates how the expulsion campaign and the departure program 
increased the number of refugees arriving to nearby countries notably. The numbers can also give 
some indication of the refugee departures especially from Southern Vietnam, as most of the ethnic 
Chinese leaving Vietnam were from there as the ethnic Chinese population was several times than 
larger there than in the Northern parts and a large portion of the ethnic Chinese community in 
Northern Vietnam had already fled to PRC.537 However, while I generally agree with Amer on 
the fact that we can divide the implementation of the departure program into these four distinct 
phases based on the patterns of arrivals, and that the changes in the patterns of arrivals 
corresponded with CPV policy changes, I posit that we can explain the changes and peaks in the 
patterns seen in the figure even more clearly by examining different sources and accounts that 
clarify events inside Vietnam and through them highlight even some of the motives behind the 
policy changes.  
If we start from the early days of the program, it can be argued that two major factors drove the 
expansion of the program. The first one was the widespread desire among the ethnic Chinese in 
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Southern Vietnam to leave the country. 538  The dire economic situation and food shortages 
combined with the efforts by authorities to move the small traders to work in agricultural 
production in New Economic Zones made many look for ways to leave Vietnam.539 Some ethnic 
Chinese, like the family of Dr. Chung Vinh (author of memoir about leaving Vietnam titled Where 
the Wind leads), saw also the writing on the wall that the government’s attitudes towards the 
ethnic Chinese had changed. 540 There were many factors which ultimately led to people wanting 
to leave Vietnam, and once the program for the Vietnamese of Chinese descent to go abroad was 
commenced, many were willing to pay for the chance.  
The second factor driving the quick expansion of the program was the willingness of the local 
level authorities to facilitate these departures.541 The expansion of the program was also dictated 
heavily by the lucrative economics of the refugee trafficking. As was highlighted by Nguyễn Long 
in his quote in the previous sub-chapter, the local authorities were quite openly competing with 
each other for the chance to organize departures and collect gold. 542  Long stated that this 
unprohibited competition for the human cargo among the local authorities was reined later in 1978 
with new regulations from central government that established more orderly schedules for the 
departures. The purpose of these new regulations was according to him regulate the exportation 
of boat people.543   
Alongside the unprohibited competition, what most likely also led to these new regulations were 
the instances of using big freighters brought in from outside of Vietnam to ship refugees to nearby 
countries.544 Members of ethnic Chinese business groups in Vietnam used their contacts outside 
Vietnam to buy large freighters and to bring them to ports near Ho Chi Minh City. Syndicate 
members in Ho Chi Minh City recruited thousands of passengers for the departures and negotiated 
on the terms and prices with the Public Security authorities in the city.545 The first freighter that 
was brought into Southern Vietnam to pick up passengers was the Southern Cross which set out 
from Singapore in August 24th 1978 sailing under Honduras’ flag.546 It picked up 1250 refugees 
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from port near Ho Chi Minh City and set out to the open sea. According to description of the 
events by Wain (1981), it seemed that an agreed upon script had been created before the departure 
for the events that would unfold next.547 When the ship reached the South China Sea, the ships’ 
crew radio messaged a call for help and claimed that the ship had been swarmed by hundreds of 
refugees from small fishing junks. From there the ship sailed towards Malaysia and Singapore, 
which both refused to accept the refugees. After this complication, the ship headed towards 
Indonesia and once there radioed in near a remote island in Indonesian waters that the ship’s hull 
had been damaged badly and that it could not continue its journey. The refugees on board unloaded 
to the nearby shore and eventually were given a temporary asylum in Indonesia. 548  In the 
following months, several big freighters, brough into Southern Vietnam to pick up refugees, 
would set out and follow a similar script in seeking refugee from nearby Southeast Asian countries 
and Hong Kong. These ships were Hai Hong (2450 persons) in which arrived to Malaysia in 
November 1978 and Huey Fong (3318 persons) and Tung An (2300 persons) which arrived to 
Hong Kong and Philippines respectively in December 1978.549 These big freighters bringing in 
large quantities of refugees contributed significantly to the notable increase in refugee arrivals in 
the latter part of 1978 that can be discerned in Figure 1. 
The unbridled trafficking efforts drew in a lot of international attention themselves and essentially 
blew the lid off the covert departure program in late 1978. Pressure mounted from the ASEAN 
countries who were not willing to accept the refugees and from countries like Australia who were 
worried about potential refugee flows reaching their shores. Probes were also launched into the 
origins of these ships.550 U.S Intelligence information circulated to its allies at the time confirmed 
that behind the boat departures were authorities in Ho Chi Minh City and that the Vietnamese 
security agencies were involved in organizing the departures.551 The amounting international 
pressure that was brought on largely by this freighter trafficking and increased departures from 
Vietnam had ultimately an effect also on the Vietnamese policies. A consultative Meeting with 
Interested Governments on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South-East Asia was held in 
Geneva on the 11th and 12th of December 1978 and according to trip organizers interviewed for a 
FEER article published in mid-1979, the international pressure at this conference caused new 
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directives to halt the refugee departures for a while to be sent from Hanoi to the provincial PSBs 
in January/February 1979.552 These interviewed trip organizers told the newspaper that: 
“Nam Cu [the Vietnamese in charge of the Kien Giang refugee office, since replaced] told 
me that boats were stopped by order of Hanoi, because a high-ranking official who was 
abroad was blamed for the refugees… in March they were told to go ahead again”553 
Other accounts, such Wain (1981) also confirm the fact that major refugee exporting centres 
received such order during this time period of late January/early February 1979.554 In reality 
however, behind the decision to halt the departure for a brief moment was most likely other factors 
also, such as the worsening situation in the Sino-Vietnamese border, where both the PRC and the 
SRV were preparing for a some form of military confrontation in early 1979.555Halting the refugee 
program, which tied Vietnam’s security agencies’ resources, in a situation where war between the 
SRV and the PRC seemed more and more likely was most likely the logical conclusion reached 
by the Vietnamese policymakers based on the evaluation of the overall situation. All in all, the 
overall effects of the directives for more orderly departures and of the brief suspension of 
operations on the number of arriving refugees can be assessed from Figure 1., where it can be 
seen from that between December 1978 and March 1979, the number of those who reached the 
nearby countries was nearly half of the peak reached in November 1978 when 20 000 refugees 
arrived in month to these countries. The suspension of the operation had an effect especially on 
the arrivals in February 1979, as less than 9000 refugees arrived in the nearby countries in that 
month.556 And if we take into consideration that 2651 of these refugees arrived with a big freighter 
on February 7th to Hong Kong, the effects of the decision to halt departures on the arrivals becomes 
even clearer.  
The decision to halt the departure program was only temporary however, as after the moratorium 
on the departures, the expulsion policy was continued in late March 1979 with a renewed 
conviction. As was discussed in earlier in the chapter relating to the expulsions in Northern 
Vietnam, in the North the ethnic Chinese were given an explicit choice to either leave or move to 
camps or New Economic Zones.557 According to Porter (1980), behind these decisions were once 
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again explicit orders issued by the Ministry of Interior.558 In Central Vietnam, such as in the 
coastal cities of Danang and Nha Trang, the situation was quite similar, as harassment of the ethnic 
Chinese by PSB officers became a daily occurrence and the refugees were also in many cases 
explicitly told that if they would not leave voluntarily, they would be transferred to New Economic 
Zones. 559  According to Wain, the PSB authorities were also more directly facilitating the 
departures in Central Vietnam, as they were organizing land transports to the refugees to departure 
locations and lowering boat fares in order to accommodate more departures.560 In Southern cities, 
the departures that had been on hold were started again, but the amount of coercion seemed to 
remain similar to the one that had existed before.561 However, even in the South the expulsion 
processes were expedited, leading to more departures. The processing time for the applications 
became much shorter and the wait period between registration and actual departure was cut down 
to in some cases to as little as one month.562 As a result of these expulsion orders and less time-
consuming administrative measures, the boats were being sent out to the sea at a rate that had not 
been seen before and refugee arrivals to nearby countries grew exponentially each month after 
March 1979.563 This caused the refugee situation to become critical in Malaysia, Hong Kong and 
Thailand, that were at some points seeing several thousands of arrivals each week.564  
The reason behind this renewed fervour to expel ethnic Chinese was the war that had taken place 
between the PRC and the SRV between February 17th and 16th of March. This war shaped the 
policies of the Vietnamese government and the CPV once again and made them adopt even 
harsher expulsion policy towards the ethnic Chinese. The government policy became to either 
move the ethnic Chinese as far away as possible from security sensitive areas or make them leave 
in the areas that had been near the conflict.565 The change in tone and actions was visible in the 
public statements of Vietnamese representatives also few months after the war, as the Hoa who 
had previously left Vietnam were blamed by deputy foreign minister Đinh Nho Liêm in a speech 
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to media as having aided the Chinese troops by acting as guides for them.566 These concerns 
regarding ethnic Chinese giving assistance to the enemy gave further justifications to continue the 
large-scale expulsion policy taken towards the ethnic Chinese. However, it is important to note 
that the expulsions were not only limited to the ethnic Chinese who lived in Central or Northern 
parts of Vietnam and therefore more of a security risk, but rather to the ethnic Chinese throughout 
the country. The exponential increase in number of arrivals as shown in Figure 1. in March, April, 
May and June of 1979 would point to the fact that the departure program and expulsions were put 
on the fast track in the whole country after the war.567 In this manner, it was not only the policies 
in the Northern parts of Vietnam in April-June of 1979 that were “tantamount to an expulsion” 
in their implementation, as has been suggested previously by Amer (2013), but rather the policies 
in the whole country.568 
When the refugee problem in the region grew worse in the early summer of 1979, the countries 
that were directly and indirectly affected by it began searching for a solution. The solution that 
was pushed in the by the U.K behind the diplomatic curtains was organizing another conference 
on the Indochina refugee situation, and this became a reality on the 20th and 21st of July as the 
United Nations Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South-East Asia was convened by 
the UN Secretary General. 569  The meeting was successful in that in it the total number of 
resettlement places for the region was doubled from 125 000 to 250 000 and $190 million 
additional in funds were pledged for the refugee efforts for the following year. A form of three-
way agreement was however the major result of the conference, as countries of first asylum in the 
region promised to establish regional processing centres to help resettle the refugees as long as 
other countries would accelerate the rate of resettlement.570 In the meeting also the Vietnamese 
representatives pledged that "for a reasonable period of time it [Vietnam] will make every effort 
to stop illegal departures” and this became a part of the agreed upon actions to handle the crisis.571 
This promise and how it was framed gave Vietnam plausible deniability to the accusations that it 
had been expelling the refugees, providing them boats and extorted gold from them. These 
accusations Vietnam had naturally denied in the meetings.572 
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While the meeting was a success and the promise by Vietnam was welcomed with open arms, the 
decrease in the number of arrivals would point to the fact that Vietnamese authorities had begun 
to halt the outflow already in June, most likely in anticipation of harsh critique and discussions in 
the coming conference in Geneva if they would have not done so.573 The signs would point to the 
fact that before this conference in Geneva, major rethinking of the expulsion policy had taken 
place and as a result the expulsion policy was stopped and all forms of departures and escapes 
were once again to be severely punished. From late-June/early-July onwards, harsh punishments 
also started to be handed out  to trip organizers, whose actions had previously been condoned and 
even awarded, and those who were caught in the act of escaping were also prosecuted.574 Most 
likely this punishment policy was adopted as a response to the coming Geneva meeting, as two 
days before the meeting Vietnam News Agency published a lengthy article on the subject which 
admitted that “some officials were ́ getting their palms greased´ from the refugee exodus” and that 
these officials would be punished severely.575 The article also mentioned some examples of non-
government officials being punished for being involved in organizing the departures and that “no 
senior cadre has ever been involved in such affairs.”576 The narrative that Vietnam was pushing 
was that the only local low-level officials and trip organizers had been involved in organizing the 
departures. In August 1979, Vietnam’s Vice-foreign minister Nguyễn Cơ Thạch also told visiting 
American delegates that 4000 persons responsible for departures had been brough to trial so far 
and gave every indication that this policy of not allowing departures would continue.577 All in all, 
these policy changes had a notable effect on the departures and arrivals, as from July onwards, 
the number of arrivals decreased from the peaks of the previous months and in October 1979, the 
number of monthly arrivals finally reached the number pre-expulsion campaign numbers.578 
Furthermore, the way the expulsion policy was halted before the 1979 July Geneva conference 
also ultimately demonstrates that the possibility of becoming an international pariah was not a 
risk that the CPV was willing to take for the sake of continuing the expulsions.  
As a conclusion to the sub-chapter on the different phases of the expulsion system, it can be stated 
that it is evident from the different accounts that many different factors inside and outside Vietnam 
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ultimately ended up affecting how the departure program and expulsion policy was implemented 
in Southern Vietnam. The lucrativeness of the refugee trafficking and willingness on the part of 
the refugees to pay to leave were factors which drove the expansion of the program, while pressure 
from international community and fear of becoming a pariah state due to the mass expulsion 
seemed to ultimately inhibit the CPV’s ostensible intention of expelling as many ethnic Chinese 
as it could get away with. Furthermore, the statistics on the number of arrivals give us an indication 
of how much of the refugee traffic was actually associated with the ethnic Chinese expulsion 
campaign. Based on the numerous accounts that I have presented in this chapter and the statistics 
on arrivals that I analysed, it is evident that the expulsion policies of the CPV were a large 
contributing factor in why ultimately so many left Vietnam. Yet, even with this seemingly 
apparent conclusion, we need to still tackle many unanswered questions in the last chapters of this 
study, so that we can interpret more clearly the events and actions that took place in Vietnam 
during the expulsion campaign.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This final chapter focuses on evaluating the impacts of the expulsion program in the South and on 
examining the political reasons behind the expulsions further. In addition to this, the last sub-
chapter examines question of how we should ultimately understand these ethnic Chinese and boat 
people departures in light of what we know of the Vietnamese government involvement in the 
departures today.  
 
 
6.1 Evaluating the impacts of the expulsion policies in Southern 
Vietnam 
 
While the program for the Vietnamese of Chinese descent to go abroad itself was operated under 
a shroud of secrecy in Southern Vietnam, its effects reverberated throughout selected communities 
and cities in the region. One of these effects was the growing commerce connected to the refugee 
trafficking, which flourished in selected coastal provincial capitals and Mekong delta ports in the 
region. Wain (1981) described the situation in Southern Vietnam’s port areas during the time the 
departure system was operational in his book as follows: 
Vietnam might have been in the economic doldrums, but Rach Gia, capital of Kien Giang 
province was bustling. The main activity: exporting boat people. While a limited number 
of persons were directly involved in the trade, the relative prosperity it generated 
percolated through the community. Boatbuilders were busy patching up wrecks for the 
hazardous trip across the sea, and the influx of budding refugees from the Ho Chi Minh 
City metropolis, awaiting embarkation, offered an opportunity for the sale of rice, 
vegetables and other services. Refugees seemed one of the few worthwhile ways left to 
make a free-enterprising dollar in Communist Vietnam.579 
This passage illustrates well how the expulsion program did not only affect those who left or 
enrich those who were organizing the departures, but that it also had transformative effects on the 
day-to-day life of selected locations in the South. According to some observers, a new boat 
building industry was established in Southern Vietnam so that the authorities could accommodate 
the high number of refugee departures.580 The boats were evidently being built to accommodate 
the expanding refugee business.581 In addition to boats, the demand for goods needed for the 
navigation and survival at sea became also high in the black-market.582 Several different points 
acted as the main official departure points of the refugees in the South. Long Thanh, Vung Tau, 
My Tho, Vinh Long were the principal Southern departure points in the vicinity of Ho Chi Minh 
City and Tra Vinh, Can Tho, Bac Lieu and Ca Mau were the locations from which the refugees 
departed from in the Mekong Delta region.583 These locations were the principal hubs of the 
refugee trafficking in Southern Vietnam and near them transit camps were set up to accommodate 
the large number of refugees who were preparing to depart.584 Although we can offer no real 
numbers on the amount of refugees that would have passed through these locations week to week, 
in the most popular locations several departures of boats containing hundreds of passengers were 
being organized weekly during the most active periods of the departure program.585 
But what about the total number of refugees during the expulsion campaign in the South? How 
many persons ultimately ended up leaving Vietnam then through the departure program? These 
questions are some of the most important ones to answer when we evaluate the impact and scale 
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of these expulsion policies. As we do not have accurate information on the total number of 
departures, only on arrivals to nearby countries, any number that we present on this topic 
ultimately ends up being only an estimate. An informed estimate can however give us an idea of 
the magnitude of the departure program and for this reason I will analyse next the available data 
on this topic. For this analysis I will rely on two available sources for the total number of arrivals 
for Vietnamese boat refugees to nearby countries and Hong Kong, Amer (1991, 2013) and the 
CIA Directorate of Intelligence report (1983).586 The former was based on studies by Benoit, Wain 
and estimates by the UNHCR and the latter used U.S department of State statistics.587  
If we begin by comparing the total number of boat refugee arrivals for the months between August 
1978 and July 1979588, we can see that while there are some discrepancies between these two 
sources in the number of arrivals they have listed for each month, in general the two numbers in 
the two sources are quite in line with each other. The CIA report estimates that the total number 
of arrivals for this period was 240 190, while Amer placed the figure at 236 374.589 Both of these 
sources estimate that around 10% of the persons died during the journey, which means that the 
total number of refugees who departed would have been 264 209 and 260 011 respectively during 
the time the departure program was operational. This is of course only an estimation, as we have 
no way of piecing together precise information on what percentage of refugees trying to escape 
illegally were caught by the PSB officers and the Vietnamese Navy while they were still in 
Vietnam’s territorial waters and what percentage actually died as the result of the journey. Only 
those who succeeded in leaving Vietnam and made it safely to the nearby countries and Hong 
Kong became part of these statistics.  
The percentage of the ethnic Chinese among these refugees would have been high as the result of 
expulsion campaign and departure program. According to the best estimation we have for what 
percentage of these refugees would have been ethnic Chinese during this period, around 80% of 
the boat refugees in general would have been ethnic Chinese, and this percentage was even higher 
for those refugees who went to the PRC or Hong Kong.590 This means that an estimated 192 152 
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or 189 099 ethnic Chinese would have made it to the nearby countries during the time the 
departure program was operational in Southern Vietnam, if the ethnic composition of the refugees 
was exactly 80% ethnic Chinese and 20% Vietnamese during this period.591 Most of these ethnic 
Chinese would have also been from Southern Vietnam where most of the ethnic Chinese in 
Vietnam lived and where the impacts of the later stages of the expulsion campaign were the most 
visible.592 
This estimation on the number of ethnic Chinese who arrived at the nearby countries during the 
time the departure program was operational does not however tell us how many people went 
through the departure program itself.  “Buying the landing” and clandestine escapes were also 
common ways of leaving Vietnam during this period.593 Many ethnic Vietnamese would also 
leave with the officially sanctioned boats, either by obtaining false identification papers or by 
bribing the officials in charge of the program.594 For these reasons giving estimates on how many 
people actually left through the official channels is difficult, as depending on the number of 
unofficial passengers and the popularity of the other ways of leaving Vietnam, the actual number 
could have been higher or lower than the estimations on the total number of the ethnic Chinese 
who left during the time the program was operational. Yet, even if these figures are only 
approximations and rely on certain presuppositions, the fact that there could have been as many 
as 190 000 ethnic Chinese boat refugees in a period that was less than a year, gives us an indication 
of the scale and impact of the program. If we compare these numbers to the total number of boat 
arrivals for Vietnamese refugees in 1976 (12 500) and 1977 (17 300), we can see that the adoption 
of expulsion policies and the commencement of the departure program led to substantial increase 
in arrivals (and departures) of boat refugees from Vietnam.595 The analysis in the previous sub-
chapter also demonstrated how inherently the refugee outflows were linked to the CPV policy 
changes and to the changes in the implementation of the departure program. Even if we cannot 
give a proper estimation on how many people left through the official departure program, we can 
see that the expulsion policies, such as the departure program, had a significant impact on the 
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number of departures from Vietnam and that the CPV ethnic Chinese expulsion policies was 
according to all signs the most influential factor in driving the ethnic Chinese exodus from 
Southern Vietnam. Finally, it could also be argued that these policies were a large contributing 
factor to why the Indochina Refugee Crisis became serious international humanitarian and refugee 
crisis in 1978 and 1979, as the sheer number of arrivals to the nearby countries overwhelmed 
Vietnam’s neighbours.   
Another aspect that has not been discussed enough in previous academic literature has been the 
concrete benefits that the Vietnamese government gained from expelling these refugees. There 
was a clear economic motive also behind the expulsions and departure program that has not been 
discussed much in previous studies, most likely due to the fear of publishing conjectures and 
basing claims on incomplete proof. There are however many accounts and investigations from the 
contemporary period, which point to the fact that the refugee trafficking was wildly beneficial for 
the Vietnamese government and that the economics of the human trafficking was driving the 
expansion of the program. Many of these reports were however drafted and researched by 
diplomatic and intelligence entities and were as a result not published in full until much later.  
One of these reports estimating the economic impact of the refugee trafficking was the telegram 
referenced in the introduction of this study.596 The document was sent in the name of Governor 
of Hong Kong Murray MacLehose and it started by stating that: 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FINANCIAL MOTIVATION IN VIETNAM’S SYSTEMATIC 
EFFORTS TO DRIVE OUT ALL CITIZENS OF CHINESE ORIGIN IS BECOMING 
INCREASINGLY CLEAR.  
 EVIDENCE RECENTLY GATHERED IN HANOI AND HO CHI MINH CITY AND FROM 
REFUGEES NEWLY ARRIVED IN HONG KONG STRONGLY SUPPORT THESE 
CONCLUSIONS:  
A: THE GOLD AND HARD CURRENCY BEING EXTORTED FROM THOSE UNDER 
PRESSURE TO LEAVE NOW AMOUNT TO A MAJOR IF SHORT-TERM PROP FOR 
VIETNAM’S MISMANAGED AND THREADBARE ECONOMY, WITH REFUGEES PROBABLY 
CONSTITUTING THE COUNTRY’S SINGLE MOST PROFITABLE EXPORT COMMODITY.597 
The other conclusions of the report were that Vietnam’s government had authorized to stop any 
attempts to leave the country which did not go through official networks and that the refugees had 
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overtaken coal, the country’s most important export product, as the largest source of foreign 
exchange for the country. This was based on what was stated to be reliable information that there 
was a surge of remittances being sent to the Bank of Vietnam in Ho Chi Minh City in April 1979 
from the ethnic Chinese living abroad.598 The amount remitted during that month, $242 million, 
was more than double the amount remitted in any previous month in 1978 and 1979.599  According 
to a New York Times article published in June 12th, 1979, the figure for this single month was 
more than half of the total estimated exports of Vietnam for all of 1978, $416 million.600 Not all 
of this went to the boat departures, but according to both New York Times and the Hong Kong 
government document, it is highly likely that most of the money was designed to pay for boat 
passages.601 
Most of the individual claims made in this Hong Kong government document are corroborated by 
other accounts also. The New York Times corroborated the amount of the remittances cited by 
the document and provided a source for them.602 According to several sources, the departure 
program provided significant amounts of both foreign exchange and hard currency in the form of 
gold to the Vietnamese government. The FEER estimated that already during 1978, the refugee 
trafficking provided around $115 million in gold through the exit taxes to the Vietnamese 
government.603 Based on the refugee arrival statistics, the profits for the year 1979 would have 
been even higher than the estimate the FEER gave for 1978.604The U.S State department report 
titled “Vietnam’s refugee machine” in 1979 found the FEER estimate to be reasonable and added 
that this amount was roughly equal to the Vietnamese government’s known official foreign 
exchange holdings at the time.605 In his account, Nguyễn Long also stated that party members that 
he was in contact with in late 1978 told him that the “national income from the exportation of boat 
people was exceeded only by the production and sale of goods.”606 This statement was most likely 
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accurate based on the numbers of total estimated exports of Vietnam in 1978 and the FEER 
estimations on the amount of hard currency provided by the departure program to the Vietnamese 
government. Since 1975, one of the shortfall of Vietnam’s economy had been that it lacked foreign 
currency to buy necessary supplies from international markets due to relatively low amount of 
exports and small foreign exchange reserves.607 As a poor developing country recovering from 
war, its imports significantly exceeded its exports and for this reason foreign exchange was in 
high demand.608  All in all, the economic motive for the program and the concrete benefits 
Vietnamese government gained from expelling the refugees were quite clear.  
So was also the fact that portion of the total payment that the refugees paid for the departure ended 
up into the hands of the government. Besides the numerous accounts which described the 
Vietnamese government involvement in the program, there exists also many accounts of trip 
organizers being told by public security officials to deposit the gold from the refugees to 
Vietnamese national banks to pay for the departures.609 This was most likely not the normal 
practice, as usually the intermediaries paid to the PSB officers which in turn according to some 
accounts delivered the gold to the national banks, but the fact that there were documented instance 
of trip organizers paying gold directly to these banks highlights the link between the payments 
and the government even further.610 According to one unnamed intelligence report that the New 
York Times cited in an article, in Southern Vietnam the gold was melted down in the Bank of 
Vietnam in Ho Chi Minh City and transported to Hanoi to the Bank of Foreign trade.611 In this 
manner the money moved from the hands of the refugees to inside the national banking system. 
From there, according to some sources some of the gold ended up in the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern Europe, most likely as payment for the aid and arms Soviet Union provided to Vietnam.612 
This is where the trail of the gold ends, as no further sightings have been publicized. Whether or 
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not this gold was the same that had been extracted from the refugees as payments is most likely 
impossible to prove, but it is one interesting avenue in the bigger story of the expulsion campaign.  
In conclusion, after the expulsion campaign was over in Southern Vietnam a sizable ethnic 
Chinese population of 877 691 Hoa remained in the area according to 1979 Vietnamese census.613 
The period of less than a year that the departure program was operation in the South had been too 
short to expel all ethnic Chinese from the region. In addition to the short time frame, as Stern 
(1985) argued, for some of the ethnic Chinese paying to leave had not been an option due to the 
expensive payments.614 Even though the expulsions ended, the ethnic Chinese continued to be 
regarded with suspicion. Stern described these suspicions as follows:  
“During  1980-82, there seems to have been a complex and probably not fully articulated 
attitude of the party and the state toward the Overseas Chinese that was expressed as a 
feeling or suspicion that the Hoa, always irrepressible, could spring back against 
Vietnamese society in a moment's time.”615 
In November 1982, the CPV adopted decree No. 10, which included guidelines in regard to the 
Hoa. It stated that as Vietnamese citizens they had the same duties and rights as other citizens, but 
that they would be barred from being able to serve as officers in the military and as having security 
related employment.616 In this manner the CPV policies towards the ethnic Chinese continued to 
address the “threats” the ethnic Chinese were perceived to pose to certain critical sectors in the 
society.  It was not until June 1991 that the Vietnamese government restored full cultural and civil 
rights and duties to the ethnic Chinese community.617  
The boat departures from Vietnam also continued after the expulsion campaign, however now 
once again by means of escaping. In 1980 and 1981 there were 74 100 and 74 400 boat refugees, 
respectively.618 The numbers further decreased in 1982, when only 44 900 refugees made it to the 
nearby countries.619 Behind these departures was a similar desire to leave Vietnam that had fuelled 
the hay days of the expulsion campaign, but missing was the government involvement which had 
propelled the Vietnamese refugee crisis into the proportions it was in the most dire years of 1978 
and 1979. In addition to the clandestine escapes, between 1979 and 1991, 352 000 people left 
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through an Orderly Departure Program established in 1979 by the UNHCR and the Vietnamese 
government.620 Those who had relatives abroad could through this program be legally resettled 
abroad.621 During the early days of this program, ethnic Chinese were apparently a majority 
among those who left through this program, as a larger portion of ethnic Chinese had relatives 
abroad than ethnic Vietnamese, but as time passed the portion of ethnic Chinese leaving through 
the program steadily declined.622  
Although the absolute number of ethnic Chinese leaving Vietnam declined quite heavily after the 
expulsion campaign, the larger story of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam after the expulsion 
campaign has been the story of continued migration. Even to this day, the ethnic Chinese have 
continued to migrate from Vietnam at a higher pace than their population has naturally grown.623 
While we should not simplify the reasons behind this continued decline as a lot has changed in 
the past 50 years in Vietnam and outside it, we should not also disregard the question of what role 
has the complicated recent history of expulsions, discrimination and departures played in this 
larger story of continued migration and exodus.  
 
6.2 Voluntary departures, expulsions, or profitable extortion? 
 
The question of how we should interpret these boat people departures and the wider ethnic 
Chinese exodus from Vietnam between 1978 and 1979 and the Vietnamese governments role in 
the departures has been discussed since the events took place.624 Whether or not we should 
understand these departures as having been voluntary or resulted from distinct expulsion 
policies is a key question that is related to how we should ultimately interpret and understand 
these events.   
In this study I argue that behind the ethnic Chinese exoduses from Vietnam was an organized 
expulsion campaign and policies, that aimed to facilitate the departure of members of the ethnic 
Chinese minority from Vietnam. However, the policies aimed mostly to facilitate these 
departures with methods that relied on the ethnic Chinese leaving voluntarily. What we can 
observe from the example of the ethnic Chinese expulsion campaign is that expulsions were 
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orchestrated in a manner and involved methods which did not necessarily force people to depart, 
but rather create possibilities for it. The conditions and policies in Vietnam for the departures 
resembled the ones in East Germany described by famous political economist Albert Hirschman 
(1993) in his essay Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in 
Conceptual History. He wrote about the authorities’ actions towards the opposition in the 
country as follows:  
In the following years the authorities systematically used forced exit to reduce voice. The 
special term abschieben (pushing out or pushing over the border) came into use to 
denote the decision to get rid of certain critics by allowing, encouraging, or obliging 
them to leave for the Federal Republic.625 
The quote by Hirschman highlights how there were systematic policies in place in the GDR to 
subtly push people, especially members of the opposition and critics of the regime, to leave the 
country. Although the situation was not identical in the SRV compared to the GDR, it bears a lot 
of similarities. In both examples, the regimes effectively created possibilities for certain portions 
of population that were perceived to be problematic by the authorities to leave.  
This raises the question should we ultimately understand then the departures from Vietnam by 
their larger surrounding context or through how the individual decisions were formed? I would 
argue that while the expulsion campaign in Vietnam throughout its different phases relied often 
on individuals voluntarily departing, the ethnic Chinese exodus should be primarily be 
understood through the context of the expulsion campaign itself. The policies effectively 
allowed the ethnic Chinese, who were regarded as being problematic minority, to leave Vietnam 
more freely than other groups. This is however did not mean that refugees themselves were 
without agency in their decision to leave. Many were actively looking for a way out, as is 
evidenced by the account of Nguyễn Long and the story of Dr. Chung in his memoir.626 Leaving 
was an active process which required planning, funds, and searching contacts.627 For some 
people, departing was not an option, as the either the costs were too high or they could not leave 
Vietnam for some other reason.628 In this manner, the expulsion campaign did not expel every 
single ethnic Chinese from Vietnam by all means necessary, but rather often relied on the ethnic 
Chinese “removing” themselves, especially in Southern Vietnam. Yet, it is important to also 
note the general situation in Vietnam regarding the ethnic Chinese around this period and that 
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behind the expulsion campaign and the departure program were distinct and deliberate policies 
enacted by the Vietnamese authorities which made leaving possible.  
Some scholars, such as Amer (1991), have previously avoided taking too definite stance on what 
extent the Vietnamese authorities were involved in the departures. Amer stated that:  
It has not been possible to find out if any decision was taken at top leadership level to 
implement the semi legal departure system. Thus, any attempt to estimate the degree of 
involvement from top to bottom in the Vietnamese administration and party is naturally 
tentative or even speculative.629 
While actual Vietnamese government documents have not been forthcoming, and for this reason 
there are still many questions that we can only tentatively answer as Amer stated, examination 
of intelligence sources and other new sources in this study highlighted that there were these 
distinct decisions and policies behind the departure program and the expulsion campaign that 
according to these sources often came from the highest level. Furthermore, from these sources it 
was also possible to build an outline of how the Vietnamese government and authorities at 
different levels of administration were involved in the expulsion program. Based on this, I 
would argue that the emergence of the large-scale boat people crisis in 1978 and 1979 needs to 
be understood to have been closely connected to the ethnic Chinese expulsion campaign and to 
the CPV policies during this period. The involvement of the Vietnamese authorities in the boat 
people departures is seen as less speculative than Amer (1991) suggested in his original study.630 
Many previous studies, such as Amer (2013), Chang (1982), Chen (2006), Vo (2006) and Wain 
(1981), have also highlighted several of the links between the authorities’ actions and the boat 
people crisis before, but at the same time they have often, with the exception of Wain and 
perhaps Amer (2013) in part, failed to highlight the systematic decisions and policies that 
created the ethnic Chinese exodus and increased the boat departures in 1978 and 1979.631 The 
contribution this study brings to this topic is the conclusion that based on the examined new 
sources and several accounts, as well as re-examination of other available information, we can 
see that CPV did indeed try to expel ethnic Chinese minority members from Vietnam and 
enacted policies which led to the ethnic Chinese exodus from Northern and Southern Vietnam 
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between early 1978 and mid-1979. Many of the examined intelligence assessment also provided 
new information on the specific factors and decisions behind the policies.  
The politics of expulsions seemed to be inherently connected to both domestic developments 
and to the Sino-Vietnamese relations. Due to the emerging conflict between the PRC and the 
SRV, the unresolved issues revolving around the identity, citizenship and nationality of the 
ethnic Chinese needed to be resolved quickly. These issues were also in part connected to the 
relations between these two countries and to the positions both of these countries had on these 
issues.632 The expulsions and the policies that the SRV adopted towards the ethnic Chinese 
cannot really be understood without examining them through the context of the Sino-
Vietnamese relations, as the belonging and loyalty of the ethnic Chinese seemed to be reflected 
through their perceived relationship towards the PRC and through the threats that this minority 
would possibly cause in a case of widespread conflict between these two countries. 
Yet, at the same time equally important were the domestic developments in Vietnam. The 
politics of the expulsion in Southern Vietnam were in many ways connected to the communist 
state-making in the South. Although there was at first after the reunification room for private 
entrepreneurs and economic in the economic sphere of the South, the process of gradual 
transformation of the national economy in the South slowly changed the economic realities and 
societal position of many ethnic Chinese in Southern Vietnam. The branding of the non-
comprador bourgeoisie class, to which most of the ethnic Chinese working individuals 
belonged, as unproductive and the subsequent decisions to try to force members of this class to 
work in production created a lot of discontent and opposition among the ethnic Chinese.633 
Whether or not the departure program was started as a response to relieve internal pressures 
brought on by the opposition to the changes in the Southern Vietnam’s economic system and 
confiscation of property, as has been suggested by previously Nguyễn Long is debatable.634 The 
departure program certainly became an avenue through which those individuals who no longer 
saw any future in living in the post-war Vietnam could leave. But it was also channel through 
which a minority, that that was according to many signs perceived to be a potential fifth column 
by the Vietnamese authorities, could be removed. Furthermore, before the departure program 
was started, the opposition to the economic reforms by the ethnic Chinese had been quite strong, 
and according to Long, the authorities’ had themselves approached the ethnic Chinese 
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community leaders, so from this perspective it would be reasonable to suggest that it was at least 
partly commenced to alleviate the internal pressure and opposition.  
The expulsions themselves served a purpose by removing members of this perceived fifth 
column. In the case of the Southern Vietnam, the risks that the ethnic Chinese were perceived to 
cause were more likely related to the economic power and societal power that the ethnic Chinese 
as an influential community had to oppose societal changes that the communists were trying to 
enact, rather than to security issues that were more prevalent in the North. Naturally, the events 
in the North and the disputes with the PRC over the ethnic Chinese affected the social position 
of the ethnic Chinese in Southern Vietnam also throughout the expulsion campaign. The politics 
of the expulsion were in this manner connected also to the general political situation within the 
country. Yet, at the same time, there were regional differences in how the expulsions were 
implemented and from which reasons they seemed to have stemmed from, which demonstrates 
how during this time the history of political and societal separation and differences still lingered 
between the areas of the two former Vietnams.  
The organized confiscation of property and wealth by the Vietnamese government and 
authorities in Southern Vietnam seemed to be one of these differences. Interestingly, during my 
research I was not able to find any evidence or corroborating accounts that the departure 
program that is discussed in this study would have been operational in Northern Vietnam, but 
almost all studies done on the topic that have discussed the refugee trafficking and departure 
program before have presented it as a thing that happened throughout Vietnam.635 In this 
manner, many of the previous studies that have discussed the logistics and details of the refugee 
trafficking have misrepresented this key aspect of the expulsion campaign. Furthermore, in 
general, the economic motives that were driving the expansion of the expulsion program has 
also not been discussed enough in previous literature. The confiscation of personal property and 
the large payments were an integral part of the government run departure program in Southern 
Vietnam but not it seems in the North, perhaps due to the differences in the wealth and 
occupations between the ethnic Chinese communities in the region. In many ways, the practice 
was akin to profitable extortion, as the refugees had to pay to the Vietnamese government 
covertly for something that would have been illegal otherwise. In addition to this, the 
Vietnamese authorities were stopping departures through other methods.  
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It is evident that the involvement of the Vietnamese government in a large portion of the 
departures through the departure program during the years 1978 and 1979 needs to be better 
acknowledged and discussed in future studies discussing the ethnic Chinese exodus and the boat 
people crisis. The departures of the refugees also need to be placed in the context they were 
happening in, as the societal events and political developments pushed many to seek ways of 
leaving Vietnam, and ultimately to depart. At the same time, it also needs to be acknowledged 
that the politics of the expulsion and the expulsion campaign were in many ways connected to 
the broader goals that the CPV had for building the state and society and to the conflict it was 
having with China. Interestingly, as the ethnic Chinese were not outright forcibly expelled, but 
rather left in a sense voluntarily through government program (especially in Southern Vietnam) 
and arrived quite often safely to the nearby countries, in some accounts, such as Vo (2006) they 
have been even been painted as having been the lucky ones.636 This type of conclusion naturally 
largely disregards the realities and the larger societal context surrounding the departures and 
presents an dishonest picture of the situation, but it also demonstrates, how hard it has ultimately 
been to interpret and discuss the subtle differences between voluntary and coerced actions when 
it has come to the boat people departures and ethnic Chinese exodus and how difficult it has 
been to tell the story of the CPV and the boat people.  
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